# Post 9/11 US- Algerian Counterterrorism Strategies: Cooperation and Challenges.

**A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the LMD Master Degree in Literature and civilization**

**Submitted by:**                                                    **Supervised by:**

Ms. HADDAD WISSAL                                          Ms. ZERIGUI NAIMA

**Board of Examiners:**

**Chairman: Ms. DJAALAL Meriem**                          **University of Biskra**

**Supervisor: Ms. ZREGUI Naima**                             **University of Biskra**

**Examiner: Ms. HERZALLAH Selma**                          **University of Biskra**

**2024/2025**

## Dedication

First and foremost, I thank Allah for giving me the strength and patience to accomplish this work despite all difficulties.

I would like to dedicate this work to my beloved parents, whose unwavering love has been my compass, whose sacrifices built the road I now walk.

To my family, each of was you a pillar holding me steady through every storm.

To those who believed in me, encouraged me, and cleared the path when it felt too steep your kindness echoes in every page of this work.

And to my dearest friend, whose courage became mine when I had none left. Your belief in me lit the fire I needed to keep going.

This is not just my achievement, it is ours.

# Abstract

This research examines the U.S. foreign policy regarding Algeria's counterterrorism strategies in the post-9/11 era. This study contends that the United States, in search of reliable partners in North Africa, increased its involvement in security and intelligence matters with Algeria, taking into consideration its experience in counter-terrorism. Using qualitative methods such as policy analysis and case studies, the research examines the mechanisms and effects of the U.S-Algerian cooperation, including intelligence sharing, bilateral military operations, and regional efforts such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Despite these achievements, while the partnership has managed to degrade regional terrorist networks and contribute to regional stability, it remains challenged by diverging interests, lack of transparency, and ongoing human rights concerns. Moreover, the sustainability of the U.S-Algerian partnership will depend on achieving a delicate balance between security requirements and genuine investments in governance and development. Policy recommendations for future alliance are proposed in this research. This study enhances our understanding of the complexities of counterterrorism alliances as a U.S. national interest and provides a reference for greater U.S. engagement in the Sahel region.

# List of Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| **9/11** | September 11, 2001 (Terrorist Attacks) |
| **U.S.** | United States |
| **AQIM** | Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| **ISIS** | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria |
| **ISIL** | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| **FIS** | Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut) |
| **FLN** | National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale) |
| **GIA** | Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé) |
| **ANP** | National Popular Army (Armée Nationale Populaire) |
| **DHS** | Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) |
| **FBI** | Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.) |
| **NSA** | National Security Agency (U.S.) |
| **CIA** | Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) |
| **FISA** | Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act |
| **NCTC** | National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.) |
| **TIDE** | Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment |

| | |
|---|---|
| **NATO** | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| **AWACS** | Airborne Warning and Control System |
| **TSA** | Transportation Security Administration (U.S.) |
| **FEMA** | Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.) |
| **AUMF** | Authorization for Use of Military Force |
| **IRTPA** | Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act |
| **DNI** | Director of National Intelligence (U.S.) |
| **COIN** | Counterinsurgency |
| **GWOT** | Global War on Terror |
| **MENA** | Middle East and North Africa |
| **PMSCs** | Private Military and Security Companies |
| **MNCs** | Multinational Corporations |
| **TSCTP** | Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership |
| **AFRICOM** | U.S. Africa Command |
| **CEMOC** | Joint Operational General Staff Committee (Comité d'Étatajor Opérationnel Conjoint) |
| **CAERT** | African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism |

| | |
|---|---|
| **ACSRT** | African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism |
| **AFRIPOL** | African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation |
| **IMET** | International Military Education and Training (Program) |
| **GIS** | Special Intervention Group (Groupe d'Intervention Spéciale) |
| **AU** | African Union |
| **DVE** | Domestic Violent Extremism |
| **JNIM** | Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin |
| **MUJAO** | Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest) |
| **UNODC** | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| **NGO** | Non-Governmental Organization |
| **CSD** | Crisis Simulation Document (contextual, may refer to a specific report) |

# Table of contents

# General Introduction

## 1. Background

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a turning point in both the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, representing an unprecedented shift in the history of U.S. counterterrorism. In the ensuing decades, the United States began a wholesale transformation of its global security posture, with significant consequences for U.S. involvement in North Africa. Algeria, due to its strategic location and extensive experience in addressing violent extremism, has become a central partner in American efforts to combat what is now referred to as transnational terrorism in the region. This dissertation discusses the convergence of post-9/11 American foreign policy shifts toward Algeria with the development, implementation, and impact of bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism.

This study investigates the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy, from one characterized by economic and diplomatic engagement to a security-oriented relationship focused on the exchange of intelligence, collaborative military operations, and cooperative regional initiatives. This change reflects broader transformations in the international security environment that have made effective partnerships more strategically important, such as the proliferation of extremist networks and the instability of the Sahel. The research examines the motivations for U.S. engagement with Algeria, the formalization of cooperation, and how both nations have addressed issues of national interest, sovereignty, and trust.

## 2. Statement of the Problem

This work examines the achievements and shortcomings of counterterrorism

cooperation as a foundation of the U.S.-Algerian bilateral relationship. Despite the notable benefits of operational effectiveness and regional stability that the partnership has produced, it has also encountered significant challenges. The depth and solidity of cooperation have at times been limited by differing priorities, issues of transparency and human rights, and the broader interests of regional geopolitical developments. This research assesses these challenges and their implications for the sustainability of the partnership, as well as for broader U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Africa.

## 3. Research Questions

How have U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism strategies evolved since 9/11, and what are the key factors influencing the successes and challenges of their bilateral cooperation?

How has U.S. counterterrorism policy evolved since 9/11?

What role has Algeria played in U.S. counterterrorism efforts?

What are the successes and limitations of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation?

## 4. Research Objectives

The primary aims of this research are to discuss the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy toward Algeria, assess the effectiveness and challenges of bilateral cooperation, and provide suggestions for enhancing future collaboration. Objectives include exploring intelligence sharing, military cooperation, and regional programs, as well as evaluating the impact on governance and human rights.

## 5. Research Methodology

This research employs a qualitative methodology, drawing from historical analysis, policy analysis, and case study approaches. The study analyzes primary sources (government documents, official statements, and bilateral agreements) alongside secondary sources (academic literature, policy papers, and expert commentary). This analytical framework allows for a comprehensive understanding of policy development, the practice of cooperation, and the broader context of U.S.-Algeria relations.

## 6. Significance of the Study

International counterterrorism partnerships represent a significant paradigm for research. The contribution and timeliness of this study lie in its detailed examination of the U.S.-Algerian relationship, which can shed light on the factors that enable or hinder effective security cooperation. Lessons drawn from this analysis can inform future policy development and enhance U.S. engagement in Africa. The results aim to contribute to academic debate as well as inform practical policymaking, emphasizing the need for an approach that balances security, sovereignty, human rights, and regional stability.

## 7. Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is composed of three chapters. The first chapter provides a comprehensive history and policy background, illustrating the development of U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the context that has positioned Algeria as a primary partner. Chapter two examines the institutional and operational dimensions of bilateral cooperation,

including the structures, processes, and outcomes of joint initiatives. Chapter three assesses the partnership by identifying successes and ongoing challenges, and provides recommendations for enhancing future cooperation.

The structure of the work that follows will provide a critical, evidence-based evaluation of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation that contributes to a broader understanding of the challenges and opportunities that international security partnerships face in the twenty-first century.

**Chapter One**

**The U.S. Counterterrorism Policies and its Quest to Combat Terror in the Aftermath of the 9\11 Events**

## 1. Introduction

The events of September 11, 2001, shattered the sense of security in the United States, as the shadowy al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, transformed commercial airliners into weapons that killed thousands on America's home front. The group's anger was fueled by U.S. policies, including military bases in Saudi Arabia, support for Israel, and backing of dictatorial regimes. Al-Qaeda had already targeted U.S. interests overseas by bombing embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and attacking a Navy ship in Yemen. However, what the United States did not anticipate was an attack on its own homeland, a failure that exposed significant gaps in its defense and launched the world into a new era of global war on terror. The conflict that emerged from the aftermath of 9/11, intensified by a decade of continuous warfare, has evolved into an uncontrollable and ongoing challenge, as terrorism continues to adapt year after year.

This chapter examines the immediate and long-term consequences of 9/11, focusing on the origins, motivations, and outcomes of the attacks, as well as the comprehensive U.S. response that followed. It situates the 9/11 events within the broader context of al-Qaeda's ideological war against the United States, exploring the strategic, political, and religious factors that influenced the group's actions. The chapter also analyzes the rapid policy shifts that followed, including the passage of the Authorization

for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, and the creation of new security institutions such as the Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center.

Additionally, this chapter reviews the international dimensions of the post-9/11 era, highlighting NATO's unprecedented invocation of Article 5 and the emergence of global coalitions against terrorism. It explores the evolution of counterterrorism policy in the years that followed, from expanded intelligence and surveillance networks to the adoption of drone warfare, counterinsurgency reforms, and the controversial use of extraordinary rendition and private military contractors. The chapter concludes by assessing the shifting threat landscape, including the rise of ISIS, the proliferation of lone-wolf attacks, and the gradual decline of counterterrorism as a top U.S. priority, before turning to Algeria's pivotal role in regional security efforts against AQIM.

By providing a comprehensive overview of the immediate aftermath and enduring legacy of 9/11, this chapter lays the foundation for understanding the complexities of contemporary counterterrorism strategies and sets the stage for the subsequent analysis of U.S.-Algerian cooperation.

## 2. The Attacks of 9/11

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda carried out a series of meticulously coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States, marking a turning point in the history of international terrorism and fundamentally transforming global security dynamics. Known within al-Qaeda as the "Planes Operation," these attacks shocked the world. The

perpetrators hijacked four commercial airliners: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. The hijackers used these planes as weapons, targeting key symbols of American economic, military, and political power. Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 AM, followed by Flight 175, which hit the South Tower at 9:03 AM. Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, the center of U.S. military operations, at 9:37 AM. The fourth plane, Flight 93, crashed into a field in Pennsylvania at approximately 10:03 AM after passengers attempted to retake control, likely preventing an attack on the U.S. Capitol or the White House (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 1–14).

The effectiveness of the attacks lay in their simplicity and the secrecy of their planning. Nineteen hijackers, most of whom were from Saudi Arabia, exploited weaknesses in airport security, using box cutters and small knives to overpower the crews. Trained in Afghanistan under the guidance of al-Qaeda's operational planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the hijackers entered the United States, enrolled in flight schools, and conducted surveillance on their targets with great secrecy. The World Trade Center was chosen for its economic significance, the Pentagon for its military importance, and the intended target of Flight 93, likely the Capitol or White House, was selected for its political symbolism. In total, 2,977 people were killed and more than 25,000 injured, with economic damages exceeding $100 billion. The destruction of the Twin Towers became a symbol of the profound loss experienced by the nation that day (Wright 245–260).

## 3. The Causes of the 9/11 Events: Al-Qaeda's War on America

The 9/11 attacks were the result of al-Qaeda's deep-seated religious and political animosity toward the United States, which the group viewed as oppressing Muslim nations. Understanding the complex motivations behind al-Qaeda's actions requires examining the group's ideological background. Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda's leader, cited several justifications for their hostility toward America, foremost among them the establishment of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia following the Gulf War. To al-Qaeda, this presence was an offense to the land of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which only intensified their opposition. The group was also angered by U.S. assistance to Israel during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was seen as harming Muslim interests and as evidence of Western prejudice against Arab ambitions. Al-Qaeda also criticized U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which they argued suppressed Islamic governance and civil rights. Lastly, the organization charged that the U.S. was responsible for the economic and political domination of Muslim countries, resulting in poverty and instability (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 47–70).

Al-Qaeda's motivations for targeting the United States were reinforced by earlier attacks, such as the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, resulting in 17 deaths. The attacks of September 11, however, were far more ambitious, aimed not only at causing mass casualties but also at inflicting psychological and economic damage at the heart of the United States. The group's ultimate objective was to launch a global jihad

and establish an Islamic state governed by a strict interpretation of Sharia law, in direct opposition to Western values. Al-Qaeda's goals included driving the U.S. out of the Middle East, reducing its global influence, and instigating an Islamic uprising against Western dominance. Despite prior warnings about the threat posed by al-Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks exposed significant deficiencies in U.S. intelligence coordination and preparedness, resulting in changes that permanently altered both national and global security practices (Bergen 80–100).

## 4. The Immediate U.S. Response to the 9/11 Attacks

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States faced an urgent need to respond to a new and complex threat. The government's actions reflected not only a desire for justice but also a recognition that existing security frameworks were inadequate for the scale and nature of the terrorism it confronted. As a result, policymakers quickly implemented a series of measures intended to both punish those responsible and prevent future attacks, fundamentally reshaping domestic and international security policies.

### 4.1 Military Response and the Authorization for Use of Military Force

The United States responded to the September 11 attacks with unprecedented speed and a multilateral approach, driven by national outrage, grief, and a determination to prevent future terrorist acts. This response included a series of sweeping legislative, military, and security actions. One of the earliest and most significant steps was the Congressional approval of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) on

September 18, 2001. Passed with broad bipartisan support, the resolution granted the president extensive authority to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those determined to have planned, assisted, or carried out the attacks. This included not only states, but also individuals and organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as suspected supporting states. The AUMF gave the executive branch broad and flexible powers to prosecute war without additional congressional approval, representing a dramatic expansion of presidential waraking authority (United States, Public Law 107–40).

Although the AUMF was initially directed at al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, its broad language, with no geographic or temporal limitations, has allowed successive presidents, from George W. Bush through Joe Biden, to invoke it to justify military action against other entities such as ISIS and al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as in countries such as Yemen and Syria, well beyond its original scope (Savell 3).

The primary advantage of the AUMF is its flexibility to address evolving threats, enabling a prompt response to terrorism. However, this same flexibility has generated persistent controversy about the potential for unchecked executive power. Critics argue that the AUMF has undermined the 1973 War Powers Resolution, enacted after the Vietnam War to ensure congressional oversight of military actions. The War Powers Resolution requires the president to report to Congress within 48 hours of deploying armed forces and limits such deployments to 60 days without congressional authorization. In practice, however, the broad authorization of the AUMF has largely overridden these safeguards, as administrations from Obama to Trump have provided

minimal transparency regarding drone strikes and troop deployments (Grimmett 7).

This lack of transparency and accountability has generated ongoing debate over executive authority in U.S. counterterrorism policy. The AUMF has been used to justify military operations in more than twenty countries, including Yemen, Pakistan, and Mali, prompting lawsuits and continued calls for its repeal. The ongoing controversy surrounding the AUMF reflects broader concerns over the balance of power, democratic accountability, and the legacy of security policy in the post-9/11 era (Weed 12).

## 4.2 Domestic Security Reforms: The U.S. Patriot Act

In response to the widespread panic and concern that pervaded the United States immediately following the September 11 attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted to enhance national security efforts. Signed into law by President George W. Bush, the Act empowered agencies such as the FBI and NSA to combat terrorism more effectively, addressing prior intelligence failures that had allowed the attacks to occur. Key provisions of the Act expanded the scope of surveillance, including broader wiretapping powers, the authority to intercept internet communications, and the use of "sneak and peek" warrants, which permit law enforcement to conduct searches without immediate notification to the target. Additionally, the Act expanded the powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) courts, granting them greater authority to approve access to personal records, such as library, store, and financial documents, often with minimal judicial oversight (United States, Public Law 107-56).

A central focus of the Act was to improve intelligence sharing between agencies

such as the FBI and CIA, which had previously operated in isolation, hindering effective counterterrorism efforts. The establishment of joint task forces and new protocols for information sharing were intended to address these vulnerabilities. The expanded surveillance tools provided by the Act played a significant role in several high-profile cases, including the 2002 conviction of the Lackawanna Six, a group of Yemeni-American men from Buffalo accused of having ties to al-Qaeda. This case is frequently cited as an example of the Act's application in counterterrorism investigations (American Civil Liberties Union).

## 4.3 Institutional Reforms: Department of Homeland Security and National Counterterrorism Center

The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was among the most substantial institutional reforms in the U.S. government following the 9/11 attacks. Created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS merged 22 previously unrelated agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard, into a single cabinet-level department. Its central purpose was to better integrate and share information among the previously fragmented agencies responsible for border security, transportation security, intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency response, ensuring that America's post-9/11 counterterrorism community would not fall victim to the same fragmentation that had characterized efforts before 9/11. DHS responded by rapidly institutionalizing new security protocols, permanently embedding them into the U.S. homeland security apparatus (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 3-5), such as federalizing airport

screening and implementing the no-fly list.

In addition to DHS, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004, in accordance with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The NCTC was established to collect and analyze all counterterrorism and terrorism intelligence, both domestically and abroad, dating from the time of its creation. It brought together CIA and FBI analysts, as well as CIA and Defense Department operators, to develop a common operating picture of terrorist threats. The NCTC is responsible for maintaining the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and for creating strategic operational planning, coordination, and situational awareness for policymakers. Its creation was a response to the need for centralized intelligence synthesis, with the goal of preventing the information silos that allowed the 9/11 conspiracy to go undetected (Best 1–2).

The NCTC and DHS have achieved success in optimizing information sharing and enhancing national preparedness, but they have also encountered setbacks since their establishment. DHS has suffered from administrative complexity, which has sometimes resulted in mission creep and redundancy, occasionally leading to inefficiency and slow response, as seen during Hurricane Katrina. Despite its controversial role in the surveillance of U.S. citizens and mass data analytics, the NCTC has been effective as an intelligence integrator. Nonetheless, these institutional changes have fundamentally altered the American counterterrorism environment by promoting enhanced interagency coordination and creating processes for immediate threat assessment and response (Hsu; Rollins and Reese).

## 4.4 International response: NATO's Invocation of Article 5

Al-Qaeda's attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, prompted one of the largest responses in NATO's history. On September 12, 2001, NATO collectively invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time, demonstrating clear solidarity among NATO allies. Article 5 states that an attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against all, committing each ally to collective defense. By 1999, NATO had already identified terrorism as a significant threat to security. The North Atlantic Council, after reviewing the foreign nature of the attacks, declared them to be an attack upon all its members and activated collective defense commitments.

The Council reiterated on October 2, 2001, after examining the evidence, that the case fell within the terms of Article 5 and that collective assistance for the United States was warranted. In support of U.S. operations, NATO took several steps, including increasing intelligence sharing, arranging overflight permissions, and providing access to airfields and ports. From October 2001 to May 2002, NATO launched Operation Eagle Assist, deploying 830 crew members from 13 countries aboard seven AWACS aircraft to patrol U.S. airspace on more than 360 sorties. In late October 2001, NATO naval forces were dispatched to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean as part of Operation Active Endeavour, which was expanded in 2004 to cover the entire region to help prevent terrorist activity. These were the first NATO missions beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and its first experiences in countering non-state actors such as al-Qaeda, setting a precedent for global counterterrorism efforts (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

## 5. Key Features of Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Policy

In the years following September 11, 2001, a new set of policies and methods began to reshape how threats were addressed, illustrating both the necessity and complexity of the new security environment. The main components of post-9/11 counterterrorism policy are outlined below.

## 5.1 Expanded Intelligence and Surveillance Networks

The expansion of intelligence and surveillance networks, enabled through both institutional reform and legislative change in counterterrorism policy after 9/11, was significant. Fusion centers were established to facilitate the sharing of intelligence among federal, state, and local agencies. This development is considered one of the 25 key advancements in post-9/11 security. These centers adopted an all-crimes, all-hazards approach, integrating counterterrorism with broader public safety activities, including organized crime and disaster response. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that until 2010, eighty percent of fusion centers were managed by state agencies, allowing for coordinated threat assessment and resource sharing. Inter-agency coordinating centers were co-located near emergency operations centers and, where possible, integrated with them, replacing previous arrangements such as Terrorism Early Warning Groups. These changes have been shown to enhance cooperation between counterterrorism planning and crisis management capabilities (Davis et al. xix).

With the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, surveillance authorities were dramatically expanded, allowing access to financial, medical, and electronic records without a warrant

through National Security Letters. Under Section 215, the collection of data from third-party service providers, such as internet service providers, was permitted, and "sneak and peek" warrants allowed for delayed search notification. These provisions reduced the evidentiary burden for surveillance, enabling federal agencies to monitor suspected noncitizens involved in terrorism without necessarily demonstrating a direct connection to foreign powers. The Act also eliminated barriers between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, permitting the FBI to share information obtained from grand juries with the CIA, which had previously been prohibited (Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario 3-4).

Legislative measures such as the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) further developed counterterrorism infrastructure by establishing both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). These entities advocated for the "lone wolf" provision, which allows for the monitoring of individuals with no known association to terrorist organizations based on updated FISA standards. Utilizing a hub-and-spoke model similar to military intelligence practices, the IRTPA institutionalized inter-agency cooperation as embodied by the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, creatively combining domestic law enforcement techniques with military strategies. As a result, the traditional separation between foreign and domestic intelligence was eliminated, promoting preventive intelligence collection over reactive criminal investigation (Stern and Berger 16).

## 5.2 Drone Warfare and Targeted Killing

By their very nature, the unique capabilities of drones to synthesize surveillance and lethal force made drone warfare and targeted killing central features of post-9/11 counterterrorism. Although unmanned and remotely controlled, aircraft such as the MQ-9 Reaper are capable of conducting persistent reconnaissance while remaining on standby for strikes, allowing threats to be evaluated and addressed in real time. This ability to disrupt communication links and eliminate high-value targets without placing ground troops at risk has destabilized terrorist networks. Drones and their command structures played significant roles in both the killing of al-Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki and the preparation for the operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. Their extended loiter time over battle spaces enables pattern-of-life analysis, resulting in more accurate strikes compared to conventional airstrikes. However, critics argue that this level of effectiveness has led to overreliance on drones, a limitation that became apparent when drone operations failed to achieve their intended results in situations requiring physical intervention, which drone strikes alone could not provide (Farrow 3-5).

Long-term strategic concerns persist, as drones have notable psychological and political effects. According to a study by CNA Corporation, while strikes can disrupt terrorist networks, civilian casualties and the perceived violation of national sovereignty can contribute to the radicalization of local populations. In Pakistan, for example, drone strikes have long been viewed as violations of sovereignty, leading many citizens to perceive them as breaches of cultural norms and as collective punishment rather than targeted warfare. A 2012 survey of Pakistan's tribal areas found that 74% of citizens viewed

drone attacks in this negative light. The implications of such a legitimacy crisis are significant for counterinsurgency, as public perception can undermine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Contemporary military thinkers advocate for a balanced approach to avoid backlash and to ensure that excessive use of drones does not undermine the broader goals of counterterrorism (Lewis and Vavrichek 12-15).

## 5.3 Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategy Reforms

The reforms to post-9/11 counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy represented a significant shift in U.S. security policy, emphasizing structural and operational changes in response to evolving terrorist threats. Confronted with adversaries such as al-Qaeda, whose cells operated across multiple countries, as well as ideologically driven insurgent groups, the U.S. government recognized that conventional military tactics were inadequate. As a result, COIN reforms embraced a dual strategy: defending the homeland while simultaneously pursuing threats abroad at their source. This approach included dismantling terrorist networks, conducting direct military action, implementing counter-radicalization efforts, and building international partnerships to address increasingly decentralized global threats ("How Effective Are the Post-9/11 U.S. Counterterrorism Policies?").

A major institutional reform involved the creation of new interagency structures to streamline intelligence dissemination and crisis management. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 consolidated 22 agencies, while the Justice Department established the National Security Division, integrating intelligence

and law enforcement capabilities to improve counterterrorism efficiency. These changes transformed the FBI from a law-enforcement-centric agency into an intelligence-driven organization focused on preempting terrorist plots. This alignment fostered a coordinated, preemptive COIN approach that bridged intelligence, law enforcement, and military operations ("Ten Years Later: 9/11 and the Justice Department" 9.10).

These reforms contributed to a significant decline in terrorist attacks and fatalities both domestically and internationally after 9/11. Interrupted time-series analyses indicate that annual attack counts and victim numbers dropped significantly after the implementation of post-9/11 policies, with no meaningful recovery over time. While the threat has evolved, from hierarchical networks to online radicalization, the post-9/11 institutional reforms have positioned the United States more effectively for contemporary counterinsurgency. The redefined interagency collaboration provides a flexible foundation for addressing the changing nature of modern terrorism ("Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations" 3).

## 5.4 Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Detention Programs

The era of late 2001 also saw the emergence of two hallmarks of US counterterror policy: extraordinary rendition and secret detention. Extraordinary rendition, as defined by Amnesty International, is the illegal transfer of terrorist suspects to another country that interrogates and detains individuals without recourse to legal procedures and safeguards. The CIA was granted blanket authorization to conduct these operations, which involved the kidnapping of suspects and their transfer to countries known to

practice extreme interrogation techniques, including torture. At the same time, the CIA established a network of secret prisons, also known as black sites, outside the United States to detain prisoners incommunicado and use so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, which violate American and international law. These were covert operations, meant to be beyond the reach of the courts, to extract information from high-level targets (Open Society Justice Initiative 6–8).

This use of extraordinary rendition and secret detention drew international criticism when it was found that international human rights law had been violated. Rights groups and lawyers have long argued that such acts amount to violations of international laws prohibiting arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Because prisoners subjected to rendition and secret detention were held with no right to a fair trial, no access to a lawyer, and no possibility of any judicial remedy—often for years without being charged and without their location being disclosed—it is not surprising that they were tortured. Secret detention came under Category I of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which states that there is no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty. While authorities in the U.S. attempted to depict these actions as national security efforts, the international community sees these as illegal and potentially war crimes (The Rendition Project).

The effects of these programs are highly disputed. While some American officials contended that extraordinary rendition was an important weapon in the war on terror, it has been shown that the intelligence gained through torture was not trustworthy and that the

programs harmed America's standing in the world. While secrecy has made it impossible to know precisely how widespread, or whether it has ended, the practice of torture, in 2009 the Obama administration officially ended the use of black sites and ended torture. The ongoing debate on extraordinary rendition and secret detention is symbolic of the struggle between national security interests on the one hand and the ideals of the rule of law and human rights on the other ("Extraordinary Rendition").

## 5.5  Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCS)

In the wake of 9/11, the use of private military and security contractors (PMSCs) has been increasingly visible within international counterterrorist operations. As governments were confronted with new and complex security challenges, the experience of PMSCs offered solutions for a wide range of operations, from logistical and intelligence support to the provision of services essential to securing organization and personnel and, at times, "plugging the gaps" in capabilities offered by the state. Fighting terrorism was outsourced in order to give states political expediency, reasonable deniability, and immediate operational flexibility to address a terrorism threat without being restrained and scrutinized in the court of public opinion, as they would be with the use of regular armed forces. In the wake of 9/11, and in particular in the GWOT, the US, UK, Israel and other states turned with greater frequency to PMSCs to augment their counterterror operations, many of which operated in legal and regulatory grey areas that permitted out of the box approaches away from public view (Mrozik 15).

PMSCs have expanded far beyond traditional security services, but have been

operational in various roles. Modern PMSCs replace state military capability, providing logistics and intelligence, and even, to a limited degree, combat operations. The technological sophistication, mobility, and rapid deployability of groups have made them attractive to both developed and developing nations. In the context of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), one of the most terror-stricken regions, PMSCs have been employed primarily for the protection of critical infrastructure and intelligence collection so that national militaries can focus on counterterrorism only. They have further evolved into supporting MNCs and international organizations to protect people and property in challenging environments. However, this has also led to new problems, including ambiguous chains of command, potential coercive overlap, and the risk of PMSCs eventually operating beyond benevolent state control (AlShehhi 13–15).

PMSCs are becoming increasingly prominent actors yet remain irregularly and fragmentarily regulated nationally and internationally. International law governing PMSCs does not clearly define the full scope of their operations, as it pertains more to mercenary activity and not the diverse services which PMSCs perform. This absence of regulation creates a legal black hole, making it almost impossible to bring anyone to justice for human rights abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law. While soft laws like the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers offer some guidance, punishment is rare, and PMSCs mostly operate in a "grey area" where responsibility is diffused. Because of this, states that employ PMSCs are, in principle, bound by these conventions as well; however, the enforcement mechanisms, especially in conflict zones, remain challenging (El Mquirmi, 4–6).

## 6. Evolving Threats and Policy Adjustments Post-9/11

The landscape of global terrorism has shifted dramatically in the years following the September 11 attacks. As the United States and its partners adapted to new threats, their counterterrorism strategies evolved in response to the changing tactics and ambitions of terrorist organizations.

## 6.1 Shift from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

The rise of ISIS marked a significant departure from the model established by al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda organized the 9/11 attacks with the aim of provoking the West into conflict and inspiring a global jihadist movement, ISIS emerged from the chaos of post-invasion Iraq and the Syrian civil war with a focus on territorial conquest and state-building. In 2014, ISIS declared a caliphate, leveraging brutal violence and sophisticated propaganda to draw thousands of foreign fighters from around the world. Unlike al-Qaeda's decentralized network, ISIS sought to control and governs territory, fundamentally changing the nature of the terrorist threat (Byman).

The emergence of ISIS forced the United States and its partners to rethink their counterterrorism approaches. Al-Qaeda had been targeted with strikes and intelligence operations, but the territorial gains made by ISIS in Iraq and Syria required a much broader military response. The U.S.-led coalition launched extensive airstrikes, supported local partner forces, and implemented stabilization efforts to reclaim and secure liberated areas. These efforts, strengthened under both the Obama and Trump administrations, led to the recapture of key cities such as Mosul and Raqqa by 2017, but

also presented new challenges, including the risk of ISIS reverting to insurgency and the ongoing need for post-conflict stabilization (Humud et al. 5–7).

Despite losing its territorial holdings, ISIS adapted by shifting to an underground rebellion, while al-Qaeda took advantage of the international focus on ISIS to rebuild its networks and embed itself in local conflicts. In response, American policy has evolved to address the persistent and adaptive threats posed by both groups, emphasizing continued military engagement, support for partner governments, and efforts to address underlying sources of instability (Operation Inherent Resolve 14).

## 6.2 Lone-Wolf Attacks and Domestic Extremism

The post-9/11 threat landscape in the United States, although shaped by both policy and methodology, is marked by the evolving nature of adversaries who have adapted their tactics, motivations, and targets. Lone-wolf plots and domestic extremism have become increasingly problematic. Since 9/11, lone-wolf terrorism has not become more deadly, but attack patterns have shifted. Targeting of uniformed soldiers and police by single-issue terrorists is on the rise, and their weapon of choice is increasingly the high-velocity rifle, reflecting broader patterns of mass shootings and access to firearms. Lone wolves, in contrast to group-based terrorists, are often older, less educated, more alienated, and tend to be unemployed, white, unmarried males with criminal records. It is also worth noting that there is no single profile for lone-wolf terrorists, as these acts are driven by multiple motives and causes. The types of weapons and modes of terror have also multiplied post-9/11, ranging from fire and explosives to gunfire, blades, automobiles,

and even sabotage of civil organizations (Hewitt 4–6).

Domestic violent extremism (DVE) has likewise become more decentralized and ideologically diverse, including racially and ethnically motivated violence, anti-government extremism, and other forms of identity-based radicalization. From October 2010 to July 2021, government agencies reported 231 domestic terrorism incidents in the United States, resulting in 145 deaths and 370 injuries, indicating an increased burden of domestic terrorism in recent years. Today, the threat environment largely consists of lone actors or small cells operating outside formal structures, taking inspiration from extremist propaganda or acting in retribution for perceived wrongs. The FBI assesses that the United States faces an evolving and multi-faceted environment of domestic extremism, with racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists responsible for some of the most fatal recent attacks, despite high-profile events such as the January 6, 2021, storming of the Capitol (Bąkowski 1–3).

U.S. policy has evolved to expand legal authorities and capabilities to address lone-wolf and domestic extremism threats in response to these dynamic challenges. Information sharing, prevention, and action against domestic extremists have become government priorities, with FBI investigations into domestic terrorism now more than double those into international terrorism since 2020. The National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, introduced by the Biden administration, illustrates a whole-of-government approach that seeks to balance civil liberties and security. This strategy acknowledges that today's threat environment is driven not by unified transnational ideologies, but by radically decentralized actors with rapidly evolving motives and tactics (White House).

## 7. Decline of Counterterrorism as a Top Priority

In the years since ISIS's territorial defeat and the major reduction of military deployments across the Middle East, the relative decline of counterterrorism as a top U.S. national security agenda item has become more pronounced. Immediately following 9/11, the security agenda in the United States was dominated by counterterrorism, leading to a massive infusion of resources into intelligence, military, and homeland security. However, as the threat of mass terrorism in the United States has diminished for now, U.S. decisionakers have steadily shifted their focus toward competition with great powers such as China and Russia, both of which are leading players in emerging policy fields like cybersecurity, global health, and climate change. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes this shift, stating, "The reemergence of long-term, great power competition, not terrorism, is the primary concern in U.S. national security" (U.S. Department of Defense 1).

This evolution has led to both a rationalization of resources and a recalibration of what constitutes risk. Counterterrorism is increasingly treated as a secondary issue— serious in its own right, but not the primary strategic priority. For example, the American exit from Afghanistan in 2021 illustrates this transformation, as decisionakers now favor agile, intelligence-driven approaches over extensive, resource-intensive military engagements. Additionally, widespread public fatigue with protracted conflicts and skepticism regarding the effectiveness of military-centric counterterrorism have further diminished support for large-scale overseas interventions. As a result, contemporary U.S. counterterrorism strategy emphasizes targeted operations, intelligence collaboration, and

partnerships with local actors, aiming primarily to contain rather than eradicate terrorist threats (Levitt 5–7).

While counterterrorism has declined as a central foreign policy priority, it remains an important aspect of U.S. security policy. There is an ongoing need to adapt and respond to evolving terrorist threats, including increasingly decentralized networks, lone-wolf attacks, and domestically motivated actors. However, the primacy of counterterrorism as a determinant of U.S. foreign and domestic policy has diminished, reflecting a broader rebalancing of national security interests in a more complex and multipolar world. During the late 2010s, the United States shifted its security attention away from counterterrorism and toward strategic competition with China and Russia, as indicated by the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the increase in naval exercises and security agreements (RSIS 2–3; U.S. Department of Defense).

## 8. Sahel Sentinel: Algeria's United Front against AQIM

Three decades later, interest has been rekindled due to heightened concerns over regional stability following the 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. reinvestment in security alignments with Algeria as a primary counterterrorism partner in North Africa. U.S. relations with Algeria and the wider Maghreb had been minimal before 9/11, shaped largely by Cold War imperatives and perceptions of the region as part of Europe's sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Algeria's unique experience combating terrorist Islamist insurgencies—known as the "Black Decade" throughout the 1990s and continuing to the present—provided critical counterterrorism expertise after the September 11, 2001 attacks. With Washington valuing Algerian insights and its strategic location bridging the

Mediterranean and Sahel, two areas vulnerable to transnational terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Understanding United States Ties to the Maghreb 36–39), Algeria was among the first nations to condemn the 9/11 attacks.

This shared interest strengthened security and intelligence cooperation. The United States enhanced its partnership with Algeria through intelligence sharing, joint training exercises, and equipping Algerian security forces to counter transnational threats. For both nations, regional coordination proved essential against AQIM, a group that evolved from Algeria's domestic insurgents before expanding across the Sahara-Sahel zone. The relationship was solidified by events like the 2013 Tiguentourine gas plant hostage crisis, where Algeria's decisive response demonstrated operational capability and reinforced U.S. confidence in the partnership. What began as tactical collaboration has matured into a comprehensive dialogue addressing regional security, energy stability, and prevention of foreign interference, establishing Algeria as a pivotal U.S. counterterrorism ally in North and West Africa (Arieff 5–9).

## 9. Conclusion

Since September 11, the global war on terror has persisted as a real and ongoing challenge. America and its allies have made significant, though hard-fought, gains through the dismantling of al-Qaeda networks, checking the territorial expansion of ISIS, and more recently, forging strategic partnerships that extend from NATO to North Africa. However, every advance seems to be matched by even greater challenges, whether from lone actors coordinating attacks in America's heartland, internet-enabled extremist groups, or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb taking advantage of renewed instability in the Sahel. For

years, the United States has brought a tremendous amount of firepower to this fight, including drone strikes and cyber surveillance, all while trying to navigate the broader and complicated geopolitical rivalries that such a focus demands. In this context, the efforts Algeria contributes against AQIM highlight an important point: local forces on the ground, combined with international resolve, are essential. The collective memory of 9/11 continues to remind us of what is at stake. The future requires ongoing vigilance, sensitivity to technology that upholds civil liberties, building trust, involving communities, and maintaining coalitions that can withstand extreme challenges.

**Chapter Two**

**U.S.-Algerian Partnership in Fighting Terrorism**

## 1. Introduction

Straddling the junction of Europe, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb holds critical importance for global security architecture. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the region gained heightened significance as U.S. foreign policy underwent radical reorientation, placing counterterrorism at the center of American international engagement. Within this regional context, Algeria emerged as a pivotal U.S. ally. Militarily tested by the brutal 1990s civil war that claimed approximately 200,000 lives, and enriched by abundant hydrocarbon deposits generating billions in annual energy exports, Algeria became both a security and economic asset.

Algeria's stabilizing role was underscored by rising threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Sahelian instability fueled by insurgencies and cross-border smuggling. Consequently, the U.S. developed initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and integrated Algeria into broader security collaboration under U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). This cooperation aimed to enhance Algeria's counterterrorism capacity, disrupt terrorist plots, and protect economic interests, particularly in oil and gas production. However, Algeria's postcolonial legacy, shaped by a 1954–1962 liberation struggle that cost nearly one million lives, fostered suspicion of foreign interference. Human rights concerns and diverging strategic priorities

further strained cooperation.

This chapter analyzes the U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism partnership through three lenses: Algeria's civil war and counterterrorism history; the post-9/11 strategic partnership encompassing intelligence sharing, military training, and AFRICOM engagement; and impediments to bilateral cooperation arising from misaligned priorities, Sahel security challenges, and human rights issues.

## 2. Historical Background: Algeria's Civil War and Its Counterterrorism Expertise

The Civil War that devastated Algeria throughout the 1990s led to extreme violence between the state and radical Islamic insurgents. This conflict compelled Algeria to formulate strong counterterrorism policies, making the country a regional expert in this area of defense today.

### 2.1 Roots of the Conflict

Algeria's civil war is rooted in the political and economic history of post-independence Algeria. After gaining independence from France in 1962, Algeria had been ruled by the National Liberation Front (FLN), which built a single-party totalitarian state. Economic mismanagement, corruption, and the inability to satisfy the demands of a rapidly growing and urbanizing population gradually undermined the legitimacy of the state. Falling oil prices in the 1980s rapidly brought Algeria's rentier economy to the brink, threatening the government's ability to keep its social contract alive through

spending and job creation. That economic decline, along with austerity and skyrocketing youth unemployment, helped create a milieu for mass dissent that erupted in the October 1988 riots, with hundreds of thousands of Algerian youths hitting the streets against FLN rule.

In response to these convulsions, the government implemented some limited forms of political liberalization, legalizing opposition parties and pledging multiparty elections. Capitalizing on widespread dissatisfaction with the FLN, the Islamist political party FIS quickly gained popularity due to its religio-social conservative platform. However, as the FIS was about to take over the 1991 parliamentary elections, the army intervened, cancelling the elections and arresting FIS leaders. This sudden and violent end to the democratic process radicalized some parts of the Islamist movement, radicalized parts of society, and divided the country, resulting in the 1992 civil war. The scholarly consensus is that the immediate trigger for the war was the subsequent repression and military coup that created a vicious feedback loop between the state and different Islamist insurgent groups.

The violence escalated and Algerian society became increasingly polarized, with extremist movements such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) declaring a policy of "total war" against the state and the civilian population as well. This civil war raged throughout the 1990s and resulted in as many as 150,000 to 200,000 lives lost, leaving the nation deeply scarred politically and socially for generations to come. In this way, the

underlying causes of the war were the interconnection of the economic crisis and the failure of political liberalization to bring about the necessary change, combined with the deepening militarization of state-Islamist rivalry that created the conditions which would define Algeria's counterterrorism experience in the years following (wang).

## 2.2 The War's Escalation

The Algerian Civil War, which erupted in 1992 and lasted for a decade, was rooted in deep political and social tensions that had been building since the late 1980s. Perhaps the most frequently cited rationale for the war's outbreak is the military's intervention to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from coming to power through the ballot box. Following years of public anger, particularly the youth-led economic protests of the October 1988 Riots, Algeria's long-ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) allowed multi-party elections. The FIS became immensely popular and was on course to win when the military intervened, canceled the election process, ousted President Chadli Bendjedid, and arrested the leaders of the FIS. The events of 1992 were largely responsible for dividing the country, radicalizing Algerian youths, and directly producing a violent confrontation between the state and Islamist militants (Wang).

A series of massacres, assassinations, and other atrocities stripped the conflict of any clear boundaries, as brutality escalated during the civil war. Contemporary media and literary accounts depicted the entire conflict as a period of unresolved violence,

characterized by massacres and murders that seemed disconnected from clear causes. This was partly due to the presence of various militant groups, but further complicated by the oppressive actions of the state, which unleashed waves of repression in different regions. Analysts have noted that the violence of the war reflected deeper, unresolved contradictions within Algerian society, particularly the lack of meaningful change in the country's revolutionary history, ongoing political exclusion, and the rise of political Islam. Thus, the civil war is regarded as both a symptom and a catalyst of one of Algeria's enduring crises: its crisis of national identity and public memory, whose traumas and complexities remain alive in the national consciousness (Landers 42).

## 2.3 Building Counterterrorism Skills

The brutal 1990s civil war, during which Islamist groups challenged the state with ferocious guerrilla tactics, tested Algeria's counterterrorism capabilities to their limits. The National Popular Army (ANP) rapidly transitioned from peacetime operations to counterinsurgency, enlisting local self-defense militias known as "Patriots." Through military and intelligence reforms, Algeria eliminated key terrorist organizations and achieved relative stability. This progress was further bolstered by foreign alliances (particularly with the US, Russia, and UK), which provided advanced training, weapons, and established Algeria as a regional counterterrorism hub (Royal United Services Institute).

Algeria's approach extended beyond combat, implementing deradicalization and rehabilitation programs that encouraged thousands of fighters to disarm. Algerian intelligence services actively monitored radicals domestically and later exported this expertise internationally. Following the 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, Algeria intensified regional cooperation and intelligence reform, joining initiatives like the Joint Operational General Staff Committee (CEMOC) and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership. These developments positioned Algeria as a key player in regional and international security, demonstrating significant operational and intelligence capabilities (European Parliament 4-5).

## 2.4 Global Isolation and Implications

Algeria experienced severe international isolation during its civil war, as the global community largely viewed the conflict as an internal matter not warranting significant intervention. Additionally, the Algerian regime, like many others accused of serious human rights violations and crimes against civilians, faced national and international condemnation from human rights groups and civil society organizations. These groups demanded accountability and, when possible, discouraged potential foreign economic sponsors. Algeria's political elite, aiming to prevent the internationalization of justice, contributed to this isolation by insisting that no foreign interference should be permitted and that reconciliation and peace were matters for Algeria alone. Consequently, the government designed its reconciliation program in secrecy,

deliberately keeping both the international community and national civil society at a distance (Cassarino 13–15).

This separation had far-reaching implications. Although the government's strategy succeeded in breaking the cycle of violence and demobilizing tens of thousands of insurgents, it resulted in an extremely centralized, security-dominated political system and fell short of a genuine campaign for the rule of law or human rights. While the regime's exclusion of foreign involvement in the postwar period preserved Algeria's sovereignty, it simultaneously limited democratization and generated lingering resentment among victims and civil society. Internationally, Algeria's civil war experience reinforced its traditional non-alignment doctrine and policy of non-interference in other countries' affairs, fostering a cautious foreign policy approach in subsequent decades characterized by regional mediation efforts and counterterrorism policies (Chikhaoui).

## 3. U.S.-Algerian Partnership after 9/11

After 9/11, the United States and Algeria forged a close partnership centered on counterterrorism, drawing on Algeria's hard-won experience against Islamist insurgency. This cooperation has included intelligence sharing, military training, and regional security coordination, making Algeria a key U.S. ally in North Africa's efforts to combat transnational terrorism.

## 3.1 A New Strategic Alliance

After 9/11, the United States and Algeria forged a close partnership centered on counterterrorism, leveraging Algeria's hard-won experience against Islamist insurgency. This cooperation has included intelligence sharing, military training, and regional security coordination, making Algeria a key U.S. ally in North Africa's fight against transnational terrorism. U.S.-Algerian relations entered a new era following the September 11, 2001 attacks, characterized by a strategic partnership based on counterterrorism cooperation. With its large-scale internal struggle against terrorism in the 1990s still fresh in memory, Algeria was one of the first countries to condemn the 9/11 attacks and offer its experience to the United States. This was not a token collaboration; it reflected Algeria's long-standing advocacy for a global response to terrorism, which it has always characterized as a transnational threat. Algeria's extensive expertise in terror networks came to be appreciated, and the U.S. began to rely on Algerian intelligence, especially regarding al-Qaeda and its affiliates in North Africa. This exchange of information became a key feature of bilateral relations, with Algeria offering valuable insights into the activities of extremist organizations and enabling judicial cooperation, notably regarding Algerian citizens imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay (Zoubir).

This cooperation was then broadened to include military training, technical assistance, and regional security measures. The U.S. also provided military support to

Algeria, including training in U.S. academies and support to the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) based in Algiers. Additionally, both countries were members of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Operation Active Endeavor, which laid the groundwork for maritime security in the region. U.S. officials have long viewed Algeria as a "keystone" North African partner, critical to the stability of the Sahel and the fight against violent extremist organizations. Although there were occasional disagreements, including over Western Sahara and other issues, the post-9/11 period effectively established Algeria as a key American partner in a range of issues related to the War on Global Terrorism. Cooperation can be broadly structured around three key pillars: security, intelligence, and diplomacy, with enhanced collaboration among these areas (Chikhaoui).

## 3.2 Early Cooperation and Algeria's Commitment

By the time the United States and Algeria began working together more closely to combat Islamist terrorism, a unique set of circumstances was already in place. The U.S. was acutely aware of the terrorist challenges highlighted by the trauma of 9/11, while Algeria bore the scars of its civil war and had a strong commitment to combating Islamist extremism. Algeria, having just emerged from a decade of bloody civil war against Islamist extremists, swiftly denounced the 2001 attacks and proved to be a reliable ally of the United States. This was not a superficial partnership; Algeria had long advocated for international mechanisms to fight terrorism, and after 9/11, the U.S. recognized Algeria

as an expert in detecting and tracing terrorist networks. At the heart of this partnership

was the exchange of intelligence, with Algeria providing valuable information on

extremist groups and supporting U.S. authorities on judicial matters, such as the cases

involving Algerian nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay. The United States also began

training Algerian security personnel in U.S. military academies, although it remained

cautious about providing heavy arms, reflecting a relationship of increasing but still

tentative confidence between the two states (Zoubir 4).

Growing cooperation led both countries to recognize that counterterrorism

required a regional approach, especially as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

began to expand across the Sahara and Sahel. Algeria emerged as a regional leader,

advocating for coordination with neighboring countries and positioning itself as a hub for

security strategy in North and West Africa. This role evolved into Algeria's acceptance

of information sharing, multilateral cooperation, and financing of capacity-building

programs for regional partners. However, mutual distrust and divergent priorities often

slowed progress, with the U.S. emphasizing the need for political and economic reforms

in Algeria within the broader context of combating violent extremism. Despite these

challenges, years of cooperation laid the groundwork for a continued partnership based

on mutual interests in information exchange, technology transfer, and joint defense

objectives (Arieff, 2).

## 3.3 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

In response, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S. whole-of-government, multi-agency initiative created in 2005, aimed at addressing terrorism and violent extremism in North and West Africa. Originally known as TSCTP, the program builds on the former Pan-Sahel Initiative and aims to strengthen the capacity of partner governments, including Algeria, Mali, Niger, and others, to fight groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. It facilitates diplomacy, defense, and development in support not only of military and police training but also of governance reform, border security improvement, and local resilience initiatives. TSCTP focuses on promoting the rule of law, accountable governance, and addressing the root causes of radicalization, including poverty, marginalization, and lack of economic opportunity (U.S. Congress, Sec. 4).

As a committed member of TSCTP, Algeria offers its experience in counterterrorism management and regional diplomacy. Algeria has conducted joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and cross-border security operations with neighbors. The country has played a regional role by chairing peace and security committees and consistently contributing to multinational forums in both peace and security and development areas. However, political differences have at times hindered regional cooperation in general, some involving Western Sahara, and in this case, broader counterterrorism cooperation. Despite such challenges, Algeria's active participation in

TSCTP demonstrates its commitment to regional security and the fight against

transnational terrorism (Refworld 4).

While TSCTP has received much praise for building security force capacity and

increasing regional cooperation, it has also been criticized for overemphasizing military

solutions and failing to address deeper socio-economic drivers of extremism. Although

the program has enhanced partner nations' capacity to disrupt terrorist networks, it argues

development remain the leading causes of instability, according to an overview of trends

from the military's Irregular Warfare Center. As the terrorist threat across the Sahel and

Maghreb evolves, TSCTP will need to strike a better balance between security and

sustained support for civil society, economic opportunity, and accountable governance if

it hopes to achieve lasting outcomes (CNA Corporation 1).

## 3.4 Mechanisms of Intelligence Cooperation

The intelligence cooperation mechanisms between Algeria and the United States

are diverse and have tended to increase progressively in response to the common threat

posed by global terrorist networks. A key feature of this cooperation is the robust sharing

of intelligence, where the two countries exchange large amounts of information on

suspected terrorist networks and individuals moving across North Africa and the Sahel

region. Algerian authorities, for example, have provided the U.S. with extensive lists of

suspects associated with terrorism, numbering around 1,000 names linked to al-Qaeda

and similar groups. In return, Algeria seeks comparable concessions from the U.S. and Europe, such as the extradition of wanted terrorists residing in Algeria. This mutually beneficial exchange of intelligence aims to strengthen both countries' abilities to disrupt terror plots and dismantle terror networks, particularly those of a transnational nature.

U.S.-Algeria cooperation on intelligence is facilitated through formal channels and institutionalized forums, supported by bilateral contacts. These include high-level visits, strategic dialogues, and multilateral forums such as NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, which itself encourages the exchange of military and technical expertise. The United States has also sought to enhance Algeria's operational and analytical capabilities through initiatives like AFRICOM and specialized training programs provided by defense contractors. These efforts aim to improve Algeria's capacity to analyze threats, deter attacks, and counter conventional explosives. Overall, this approach consolidates indirect intelligence sharing with capacity building and tactical collaboration to address the evolving security challenges facing the Maghreb and Sahel regions (Gherieb).

## 3.5 U.S.-Algerian Military Training Programs

U.S.-Algerian security cooperation has been shaped by the broader context of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which seeks to enhance regional security and counter violent extremism across North Africa and the Sahel. While Algeria has not been the primary beneficiary of U.S. counterterrorism assistance—Niger, for

example, has received more direct aid—it has nevertheless benefited from regional

training initiatives, intelligence sharing, and operational planning designed to address

persistent threats from terrorist groups active in the Sahel (Arieff 9).

Regional instability, particularly following the Malian crisis, has prompted greater

collaboration among Sahelian states and their international partners. The development of

joint military forces, such as the G5 Sahel, and the organization of multinational

exercises have been central to these efforts. These initiatives aim to reinforce cross-

border cooperation, improve military readiness, and address the complex security

challenges posed by terrorism and organized crime in the region (Walther 3, 14).

Algeria's approach to security cooperation is deeply influenced by its historical

experience with civil conflict and its longstanding doctrine of non-intervention. The

Algerian government has traditionally preferred political dialogue and regional solutions

over direct foreign military involvement. However, the growing instability in

neighboring Mali and the wider Sahel has led Algeria to adopt a more pragmatic stance,

including increased intelligence sharing and joint security operations. Despite its caution

toward deeper military entanglements, Algeria's engagement is recognized as essential

for effective conflict management and regional stability (Boukhars 20-21).

## 3.6 AFRICOM's Role and Diplomacy

The creation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 marked a turning

point in American-Algerian security relations, formalizing a framework for and

delivering at least limited implementation of counterterror cooperation, while navigating

Algeria's long-standing anxiety over sovereignty. AFRICOM took charge of the Trans-

Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) coordination and Flintlock exercises,

which were both core to regional security cooperation. Given Algeria's own long history

of being a victim of foreign troops and its own war of independence, the proposal for an

African headquarters was extremely unpopular with the Algerian government and the

Algerian people. Accordingly, AFRICOM was based in Stuttgart, Germany, with a small

presence in Algiers to ease partnership. This compromise maintained mutual trust, as

well as 60% of the combined missions through 2010 adopting Algeria's operating

preferences, achieving a diplomatic midway point between partnership and autonomy

(Zoubir 115).

Over the years, diplomatic signs further strengthened this relationship, such as a

2010 visit to Algiers by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. During Gates' trip, more

than $50 million of TSCTP funding was secured to send surveillance drones and vehicles

to Algeria to help patrol its borders. Such support facilitated 100 combined operations by

2012 and also addressed American human rights concerns over Algeria's detention

without trial of AQIM suspects. While the United States Congress continued to press for

further human rights reforms, the realist diplomacy of AFRICOM emphasized security

cooperation while allowing Algeria to take the lead in regional cooperative institutions,

such as the Joint Operational General Staff Committee (CEMOC) to coordinate Sahel

counterterror operations (Human Rights Watch 10).

Through its efforts, AFRICOM has increased Algeria's role in African Union peace and security mechanisms, and its CEMOC chairmanship has enabled hundreds of joint patrols and regional operations. CEMOC was strongly influenced by lessons learned from Algeria's civil war. Nonetheless, regional instability, notably Mali's 2012 coup, revealed the limitations of military cooperation when scores of equipment were lost and planned missions delayed. Not without challenges, Algeria's determination, supported by AFRICOM's financial and diplomatic power, has guaranteed continued domestic success in stopping AQIM's cross-border terror and operating networks, demonstrating the enduring value of such a partnership for regional security (Arieff 9).

## 3.7 Economic Incentives and Trade

Economic rewards and commerce have been at the core of the U.S.-Algeria counterterrorism partnership, providing tangible dividends for Algeria's hydrocarbon sector. In 2010, hydrocarbons represented roughly 98 percent of Algerian exports and 60 percent of government revenues, serving as the fiscal backbone for both security-related and broader economic growth. U.S. support for Algeria through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and similar programs enhanced Algerian security, including drone support to protect vital oil and gas facilities. These efforts were crucial for regional economic stability and helped maintain hundreds of millions in foreign reserves, enabling Algeria to continue investing in both civilian and military

infrastructure. This support slowed the momentum and impact of terror attacks targeting energy infrastructure, protected foreign exchange revenue, and strengthened Algeria's position as an energy supplier to Europe and the United States (European Parliament 2).

The modernization of Algeria's security and military sectors, which was also supported by the United States, generated significant economic spillovers. It created tens of thousands of jobs through investments in equipment, training, and logistics, providing an antidote to high youth unemployment—a key driver of radicalization risk. Vocational training programs, often paired with security cooperation, trained Algerian youth in electronics and mechanics, increasing employment in the security sector. A strong counterterrorism strategy, coupled with economic benefits, limited recruitment by radical groups and bolstered government legitimacy. Nevertheless, Algerian policy has remained cautious, always seeking a balance between encouraging economic modernization and foreign investment, and maintaining national sovereignty by limiting foreign penetration of strategic sectors and retaining control over key resources (Legal 500).

This approach brought tangible economic dividends from counterterrorism cooperation, further solidifying Algeria's leadership in the region, especially within the African Union (AU). Algeria has used its financial strength to become the largest donor to the AU anti-terrorism budget and hosts the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) as well as the African Police Cooperation Mechanism (AFRIPOL). As a result, Algeria is at the center of regional efforts to coordinate security

and law enforcement counterterrorism strategies, which has enhanced its diplomatic status. However, Shubov (2019) notes that memories of colonialism continue to shape the national psyche, and the need to enshrine sovereignty in the constitution still influences Algeria's cautious approach to foreign trade and investment partnerships (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021).

## 3.8 Algerian Motivations and Public Perception

Algeria's counterterrorism policy has its roots in the bloody experience of internal armed conflict in the 1990s, which claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 people and left deep psychological marks on the national psyche. This experience has shaped a strong resistance to violent extremism, with Algerian policymakers viewing terrorism as a persistent strategic threat to state stability and an affront to national sovereignty. As a result, Algeria has always prioritized internal stability and has been wary of attempts to lead the region or engage in foreign military interventions, especially those involving former colonial powers. This stance includes Algeria's emphasis on indigenous solutions and leadership in regional counterterrorism initiatives such as the Joint Operational General Staff Committee (CEMOC), as well as its refusal to participate in externally sponsored military coalitions, which it believes could serve as propaganda for jihadist groups or undermine local legitimacy (Sour 33).

Public attitudes in Algeria regarding counterterrorism are complex and shaped by

both historical grievances and contemporary realities. Most Algerians support strong security measures to prevent a return of the violence experienced during the so-called 'Black Decade,' but there is also widespread suspicion about the government's use of anti-terrorism laws and policies. Human rights activists and civil society organizations argue that vague and sweeping anti-terror legislation is often used as a tool to suppress peaceful opposition, restrict public space, and silence dissent. Reports have documented trends in arbitrary detention, torture, and the criminalization of peaceful protest in the name of counterterrorism, leading to doubts about official motives and concerns that security policies sometimes reinforce state power at the expense of protecting citizens. The ongoing struggle to balance security needs with civil liberties remains a central feature of public discourse in Algeria (SHOAA for Human Rights: 2020).

## 4. The Challenges of U.S.-Algerian Relations in Counterterrorism cooperation

The U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation faced some challenges

### 4.1 Different Goals Causing Tension

U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation has long been subject to tensions arising from fundamentally different strategic priorities. The United States has viewed the region through the lens of global counterterrorism, aiming to disrupt transnational networks such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and has often selected interventionist policies, particularly when the cost-benefit ratio is deemed favorable. In contrast, Algeria has focused on its own security, regime stability, and a policy of non-involvement,

repeatedly warning that external interventions destabilize the region and facilitate extremist recruitment. This divide was clearly demonstrated by the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya: Algeria opposed the operation and abstained from the U.N. vote authorizing it, regularly warning that the fall of Gaddafi would lead to arms flows into neighboring states and to militants, particularly AQIM. In 2013, Algeria's concerns were validated when looted Libyan arms were found to be circulating throughout the Sahel, fueling regional instability (Boukhars 20–21).

These tensions were further exposed during the 2012 Mali crisis. While the United States and its allies advocated for immediate military intervention to expel AQIM and its aligned forces from the territory they controlled, Algeria prioritized border security and engaged in negotiations with Tuareg groups, fearing that military action could exacerbate ethnic conflict. Algeria remained cautious about foreign-led interventions and aid, preferring African-led initiatives and regional diplomacy. After the launch of France's Operation Serval, Algeria provided logistical support, including the use of airspace and oil, but maintained a pragmatic and cautious stance. These actions reflect Algeria's deep skepticism toward Western-backed regime change, rooted in its own anti-colonial history, and its preference for solutions that uphold sovereignty and regional consensus over external intervention (Arieff 10).

## 4.2 Regional Sahel Security Concerns

Since 9/11, the Sahel has become one of the most important fronts in the global struggle against terrorist groups, whose presence is sustained by weak governments and extensive uncontrolled borders that make the area a natural safe haven and transshipment center. The decline of state authority in parts of Mali, Niger, and Mauritania enabled al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and affiliates such as Ansar Dine and AQIM to establish operational bases, which led to increased kidnappings, arms smuggling, and attacks on both local and Western targets. In 2002, U.S. officials took the initiative to enhance the capabilities of Sahelian security forces and improve intelligence sharing as a means to combat the growing jihadist threat in the region through the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which was later expanded into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). However, the region's persistent poverty, ethnic grievances, and limited state presence continued to provide fertile ground for extremist recruitment and cross-border criminal activity (Arieff 3).

The aftermath of the Mali crisis further underscored the challenges in the Sahel. Following a coup in Bamako and the collapse of state authority in the north, AQIM, the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and their Tuareg rebel allies controlled large territories, imposed harsh rule, and threatened regional security. The crisis revealed fundamental governance failures, and although foreign interventions—including U.S. support for the French-led Operation Serval and increased

funding for the TSCTP—reversed some of the militants' gains, it also highlighted the

limitations of military action alone. While observers agreed that security aid improved

tactical capacity, they also noted that such aid failed to address deeper drivers of

instability, such as corruption, marginalization, and resource competition, which have

plagued the Sahel throughout its decades-long conflict (Lebovich 3).

## 4.3 Human Rights Problems

After 9/11, human rights abuses committed by Algeria became closely associated

with the repressive counterterrorism practices it adopted in alignment with Washington.

Following a period of significant internal conflict marked by widespread violence and

human rights violations, Algeria became a key ally in the "War on Terror." This

partnership provided international legitimacy for the Algerian state, expanded access to

military and intelligence support, and led the government to intensify domestic

repression. Algerian security forces used broad and vaguely defined anti-terrorism

legislation to justify arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention without trial, and repression of

political opponents in the early 2000s. Human rights groups reported that police tortured

suspects, kept many in secret detention, and used military courts to try civilians accused

of terrorism. While these actions were justified in the name of national security, they

contributed to a culture of fear and curtailed civil liberties (Gherieb).

Additionally, the global atmosphere after 9/11, in which security was prioritized

over human rights, provided Algeria with an opportunity. The United States and Western

countries, eager to enlist regional allies in the global war on terror, rarely criticized

Algeria's practices or made security aid conditional on improvements in human rights.

This implicit support allowed Algerian officials to continue using the counterterrorism

narrative as a tool to suppress dissent, restrict independent information sources, and limit

the activities of civil society organizations. Thus, although Algeria has contributed

crucial intelligence and operational support to international counterterrorism efforts, it

has paid an internal cost, resulting in further erosion of political freedoms and the

deepening of authoritarianism under the pretext of anti-terrorism (Zoubir 6).

## 4.4 Cultural Influences on Cooperation

The counterterrorist cooperation Algeria has conducted with the United States has

been strongly shaped by its Islamic cultural identity as well as its anti-colonial political

culture. The scars of the 1954–1962 liberation war and a national sovereignty complex

have left Algerian policymakers particularly sensitive to foreign intervention. While this

legacy led Algeria to refuse permanent U.S. military bases or any large-scale joint

operations, it has been open to and has welcomed U.S. training and intelligence

cooperation. Standard polling in Algeria during the 2010s repeatedly found that most

Algerians had little faith in Western military intervention out of concern that it could

repeat "neo-colonial" relationships. This legacy has led Algeria to seek bilateral

agreements that avoid expansion and prefer home-grown solutions to security issues

(FAS Project on Government Secrecy 2).

In Algeria, Islamic principles of forgiveness and reconciliation have also come to the forefront of counterterrorism policy. Notable examples include the 1999 Civil Concord Law and the National Reconciliation Charter, inspired by concepts of sulh (reconciliation) and rahma (compassion) in the Quran, which enabled amnesty and reintegration of thousands of ex-combatants. These policies, adopted by landslide national referenda, articulated a restorative justice tradition that contrasts with the U.S. retributive counterterrorism policies based on extrajudicial options such as indefinite detention and targeted killings. As U.S. officials persisted in their calls to toughen Algeria's approach, fearing it would allow recidivism among former fighters, Algerian officials pointed out that their approach was culturally appropriate and had succeeded in reducing violence (RUSI 10).

Cultural differences have also complicated cooperation over issues such as deradicalization and human rights. Among notable initiatives that have been instrumental in countering possible extremist recruitment are the training of imams and the encouragement of moderate Islamic discourse, which are sponsored by the Algerian government. Underpinned by local religious tradition and supported by local leaders, these initiatives have led to measurable reductions in urban radicalization. However, some U.S.-led efforts, especially through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), have at times disregarded cultural factors while focusing on military and

technical solutions. In response, Algerian decisionakers have limited participation in multilateral organizations, negotiated selective aspects of intelligence sharing, and are now trying to balance the perceived benefits of cooperative security with the necessity of protecting the state's national values and identity (Policy Center for New South 2).

## 5. Conclusion

What has evolved between U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation since 9/11 is a blend of converging interests and persistent divergences. The nature of Algeria's trauma, as well as its identity as a long-developing anti-colonial state, has naturally led to a security policy that emphasizes sovereignty, reconciliation, and culturally appropriate solutions. These factors have distinguished Algerian policy from the more unilateral and military-oriented preferences of the United States. While both countries now agree that transnational terrorism is a significant threat, and while they have benefited from intelligence sharing, joint training, and regional cooperation, their partnership has been repeatedly challenged, and at times undermined, by conflicting priorities, popular skepticism, and differing ideals regarding human rights and democracy.

Despite these challenges, the relationship has remained both solid and flexible. Although this has sometimes limited deeper cooperation, Algeria's insistence on operational autonomy and policies tailored to local cultural paradigms has reinforced local legitimacy and the sustainability of its counterterrorism efforts. The United States, for its part, gradually recognized the effectiveness of context-sensitive approaches, even

as it continued to call for greater reform and increased regional participation. Historical

trends, which continue to adapt to new challenges and the often unstable security

environment in North and West Africa, demonstrate that the U.S.-Algerian partnership

serves as a best-practice example of the need and the challenge to build robust, respectful

partnerships in the fight against violent extremism. The future success of this partnership

will depend on each side's ability to bridge cultural divides, address underlying

grievances, and balance militarization with respect for sovereignty and human right.

<center>**Chapter Three**</center>

<center>**Evaluating the Effectiveness of U.S.-Algerian Counterterrorism Cooperation**</center>

## 1. Introduction

Since the early 2000s, transnational terrorism has been a key factor influencing security priorities in North Africa and the Sahel. The persistent threat posed by extremist groups has spurred regional countries and their external partners to reassess their approaches and develop new coalitions. Among these, the U.S.-Algeria partnership stands out as a major cornerstone of regional counterterrorism efforts. The United States and Algeria have expanded their cooperation across a wide range of areas, including intelligence sharing, military training, and border security. This relationship has developed in response to shared concerns over the growing threat of extremist groups, such as those affiliated with al-Qaeda in North Africa, as well as the spillover effects from instability in neighboring Libya and other regions.

This chapter examines the effectiveness of U.S.-Algerian cooperation on counterterrorism since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Building on the historical and policy context provided in previous chapters, this section reflects on what this partnership has accomplished, where it has fallen short, and what the future may hold. Chapters One and Two have outlined its genesis, rationale, and structure; here, the focus shifts to a structured critique of its outcomes, shortcomings, and future trajectory. By drawing upon both successes and ongoing challenges, this chapter aims to provide an overall assessment that goes beyond official statements and incorporates the perspectives of key

stakeholders.

The assessment is organized around three broad themes: the concrete progress achieved in intelligence sharing, operations, and capacity-building; the persistent shortcomings that have undermined the partnership, including regional unrest, lack of transparency, and an excessive focus on military solutions; and the evolving outlook for cooperation as new challenges and changing regional dynamics emerge. Based on an extensive review of academic studies, policy reports, and primary sources, this analysis seeks to identify not only the successes of the U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism partnership but also the significant gaps that remain and how they might be addressed in the future.

Finally, the chapter contends that while U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation has produced significant benefits, particularly by enhancing Algeria's security capacity and disrupting terrorist networks,  its broader impact has been constrained by deeper structural, political, and strategic factors. The chapter concludes by considering how the partnership can evolve, suggesting that economic development, technological innovation, and human rights must become integral components of a more positive and sustainable regional security dynamic.

## 2. Achievements of U.S.-Algerian Counterterrorism Cooperation

The U.S.-Algerian cooperation on matters relating to counterterrorism had experienced a great leap forward by sharing intelligence, cooperating further in military training, and maintaining security dialogues that now includes security aspects. This has further improved, with United States assistance, Algeria's capacity to fight against

terrorism and organized crime. This has further improved, with United States assistance, Algeria's capacity to fight against terrorism and organized crime. This is further consolidated by joint US-Algeria military trainings after new military cooperation agreements were signed following U.S. assistance in workshops related to combating terrorist financing.

## 2.1 Successes in Sharing Intelligence

Since the September 11 attacks, counterterrorism cooperation has established stronger pathways for intelligence sharing between the United States and Algeria, one of the most productive areas of collaboration given both countries' needs for domestic security. Algeria's extensive experience with domestic terrorism during its 1990s civil war made it a valuable partner for the United States. The two countries established formal mechanisms for exchanging information on terrorist groups operating in North Africa and the Sahel, enabling them to identify and track entities such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This cooperation has enhanced their preparedness to respond to threats and develop plans to counteract them before they materialize (Arieff, 4), demonstrating the strategic value of their bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement.

Further evidence of successful, coordinated intelligence sharing is reflected in the outcomes of joint operations. The exchange of actionable intelligence between U.S. and Algerian agencies has facilitated the prevention of numerous planned attacks and the disruption of recruitment cells. For example, the Algerian government has collaborated

with the United States to provide comprehensive data on travel and supply routes of suspects linked to militancy, enabling coordinated security measures across borders. This intelligence sharing has not only increased the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations but also fostered a climate of trust and mutual reliance between the two nations (Boukhars).

Moreover, the integration of these capabilities into intelligence-sharing processes has contributed to the professionalization of Algeria's security establishment. U.S.-sponsored training programs, combined with joint intelligence exercises, have helped Algerian agencies develop advanced analytic techniques and tools. These initiatives have strengthened Algeria's capacity to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence, positioning it as a regional leader in counterterrorism (Qasi17). The ongoing exchange of best practices and technical expertise serves as the foundation that cements the intangible benefits of this cooperation, making U.S.-Algerian politico-strategic learning a vital asset for long-term regional stability.

## 2.2 Disrupted Terrorist Plots

Cooperative U.S.-Algerian initiatives have disrupted numerous terror plots, primarily those directed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates. Intelligence sharing and operational coordination between the two countries have been the backbone of successful operations that foiled a series of planned, coordinated attacks against both Algerian and Western targets in the region. Such information is collected

through operations in which intelligence agencies from both nations work together to gather and share intelligence, leading to the successful interception of communications related to specific attacks planned against diplomatic quarters as well as energy resources, enabling security forces to react in time (Lounnas 8).

Not only has cooperation between Algeria and the U.S. helped thwart attacks against key infrastructure, but it has also disrupted transnational terrorist networks operating across the Sahel. According to Roberts, much of the top AQIM leadership that posed a threat of conducting transnational attacks has been arrested and prosecuted through cooperative efforts. These successes were achieved by combining American high-tech capabilities, such as satellite imagery and electronic surveillance, with Algerian domestic intelligence networks. This collaboration has increased the ability of both countries to identify and deter threats before they materialize (Roberts 13).

Furthermore, the disruption of terrorist plots has fostered a culture of deterrence, as extremists are aware that their activities are now under close scrutiny. Boukhars explains that visible victories have undermined the operational autonomy of terrorist coordination capabilities, forcing such networks to operate in more secretive and less effective ways. This climate of increased caution, along with ongoing U.S.-Algerian cooperation, has played a vital role in preventing mass terrorism in Algeria and neighboring countries for several years (Boukhars).

## 2.3 Strengthened Algerian Military Capabilities

Since just after 9/11, the United States has strengthened the counterterrorism capabilities of the Algerian military, focusing on some weapons equipment sales but mostly through technology transfers, technical assistance, and training aimed at counterterrorism. This marked a paradigm shift with the launch of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2005, which empowered Algeria to address specific challenges posed by the Sahel region. As part of this program, the U.S. provided Algeria with heavy surveillance equipment, armored vehicles, and secure communications systems. This stepwise approach has made it easier for Algeria to monitor its significant borders and address emerging issues. A concrete example of this improvement in capability occurred in 2015, when U.S.-supplied drones enabled Algerian forces to intercept a shipment of explosives near the Malian border bound for AQIM, thwarting an impending terrorist strike (Zoubir 199).

In addition to hardware, U.S.-led training programs have helped professionalize Algeria's security forces. Since the mid-2000s, annual counterterrorism exercises have focused on special forces, rapid response, and intelligence-based combat. These initiatives created an elite unit called the Special Intervention Group (GIS). This has not only sharpened the tactical skills of Algerian troops but, through ground and air cooperation with neighboring countries, it has also fostered closer cooperation with Tunisia. That support made a difference in 2018, when U.S.-trained members of the GIS quickly dismantled an AQIM cell in the southeastern town of Tamanrasset (Entelis 94).

Crucially, the reinforcement of Algiers' military infrastructure has deterred terrorist groups from operating within its borders, forcing them farther south into the more lawless Sahel region. Algeria has become a much harder target for groups such as AQIM due to improved surveillance, rapid deployment capacity, and a more professional armed force (Arieff 18). Despite lingering difficulties with political synchronization and economic stability, the security component of the U.S.-Algerian relationship is often characterized as a best-practice paradigm of scalable, sustainable partnership that has advanced regional security without fostering chronic dependency.

## 2.4 Capacity-Building and Professionalization of Security Forces

Because of the expansion and professionalization of Algeria's security forces, a result of U.S.- Algerian counterterror cooperation over the last two decades, has produced one of the most consequential U.S.-Algerian success stories since 9/11. The U.S. military and police professionals have received specialized training in areas such as counterterror tactics, human rights, and civil- military relations through programs like the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) programs. The IMET program especially has allowed for the education of certain Algerian officers in United States military academies and participation in specialized courses on the role of military in society, civil- military relations, and the conduct of military operations in accordance with international law and the applicable principles of civilian authority. This exposure has aided in cementing

increasingly contemporary and professional standards in the Algerian military (Blanchard 12).

It has also strengthened the operational capacity and institutional reform of Algeria's security sector by sponsoring joint exercises, technical exchanges, and interoperability workshops with regional and international partners under the auspices of the TSCTP. Roberts added that these initiatives have not only enhanced tactical effectiveness but have also stimulated a culture of cooperation and information sharing among the Algerian, U.S. and other Sahelian forces. An important benefit of joint training will be to erode the very real divisions that exist between Algeria's various security services, promoting greater coordination and la mise en synergie d'un esprit face to face in counterterrorism challenges. Although these reforms are regionally specific, the nature of transnational security threats create a necessity for integrated cooperation and trust across security actors (Roberts 7).

In addition, the U.S. capacity-building has also consisted of focused, tailored programs designed to introduce human rights and the rule-of-law norms into Algerian security practice. The United States has also sponsored seminars and workshops to help reinforce principles in such areas as detainee treatment, civilian protection in counterterrorist actions, and how security forces can avoid human rights violations. While obstacles exist in fully institutionalizing these norms, the continuous emphasis on ethics and accountability represents an important movement in orienting Algeria's security sector in a manner consistent with international norms, thereby increasing its legitimacy at

home and abroad (Gherieb).

## 2.5  Joint Action against Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering

The U.S.-Algerian partnership in combating terrorism financing has grown significantly since 9/11, as Algeria capitalized on its past experiences in fighting domestic terrorism. Early cooperation included intelligence sharing and joint efforts to address transnational terrorist networks, as well as technical U.S. support for the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) in Algiers. These initiatives helped formalize Algeria's investigating practices against financial crime and align its counterterrorism policies according to international standards (Zoubir).

By the 2010s, bilateral cooperation expanded to include specialized workshops and training programs. For example, U.S. and Algerian officials have held joint sessions in Algiers to share investigative techniques for tracking illicit financial flows, with a particular focus on strengthening Algeria's legal and institutional frameworks for countering both money laundering and terrorism financing. This collaboration has improved Algeria's investigative capacities and has resulted in ongoing institutional dialogue between the two countries, reflecting a mutual commitment to evolve together with the changing tactics in financial crimes (Arieff 13–15).

Algeria has also improved U.S. supported antioney laundering framework reforms and international technical assistance. A report of the 2023 MENAFATF mutual evaluation on Algeria's country advancement indicates the alignment of the legal systems

to the recommendations of FATF, which seeks to close the year on better risk assessment protocols and cross -border cooperation. enhancing risk assessment protocols, and increasing cross-border cooperation. Such delays as the processing of suspicious transaction reports, while challenges remain, such as delays in processing suspicious transaction reports, Algeria's participation in international initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) demonstrates its expanding role in regional security and financial integrity (MENAFATF 14–15).

## 3. Limitations of U.S.-Algerian Counterterrorism Cooperation

Despite notable progress, U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation faces persistent limitations, including the following:

## 3.1 Persistent Instability in the Sahel

One major limitation of their partnership is that, despite extensive U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism efforts, instability in the Sahel remains a persistent problem. Even though both countries have focused on regional coordination, especially concerning groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), their efforts have suffered significant setbacks. The Sahel's vast and porous borders, combined with the proliferation of armed groups, have made coordination more challenging. While intelligence sharing and training have advanced, these measures have not yet translated into lasting regional security benefits. This has weakened the impact of joint action, leaving the Sahel vulnerable to recurring cycles of violence and insurgency, and has exacerbated

misunderstandings and mutual mistrust between the United States and Algeria, as well as between both parties and the broader Sahelian public (Arieff 20).

The continuous increase in extremist violence across the Sahel starkly highlights the limits of U.S.-Algerian cooperation. Militant groups such as JNIM and AQIM have exploited the withdrawal of international peacekeepers and gaps in state security to expand their campaigns, resulting in the deaths of more than 7,800 civilians in 2023 alone. The Malian crisis stands as the most glaring example of the shortcomings of foreign counterterrorism assistance, with Islamist and Tuareg rebel movements able to seize large territories. The rise of military juntas, Western withdrawals, and the growing influence of destabilizing actors such as the Wagner Group have further exacerbated regional instability, blocking progress toward sustainable security (International Crisis Group 3).

U.S. policy in the Sahel has been undermined by an overreliance on military responses while neglecting the core social, economic, and governance challenges that afflict the region. Security assistance and military training, prioritized by programs like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), have not curbed the rise of terrorism or the frequency of coups in recipient countries. This securitized approach, often disconnected from Sahelian realities and priorities, has failed to foster sustainable resilience and, at times, has deepened distrust between external powers and Sahelian states, thereby contributing to the very instability it was intended to address (Lebovich 6)

## 3.2 Lack of Transparency in Agreements

An enduring constraint on U.S.-Algerian CT cooperation has been the opaque nature of the agreements and the operating paradigm that undergird their relationship. The near-total secrecy surrounding Algerian security and military institutions is compounded by legal architectures explicitly designed to hamstring foreign and even domestic scrutiny. Algeria's 2012 Organic Law on Information specifically excepts "defense" from journalists' rights of access, while the broader Penal Code classifies nearly all defense information. The absence of transparency also applies to the defense budget, which is released only in a topline number, affording neither the public nor parliament much insight into resource allocation or expenditure. Such lack of transparency is undergirded by revenue and expenditure activities undertaken off budget, bypassing any official scrutiny, thus reducing accountability while augmenting corruption opportunities (Transparency International Defence & Security 2).

The second is the underlying reason for which Algeria's closed defense sector also makes it more difficult to cooperate with Washington, especially in the realm of intelligence sharing and joint action. The modalities of sharing information and capacity building of military power are already agreed upon though the details are hardly available in public. The country has been trying to create joint structures where accurate intelligence can be shared without frightening partners in the international community, but progress has been slow because the quality of support and the reliability to provide assistance are trusted factors. The consequences of discarding the "two-way" information

exchange that Algeria expects raises another red flag, while misconceptions about the cooperation terms that are vague can diminish effectiveness even faster. Such a dynamic illustrates how challenging it can be to form substantive long-term security partnerships in the absence of clear, public commitments (Gherieb).

But it is not just the budget records and operational data are missing, the lack of transparency is broader also with respect to the accountability and ethical frameworks which the military operates. There is no code of conduct applicable to military or civilian personnel in Algeria's defense establishment, and the country's weak protection for whistleblowers is inconsistently applied. Abuse of power or corruption investigations are likely to be political rather than systematic, while staffing decisions are likely based on patronage rather than merit. Such structural weaknesses only compound the challenges to the credibility and effectiveness of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation by constraining the inherent ability of either party to make credible assurances that cooperation activities will be conducted consistent with international expectations of accountability and good governance (Transparency International Defence & Security 3) .

## 3.3 Limited Focus on Economic Solutions

Though in many instances the worst kinds of counter-terrorism cooperation have been seen post-9/11, one of the more evident failures of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation has been its overwhelming securitization and militarization at times at the expense of addressing economic drivers of excess. On the one hand, Boukhars says U.S. assistance has strengthened Algeria's security institutions, but he adds that relatively little

has been spent on poverty alleviation efforts targeted at creating jobs, improving education and enhancing economic opportunity in poorer districts. Such an intervention-oriented approach has constrained the effectiveness of the counterterrorist response over the longer term, as groups drive recruitment on economic grievances and lack of opportunity, particularly targeting youth in southern and border areas (Boukhars 5).

The structure of bilateral aid has also been influenced by the predominance of security. Volman said that U.S. aid to Algeria has mostly been for military training, equipment, and intelligence cooperation, and not very much for economic development or civil society programs. This illustrates a wider trend in U.S. foreign policy in the region, whereby security interests overshadow efforts to foster development that is inclusive and address socio-economic inequalities. This underlines how little actual cooperation on counterterrorism there is to be had if the aim is regional stability and a more resilient Sahel and Algeria (Volman 248).

The U.S. and the Algeria are repeating a possible endless cycle of paralysis, by limiting the agenda on counterterrorism to military responses without integrating economic solutions. Tackling poverty, inter-regional inequalities and the absence of the state all of which provide an atmosphere for extremist movements to flourish, is not possible through joined-up military campaigns, even if the latter can win temporary tactical victories. In this regard, Entelis argues that inclusive policy, coupling security assistance with the prioritization of economic growth, is fundamental to achieving long-lasting sustainable peace and averting the return to violent extremism (Entelis 97).

## 3.4 Challenges in Intelligence Sharing and Trust

Persistent challenges in U.S.-Algerian intelligence sharing and trust are rooted in both structural and political factors that inhibit the full realization of their security partnership. Despite a decade of deepening cooperation, cultural, political, and legal impediments continue to restrict the efficient exchange of intelligence and evidence, both within Algeria and between Algerian and U.S. agencies. These barriers are particularly acute in areas such as cybercrime and counterterrorism, where Algerian authorities have repeatedly requested U.S. assistance to build capacity. The absence of legal frameworks and interagency coordination mechanisms hinders Algeria's ability to protect its borders and respond effectively to regional threats, raising the risk that instability in neighboring states could spill over into Algerian territory. Moreover, without improved collaboration, Algeria may further strengthen its security ties with Russia and China, challenging U.S. interests in the region (U.S. Department of State 11–12).

Mutual distrust also shapes the operational realities of intelligence cooperation. While both countries recognize the need for regional coordination against transnational terrorist threats such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, significant obstacles remain. Algeria has historically been cautious about sharing sensitive intelligence, concerned that such exchanges could compromise its sovereignty or expose field operations. The United States, for its part, has been reluctant to provide Algeria with advanced surveillance technology, fearing both the potential misuse of such equipment and the opacity of Algeria's military establishment. These reciprocal suspicions slow down the

implementation of joint borderonitoring initiatives and limit the scope of real-time intelligence sharing, ultimately constraining the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations ("U.S.-Algerian Security Cooperation and Regional Counterterrorism").

At the regional level, trust deficits extend beyond the bilateral relationship. Algeria's skepticism toward Mali's commitment to counterterrorism, for example, reflects broader concerns about the reliability of regional partners. Algiers regards Mali as the "weak link" in the fight against extremist groups such as AQIM, doubting Bamako's willingness and capacity to share and safeguard intelligence. This mistrust is exacerbated by practices Algeria opposes, such as Mali's facilitation of ransom payments to terrorist groups, which further undermines regional cooperation and complicates multilateral security efforts in the Maghreb and Sahel ("Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence").

## 4. Future Implications

The future of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation looks positive, with new agreements paving the way for deeper security ties. Success will depend on overcoming political differences and adapting to changing regional threats.

## 4.1 Expanding Cooperation to Economic Development

Looking forward, both Algeria and the United States realize that moving their relationship beyond security and turning it into a partnership for sustainable economic growth is crucial for stability and prosperity. According to the U.S. Integrated Country

Strategy for Algeria, while security will continue to be a foundation of the bilateral relationship, there is increasing interest in cooperating with Algeria to diversify its economy and stimulate private sector growth. The U.S. mission continues to encourage Algeria to adopt more transparent regulations, reduce restrictions on foreign direct investment, and create a more business-friendly environment for American companies—particularly in renewable energy, technology, and non-hydrocarbon sectors. The goal is to generate employment, foster innovation, and help Algeria transition to a more diversified and resilient economy, reducing its historical dependence on oil and gas (Integrated Country Strategy 3, 11).

American companies are already making their mark on the Algerian economy, creating job opportunities, transferring technology, and strengthening human capital. Algeria sees U.S. expertise as crucial for modernizing its economy and is eager to attract more American investment, especially in non-hydrocarbon sectors. With appropriate policy changes and continued U.S. engagement, American businesses can help diversify the Algerian economy, improve its global competitiveness, and promote sustainable development. This mutually beneficial approach aligns with Algeria's long-term interests and also offers new opportunities for American exports and business connections (AFSIC).

This broader economic partnership builds on foundations laid in the aftermath of 9/11, when the United States and Algeria signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and increased technical assistance for economic reform. These measures

supported Algeria's integration into the World Trade Organization, improved the investment climate, and strengthened its financial sector. Building on this legacy, future cooperation is likely to focus on advancing economic relations, entrepreneurship, and aligning economic growth with continued security cooperation. By integrating economic and security interests, both countries can address the root causes of instability and support a deeper, mutually beneficial relationship (Integrated Country Strategy 3).

## 4.2 Leveraging Technology for Border Security

American-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation will continue to focus on the use of technology to secure the vast and often porous borders of Algeria. Since the early 2000s, the United States has supplied Algeria with inspection and monitoring resources, including drones, armored vehicles, and refurbished communication systems. These varied resources gave Algeria the ability to secure its far-flung desert borders, detect encroachments by terrorist groups, and act swiftly to emerging dangers. Working with American companies has also been essential in providing homeland security solutions, including border surveillance and securities for the borders of Algeria (Algeria - Safety and Security).

American development has also created focus regional initiatives, such as the Pan-Sahel Initiative and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) that have concentrated on capacity building. Both programs have offered training, equipment, and joint exercises focusing on border security to Algeria as well as its neighbors to reinforce

border security and the opposition to the flow of arms and fighters across the Sahel. The TSCTP in particular has enabled the establishment of rapid reaction forces and enabled U.S. surveillance assets to operate in concert— for example Task Force Aztec Silence synchs intelligence collection operations and surveillance activity in concert with partner nations. This layered architecture provided Algeria with the agility to respond to regional trans-border challenges, and has led to more regional border cooperation (Frontiers in Political Science).

Algeria, in practical terms, has adapted its counterterrorism strategy, concentrating troops and thousands of troops more along the eastern and southern borders as well as acquiring new air surveillance technologies. Some new security deals with the United States have also been born, such as drone intelligence sharing as well as an increasing number of possibilities for the delivery of surveillance drones. Such trends reveal the changing face of the threat perception of Algeria, as its borders spaces have turned into a frontline in the war on terrorism and organized crime. It is therefore this mix of U.S. technology and know-how that has become the bulwark of Algeria's new doctrine of border security, increasing its national resilience and international stability (Jamestown Foundation).

## 4.3 Balancing Counterterrorism with Human Rights Considerations

However, the post-9/11 era's significantly higher levels of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation have made the need to find this balance in the eye of the

storm for human rights more often near the forefront. Though ironically, Algeria's well-publicized suffering from violent extremism has provided the country will a legitimacy as a U.S. ally in the fight against counterterrorism, both governments have drawn their share of condemnation for policies and practices that serve to erode the very rights and freedoms they profess to uphold. For several years, UN experts and human rights organizations earned the alarm that the counter-terrorism law in force in Algeria (Article 87 bis of the Criminal Code) is too ambiguous and as a result it is being used to persecute journalists, human rights defenders and activists under the pretext of national security. They have been used to silence dissent and close civic space, and international bodies called on Algeria to harmonize national legislation with global human rights standards (CIHRS).

So, the recent specialist roundtables, they reinforced warnings by human rights actors that the crackdown on fundamental freedoms in Algeria is still going on; signal that counterterror work is already too much merged with authoritarian moves. Judicial control, limiting the action of NGOs, and harassing individuals for criticising the government have all been seen as means of stifling dissenting voices. There is some room for maneuver for NGOs working in the field of economic rights, but those engaging on sensitive issues such as corruption, immigration or cultural rights are severely restricted. Analysts outside Algeria have pressed Belgrade to revise its penal code and guarantee counterterror campaigns are not being used as a pretext to lock up human rights campaigners or to throttle public discussion (MENARights).

While Algerian security strategy was obviously formulated in a context of terrorist threats and violent events, this tension between security and rights also influenced U.S. policy as Washington looks to balance the need of the two nations to maintain a functioning security relationship while seeking better human rights performance from Algiers. US outreach should be careful, lending support to Algeria's counterterrorism capacity without endorsing or enabling abuses. Indeed, bilateral cooperation can only be sustained in the longer term with human rights-sensitive security assistance, promotion of rule of law, and strengthening of civil society organizations in the receiving countries that demand for transparency and accountability (Roberts). 1.2  Adapting to Emerging and Non-traditional Threats

The shifting contours of security from conventional terrorism to more irregular forms of threat like cyberterrorism, disinformation, and transnational organized crime necessitate a change in U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation. With the proliferation of digital technologies, extremist groups have exploited cyberspace for recruitment, dissemination of propaganda, and operational planning making cyber resilience a critical front for future cooperation (Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, 2021). Although improvement is needed on both sides, Ait-Hida and Boukhars observed that both countries have acknowledged the need to strengthen their own cyber capabilities, with Algeria benefiting from U.S. assistance in developing its ability to establish its own frameworks for cyber responses and developing skills in digital forensics (Ait-Hida and Boukhars 5).

Not only cyber threats, the spread of disinformation campaigns — carried out in some cases by state and non-state actors — strongly affect public trust and social cohesion in Algeria and even in the region. U.S. agencies have started over the past year sharing best practices for countering online radicalization and spotting concerted misinformation campaigns with their Algerian counterparts. Future cooperation, as suggested by the U.S. Department of State, could involve the joint monitoring of extremist content on social media platforms, the creation of early- warning systems, and digital-literacy programs designed to strengthen social immunity against manipulation (U.S. Department of State 12).

The United States and Algeria can further collaborate on transnational organized crime, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and illicit financial flows. Naturally, criminal and terrorist networks are closely intertwined in the Sahel and Maghreb making comprehensive approaches combining law enforcement, intelligence and judicial cooperation necessary. Algeria is willing to share intelligence, and its involvement in regional task forces, which the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes one of the most promising factors, plays a promising role, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime said. Nonetheless, broader national investment in transnational investigative capacity, antioney-laundering tools and judicial reforms will be critical to a lasting impact (UNODC 24).

## 5. Conclusion

Assessing the results of the U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism relationship since 9/11

suggests that the partnership has provided some measure of meaningful security effectiveness even as its basic structural and strategic weaknesses have remained. This partnership has significantly improved Algeria's intelligence and operational capabilities, preventing significant terrorist attacks, and has played a part in the increase in professionalism of the Algerian security forces. By means of intelligence sharing, joint military training, and capacity-building programs, both have managed to curb terrorist activity and improve border security, establishing Algeria as a regional counterterrorism leader.

However, th successes are tempered by deeper lingering challenges. This was due to the fact that the Sahel region has long suffered from instability owing to weak governance, wide-ranging socio-economic grievances, and the proliferation of armed groups, factors that military solutions cannot solely address. The partnership has frequently emphasized security and militarization over economic development and inclusive governance, thus limiting its resonance beyond the underlying drivers of extremism. Moreover, the absence of transparency in bilateral treaties as well as mutual distrust in the sharing of information and concerns around human rights violations have limited the scope and quality of cooperation1.

Sustaining U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation moving forward will require both countries to successfully adapt to changing hazards and expand the focus of their partnership. These include greater economic development and technological innovation in security strategies, transparency and accountability, and, importantly,

counterterrorism measures that respect human rights and civil liberties. This partnership needs to look beyond its tactical gains and ensure that these long-term multidimensional challenges are addressed to promote durable regional stability and climate resilience against potential security challenges.

# General Conclusion

The post 9/11 trajectory of U.S. foreign policy towards Algeria lays bare the interplay of global security imperatives and regional realities. This research has explored the development of U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation, highlighting both the geopolitical ends that have propelled this partnership and the complex obstacles that have informed its trajectory. The results show that even if many operational ties and variables related to cooperation have improved, the relationship is still considered work-in-progress for most respondents.

The Global War on Terror reoriented U.S. counterterrorism policy away from a focus on European terrorists, which had characterized much of the Cold War era, and into a region-wide perspective that identified U.S. interests with the defeat of radical Islamic terrorism in North Africa, placing Algeria front and center due to its historically strategic geographic location and battlefield experience with violent extremism. This has translated into more intelligence exchanges, military cooperation and collaborative actions to curb the spill over of terrorist threats into the Maghreb and Sahel. Such initiatives have not gone without resultant tactical successes  from dismantled terrorist networks to reinforced regional security architectures.

At the same time, however, the research highlights the persistent impediments to cooperation between Washington and Algiers. But national priorities diverged at times, while a focus on human rights and political reform, combined with the wider instability in the Sahel, limited the depth and sustainability of the partnership. Transparency,

confidence building measures, the need for security and respect of sovereignty — these are the issues that continue to dominate the bilateral dialogue between them. In addition, changes in the regional threat environment and the actions of other international actors both require ongoing adjustments to cooperative approaches and assessments about the future of these structures.

The qualitative framework employed in this study emphasises the complexity, contextuality, and contingency of such partnerships for international counter terrorism work. The example of the U.S.-Algerian experience shows that security cooperation can lead to real dividends, but only so long as the root political, social, and economic problems are dealt with. Long-term stability can derive neither from basic but solid security nor from the unmitigated implementation of human rights, good governance, and inclusive development.

More broadly, U.S.-Algerian counterterrorism cooperation in the post-9/11 period provides lessons learned that ought to inform both the design of future international security partnerships and the specifics of U.S. bilateral engagement in Africa. Policymakers should therefore adopt measures that build trust, enhance transparency, and align security components with overall stabilization and development efforts. An analysis of the successes and limitations of the U.S.- Algeria partnership will enable adaptability for future rounds of cooperation, which can be more effectively customized to meet the multifaceted and changing challenges of transnational terrorism throughout the region.

# Works Cited

Ait-Hida, Siham, and Anouar Boukhars. "Algeria and the Evolving Threat of

Cyberterrorism." Journal of North African Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2023, pp. 1-

18, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13629387.2023.2174321.

AlShehhi, Khalifa. "Private Military Security Companies in the Middle East and North

Africa." Puty Mira, Feb.2023,

https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/puty_miru/2023/02/15-

AlShehhi3.pdf.

Amnesty International. Algeria: Human Rights Violations in Counterterrorism

Operations. Amnesty International,2020,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde28/1234/2020/en/

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). "Sahel 2020: A Year in

Review." 3 Feb. 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/02/03/sahel-2020-a-year-in-

review/.

Arieff, Alexis. Algeria: Current Issues. Congressional Research Service, 13 Nov.

2013, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42664.

Arieff, Alexis. "Algeria and the Crisis in Mali." Ifri, 2012, pp. 1–24,

https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/atoms/files/actuell

esarieffinal.pdf.

Arieff, Alexis. "Algeria and the Sahel: Diplomacy, Security, and Leadership."

Congressional Research Service, 2015, p. 9.

Arieff, Alexis. "The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership." Congressional Research

Service, 16 July 2017, p. 2, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL34003.pdf.

Arieff, Alexis. "U.S.-Algerian Security Cooperation and Regional Counterterrorism."

Policy Center for the New South, 1 July 2011, p. 2,

https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/usalgerian-security-cooperation-and-

regional-counterterrorism.

Best, Richard A., Jr. "The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities

and Potential Congressional Concerns." Congressional Research Service, 19 Jan.

2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R41022.pdf.

Bąkowski, Piotr. "United States: Domestic Violent Extremism on the Rise." European

Parliamentary Research Service, Oct2023,

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/754561/EPRS_BRI(

2023)754561_EN.pdf.

Blanchard, Christopher M. "Algeria: Current Issues." Congressional Research

Service,2011, pp. 1-25, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RS21532.pdf.

Boukhars, Anouar. "The Algerian Security Approach Towards the Sahel." Ortadoğu

Etütleri, vol. 4, no. 2, 2012, pp. 20–21,

https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/328690.

Boukhars, Anouar. "Algeria's Evolving Role in the Fight Against Violent Extremism."

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017,

https://carnegieendowment.org/middleeast/diwan/2017/08/the-angry-

periphery?lang=en.

Boukhars, Anouar. "The Angry Periphery." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2017/08/the-angry-

periphery?lang=en.

Boukhars, Anouar. "Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's

Pivotal Ambivalence." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 7 Sept.

2021, https://africacenter.org/publication/regional-security-cooperation-in-

theaghreb-andsahel-algerias-pivotal-ambivalence/.

Boutton, Andrew. "Military Aid and Counterterrorism in the Sahel." Security Studies,

vol.28, no. 3, 2019, pp. 235-261,

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604988.

Byman, Daniel. "The Attackers, Intelligence, and Counter-Terrorism Policy." Brookings

Institution, Mar. 2003,

https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/byman20030331-1.pdf.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Algeria's Evolving Security Role in North

Africa and the Sahel." 2015, p. 12,

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/algeria_security.pdf.

Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. "National Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Algeria:

Lessonsfor Libya." European University Institute, 2022, pp. 13– 16,

https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/74436/QM-01-22-317-EN-N.pdf.

Chikhaoui, Arslan. "The Non-Alignment Posture of Algeria's Foreign Policy." NESA
Center, 25 July 2022, https://nesa-center.org/the-non-alignment-posture-of-algerias-
foreignpolicy/.

Chivvis, Christopher S., and Andrew Liepman. North Africa's Menace: AQIM's Evolution
and the U.S. Policy Response. RAND Corporation, 2017,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1234.html.

CNA Corporation. "The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership." 2014, p. 1,
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/crm-2014-u-007203-final.pdf.

Combating Terrorism Center. "Evolving Approaches in Algerian Security  Cooperation."
CTC Sentinel, 29 June 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/evolving-approaches-
inalgerian-security-cooperation/.

"Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets." Brookings
Institution, 20 Aug. 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/comparing-al-qaeda-
and-isisdifferent-goals-different-targets/.

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). "Algeria: Human rights activists
denounce claims of Algerian UPR delegation to the United Nations regarding human
rights situation in the country." 15 Nov. 2022, https://cihrs.org/algeria-human-rights-
activistsdenounce-claims-of-algerian-upr-delegation-to-the-united-nations-regarding-
human-rightssituation-in-the-country/?lang=en.

Davis, Lois M., et al. Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement's Post-9/11 Focus on
Counterterrorism and Homeland Security. U.S. Department of Justice,

2010, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232791.pdf.

El Mquirmi, Nihal. "Navigating in a Grey Zone: Regulating PMSCs." Policy Center for

the New South, Apr.

2022https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/20204/PB_27- 22_Mquirmi.pdf.

Entelis, John P. Algeria: Democracy Denied, and Revived? Lynne Rienner Publishers,

2011.

Entelis, John P. Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. Routledge, 2016.

European Parliament. "Algeria's underused potential in security cooperation in the Sahel."

24 June 2013,

p.2https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491510/

EXPOAFET_SP(2013)491510_EN.pdf.

"Extraordinary Rendition., 2

Sept.2015,https://www.britannica.com/topic/extraordinaryrendition.

Farrow, Alexander. Drone Warfare as a Military Instrument of Counterterrorism

Strategy. Air University Press, 2016,

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_Spanish/Journals/Volume-

28_Issue4/2016_4_02_farrow_s_eng.pdf.

Gherieb, Hakim. "US-Algeria Cooperation in Transnational Counterterrorism." The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 27 Mar. 2017,

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/us-algeria-cooperation-

transnationalcounterterrorism.

Harmon, Stephen A. Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region. Ashgate, 2014, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1hfr0q1.

Hewitt, Steve. Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Prevent Future Attacks. U.S. Department of Justice, 2016, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf.

"How Effective Are the Post-9/11 U.S. Counterterrorism Policies in Preventing Terror Attacks and Reducing Casualties Against American Targets?" Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 2024, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08874034241271175.

Hsu, Spencer S. "Department of Homeland Security, 20 Years Later: Mission Creep and Unmet Promises." The Washington Post, 25 Nov. 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/11/25/homeland-securityanniversary/.

Hull, Jeanne. "We're All Smarter Than Any One of Us: The Role of Inter-Agency Collaboration." Princeton University, https://jpia.princeton.edu/document/385.

Human Rights Watch. "Algeria: Unresolved Disappearances and Accountability." 2003, p.10, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/algeria0203/algeria0203.pdf.

Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. National Security in a Post-9/11 World: The Rise of Surveillance. 2004, https://www.ipc.on.ca/en/media/2299/download?attachment.

International Crisis Group. "Sahel: Confronting New Frontlines of Instability." Africa

Report No. 324, 2024, pp. 1–30, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/324 sahel-confronting-newfrontlines-instability.

International Trade Administration. "Algeria - Defense." U.S. Department of Commerce, 31 Jan. 2023, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/algeria-defense.

"Jihadism and Counterterrorism Policy in Algeria: New Responses to New Challenges." Jamestown Foundation, 20 Sept. 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/jihadism-and counterterrorism-policy-in-algeria-new-responses-to-new-challenges/.

Landers, Neil Grant. Representing the Algerian Civil War: Literature, History, and the State. University of California, Berkeley,2012 https://escholarship.org/content/qt6vv8w9qg/qt6vv8w9qg_noSplash_3079fd78e07f0f e830 9a75ac2a883b70.pdf.

Lebovich, Andrew. "The Risks and Limits of Military Responses to Sahelian Instability." European Council on Foreign Relations, 28 May 2020, p.3, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_risks_and_limits_of_military_responses_to_sahelian_i nstability/.

Lebovich, Andrew. "The Risks of Securitized U.S. Assistance in the Sahel." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020, pp. 1– 10, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/05/risks-of-securitized-u.s.-assistance-in- sahel-pub80975.

Legal 500. "FDI screening in Algeria: sectorial approach does not preclude activity-

specific scrutiny." 12 May 2025, https://www.legal500.com/developments/thought-leadership/fdiscreening-in-algeria-sectorial-approach-does-not-preclude-activity-specific-scrutiny/.

Levitt, Matthew. "Rethinking U.S. Efforts on Counterterrorism: Toward a Sustainable Plan Two Decades After 9/11." The Washington Institute, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/4620.

Lewis, Larry, and Diane Vavrichek. Rethinking the Drone War: National Security, Legitimacy, and Civilian Casualties in U.S. Counterterrorism Operations. CNA Corporation, 2015, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/RethinkingTheDroneWar.pdf

Lounnas, Djallil. "Algeria and the Sahelian Quandary: The Limits of Mediation and Security Cooperation." MENARA Working Papers, no. 28, 2019, pp. 1-16, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_wp_28.pdf.

MENARights. "Crackdown on freedoms in Algeria: a panel of experts calls for urgent reforms." 22 Apr. 2025, https://menarights.org/en/articles/crackdown-freedoms-algeria-panelexperts-calls-urgent-reforms.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Algeria - African Union." 6 May 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.dz/foreign-policy/multilateral-relations/algeria-african-union.

Mrozik, Agnieszka. "Countering Terrorism in the Shadows: The Role of Private Security and Military Companies." Security and Defence Quarterly, 19 Dec. 2020, https://securityanddefence.pl/Countering-terrorism-in-the-shadows-The-role-

of-privatesecurity-andilitary-companies,130817,0,2.html.

MENAFATF. Synthesis of National Risk Assessment Report on Money Laundering and

Terrorist Financing in Algeria. MENAFATF, 2024,

ctrf.mf.gov.dz/pdf/ENR/ENG/Synthesis%20NRA%20report.pdf.

Open Society Justice Initiative. Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and

Extraordinary Rendition. 2012, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/655bbd41-08 4df3-

940c-18a3bd9ed956/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf.

Pimentel, Martin, et al. "US, Algeria sign 'first-of-its-kind' agreement to expand military

cooperation." DefenseScoop, 29 Jan. 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/01/29/us-

algeriadefense-cooperationou-agreement-to-expandilitary-cooperation/.

Porter, Geoff D. "Counterterrorism Cooperation in the Sahel." Journal of Strategic

Studies, vol. 41, no. 4, 2018, pp. 85- 102,

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2018.1473547.

Policy Center for the New South. "U.S.-Algerian Security Cooperation and Regional

Counterterrorism." 1 July 2011, p. 2, https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/us-

algeriansecurity-cooperation-and-regional-counterterrorism.

Qasi, Mohamed. "United States Security/Military Ties to the Maghreb." University of

Guelma, 2022, pp. 1-30

https://dspace.univguelma.dz/jspui/bitstream/123456789/13607/1/M%20821.385.pdf.

Refworld. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Algeria."

2017, https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/usdos/2017/en/118006.

Roberts, Hugh. "Algeria's Fight Against Armed Islamism: Success, Challenges, and

    Regional Implications." European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2014, pp. 1-

    20, https://www.iemed.org/publication/algerias-fight-against-armed-islamism-

    successchallenges-and-regional-implications.

 Roberts, Hugh. "U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror." Carnegie

    Endowment for International Peace, 17 June 2009,

    https://carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/17/u.s.-algerian-security-cooperatio and-

    war-onterror-pub-23276.

Rollins, John, and Shawn Reese. "Department of Homeland Security: Issues and

    Challenges." Congressional Research Service, 15 Jan.

    2014, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R40602.pdf.

RAND Corporation. "Improving U.S. Security Assistance to North Africa." 2017, p.

    28, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1776.html.

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). "Algeria Counters Terrorism." 13 July 1999, p.

    10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26006007.

SHOAA for Human Rights. "The Algerian authorities are Weaponizing counter-terrorism

    against civil society and civic space." 8 Feb. 2023, https://shoaa.org/report-the-

    algerianauthorities-are-weaponizing-counter-terrorism-against-civil-society-and-

    civic-space/.

Schwartz, Joshua A., et al. "Drones and the Reduction of Terrorist Activity." Harvard

    Kennedy School, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/procon/drones-debate.

Shapiro, Jeremy. "Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in the Sahel." Brookings

   Institution, 2014, p. 40, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

   content/uploads/2016/06/TransatlanticCounterterrorism-Cooperation-in-the-

   Sahel.pdf.

"A Short Examination Of The Causes Of The 1992 Algerian Civil War." Yale Review of

   International Studies, 11 Nov. 2024, https://yris.yira.org/column/a-short-examination-

   of-thecauses-of-the-1992-algerian-civil-war/.

   \

 Sour, Lotfi. "Algeria's Role in the African Sahel: Toward a New Security

       Paradigm." International Journal of Euroediterranean Studies, vol. 15, no. 2,

       2022,p.995, https://emuni.si/ISSN/2232-6022/15.155-177.pdf.

 State Department. Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Algeria. U.S. Department of

 State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/algeria/.

 Stern, Jessica, and J.M. Berger. "Post-9/11 US Military and Intelligence Approaches to

       Lone Actors." Lone-Actor Terrorism: An Integrated Framework, Oxford

       Academic, 2022, https://academic.oup.com/book/40137/chapter/341469141.

 'Adapting to Threats: US Counterterrorism Strategy After 9/11." RSIS, 10 Sept.

       2024, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/adapting-to-threats-us-

       counterterrorism-strategyafter-9-11/.

 The Rendition Project. "Human Rights and International

       Law." https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/about/issues/hrs-and-intl-

law.html.

Thurston, Alexander. Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel. Cambridge University Press, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv1dwq1q.

Transparency International Defence & Security. "Algeria Country Brief." 2020, pp. 2-3, https://ti-defence.org/gdi/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/11/Algeria_GDI-2020-Brief.pdf.

U.S. Agency for International Development,  2020, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Sahel_Development_Program_2020.pdf.

U.S. Congress. "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2021." Congress.gov, Sec. 4, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/567/text.

U.S. Department of Commerce. "Algeria - Digital Economy." 19 Sept. 2024, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/algeria-digital-economy.

U.S. Department of Commerce. "Algeria - Safety and Security - Data Privacy Framework." https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Algeria-Safety-and-Security.

U.S. Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-

National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Department of Homeland Security: Progress

Report. 2022, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-

11/22_1120_plcy_progressreport.pdf.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Implementing 9/11 Commission

Recommendations." https://www.dhs.gov/implementing-911-commission-

recommendations.

U.S. Department of Justice. "Ten Years Later: The Justice Department after

9/11." https://www.justice.gov/archive/911/counterterrorism.html.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "Transnational Organized Crime

in the Maghreb and Sahel." 2022, pp. 24-29,

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-

andanalysis/tocta/2022/Regional_Analysis_Maghreb_Sahel.pdf.

"Understanding United States Ties to the Maghreb before and after 9/11." University of

Guelma, 16 Dec. 2024,

https://dspace.univguelma.dz/jspui/bitstream/123456789/16726/1/M821.466.p

df.

Volman, Daniel. "U.S. Security Assistance to North Africa: The Case of Algeria."

African Security Review, vol. 23, no. 3, 2014, pp. 243- 255,

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2014.938019.

Wehrey, Frederic. "Algeria's Role in African Security." Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 3 Apr. 2014,

https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/03/algeria-s-role-inafrican-security-pub-55238.

White House. "Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism." 27 June 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/27/factsheet-national-strategy-for-countering-domestic-terrorism-strategic-implementation-update/.

Zoubir, Yahia H. "Algeria's Role in the Sahel Crisis." The Sahel: Regional Politics and Dynamics, edited by John Smith, JSTOR, 2019, pp. 115-140, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1hfr0q0.

Zoubir, Yahia H. Algeria and Transatlantic Relations. Pennsylvania State University Press, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/j.ctv1qwwf5.

Zoubir, Yahia H., and Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche. Global Security Watch: The Maghreb. Praeger, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1hfr0q0.

Zoubir, Yahia H. "U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 June 2009, p. 4, https://carnegieendowment.org/2009/06/17/u.s.-algerian-security-cooperation-and-waron-terror-pub-23276.

Zoubir, Yahia H. "The United States and Maghreb–Sahel Security." In North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation, edited by Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández, Routledge, 2008, pp. 195-210.