



People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Mohamed Khider University of Biskra
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of Foreign Languages

MASTER THESIS

Letters and Foreign Languages
English Studies
Literature and Civilization

US Foreign Policy and the Rise of China: The New Silk Road Project

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Academic Year: 2021-2022

Dedications

I express my gratitude to Allah for giving me the power and the ability to finish this dissertation.

I gladly dedicate this work to my loving mother, who showers me with endless love, and to the most important man in my life, dearest Father, who encourages and teaches me how to conquer life's difficulties. You are our family's pride and delight.

To my brothers who always had my back and encouraged me get back up when I was down.

My Sisters, I appreciate you being there from the beginning, patiently listening to me, and always believing in me.

Acknowledgments

This work is the result of a great deal of kindness on the part of many; First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor, **Nadjiba LOULOU**. I owe her my gratitude for her suggestions; I'm Lucky to be one of your students.

Much respect and appreciation to all the jury members who accept to examine this work **Mr. Salim KERBOUA**, Mr. **Zakaria SENOUCI**, and Mrs. **Asma CHRIET**.

Declaration

I therefore declare that the content of this dissertation is purely the result of my research, and that appropriate references or acknowledgements to the work of other researchers are made where required.

Signature

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Abir', with a stylized flourish underneath.

Abir Daas

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the implications of China's building of the New Silk Road for US foreign policy. President Xi Jinping began this program in 2013 with the goal of consolidating China's place as a global economic power while also strengthening economic connections with the rest of the world.

The New Silk Road, also known as "One Belt, One Road," aims to promote trade and strengthen economic ties between the Middle Kingdom and Europe by connecting a vast network of infrastructures in Eurasia and some African regions, such as seaports, airports, railways, and pipelines, and integrating markets. The New Silk Road will have far-reaching political, economic, and security repercussions for all countries participating and beyond because of its scale. As a result, and given the ambiguity surrounding this initiative, continued research into the long-term effects of its development is essential.

Chinese officials claim that all participating nations will gain equally from this project, and some experts think that the global economy will benefit especially since it is anticipated to boost trade, investment, and access to new markets while also enhancing connectivity by constructing and modernizing infrastructure. The US, on the other hand, worries that Beijing would utilize the New Silk Road to increase its influence on the Old Continent, which would constitute a new form of colonialism. The US initially maintained a friendly attitude while refusing to accept China's president's request to join the AIIB in order to bring the world closer together (interest harmony); however, relations later deteriorated under Trump's presidency as he adopted aggressive strategies to thwart China's advancement.

Key Words: *China; economic Power; harmony of interests; New Silk Road; OBOR; United States*

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BRI: Built Initiative Road

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CRP: People's Republic of China

EEU: Eurasian Economic Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FTA: Free Trade Areas

GATT: The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade

MFN: Most Favorable Nation

NSR: New Silk Road

OBOR: One Built One Road

PNTR: Permanent Normal Trading Rights

SOE: State Owned Enterprise

SREB: Silk Road Economic Built

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

WTO: World Trade Organization

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ملخص

General Introduction

Great changes have occurred in China and the world over the past two decades. The Chinese government has altered and improved its foreign policy concepts in response. China maintains a peaceful foreign policy on its own. The policy's main goals are to protect China's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and to encourage friendly contacts and cooperation with other nations. In addition to maintaining world peace, promote common growth through working for a better international and peripheral environment for the country's reform and modernization push.

Current Chinese-American ties, according to the majority of commentators, are complex and varied. In most cases, the United States and China are neither allies nor adversaries. The US administration does not regard China as an adversary, but rather as a competitor in some areas and a partner in others. The United States and China are engaged in a protracted and costly trade war that, even if resolved through negotiations, is unlikely to provide a long-term stable foundation. In terms of international economic and political affairs, the importance of China's rise is felt by all countries, with an emphasis on the economics and the belief that strong economies will lead to political supremacy. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the One Belt One Road (OBOR) plan. OBOR is also known as the as the New Silk Road Project or Initiative.

China's rise and “the New Silk Road Initiative” constitute a threat to the United States' global hegemony. The goal of this megaproject is to transform deep-sea trade from Southeast Asia to Europe, as well as to set the participating countries on the path to economic prosperity through coastal infrastructure improvements. The conflict between China and the United States is regarded as a major source of tension.

This analysis is carried out in order to identify the national and international implications of OBOR, which is currently in its early stages. Countries along the OBOR initiatives have

expressed political concerns, objections, and interests. OBOR intends to demonstrate the current state of the US- China relations, as well as the consequences of the new Chinese development plan's disclosure.

This study's propose is to investigate the main research question on that subject:

-What impacts have the launch of the "One Belt, One Road" project had US-China relations?

To answer the main question, the present study also needs to answer and examine the following sub-questions in three chapters:

- What key guiding ideas govern American foreign policy?
- What developments contributed to China's economic expansion?
- How does the New Silk Road Project impact US interests?
- How has US responded to China's NSR growth?

This research looks into the difference between the US and China foreign policy and the nature of China's current economic relations with the United States, as well as the techniques and aims that both China and the US are pursuing. It also tries to explain the Silk Road's most significant impact on China's development, which is an increase in economic activity.

Researchers have been interested in China's economic development over the last two decades. The United States is afraid that China will continue to grow in strength and ambition, not just economically, because of the complex factors that have interacted to shape United States policy toward China. This topic will not only examine the two actors' foreign policies, but will also highlight that the United States has yet to reach a policy of consensus on the relationship's potential strategic and defense benefits, or to consolidate a set of stable bilateral ties in the areas of trade and culture. To sum up, each country's leaders and domestic policies will continue to have a significant impact on the relationship between the two countries, as well as the rest of the world.

The methodology followed to investigate the US foreign Policy and the Rise of China; The New Silk Road, depends on descriptive, historical, and analytical approaches.

The descriptive method is used to describe the US-China relations, which covers a wide range of topics, including security, commerce, and broad economic issues, as well as the environment and human rights. However, the historical method is employed to shed light on the growth of new powers, which has frequently resulted in conflict. XI Jinping, China's new leader, has pushed hard for the US to agree to a "new model of major nation relationship" with the US that aims to avoid such a scenario. The analytical approach is for analyzing trade tensions between the United States and China, as well as their impact on global production networks. This approach is also used to analyze the impacts of NSR on the American interests and what strategies are used by the American government to hinder the Chinese rapid growth spread and protect its global dominance.

The thesis will be divided into three chapters. To create the framework for a comprehensive evaluation of the problem and a comprehensive investigation that produces solid conclusions.

The first chapter of this thesis is the theoretical section, which examines the conceptual underpinning of United States foreign policy over time, US as a global hegemonic power and; US-China relations. Their ties have progressed from harsh standoffs to a complicated combination of increased diplomacy, growing international rivalry, and increasingly interconnected economies. The second chapter represents the historical part which focuses on historical, political, and economic interactions between the United States and China in the context of the trade, and technology mentioning the problems, and challenges between the United States and China. The last chapter discusses China becoming the world's second largest economy by building the "New Silk Road" as a trade network that involves Asia,

Africa, and Europe, and its impact on the American interests and how America is facing this threat.

OBOR "One Belt, One Road" is a rebirth of the old Silk Road, but it has a significant impact on the global economy by bringing a big portion of the world under one roof. It expands its potential by building a historical infrastructure and connecting individuals all over the world through political, economic, and cultural exchanges. Because the majority of the OBOR members are developing nations, infrastructure development should be a primary priority for the OBOR initiative's worldwide future development (Sarker et al18.).

When it comes to the conflict with the United States, Chinese experts have different viewpoints. Many have questioned the United States as a conventional power, emphasizing the significant disparities between "One Belt, One Road" and the Marshall Strategy, America's big postwar development plan. The Marshall Plan had a clear ideological underpinning for them, as it imposed some political conditions on the recipient countries in order to earn their assistance in the battle against the Soviet Union. The OBOR, on the other hand, is based on "open cooperation" (kaifang hezuo) and is seen as an unconditional strategy to help China's neighbors grow their economies (Clemente 15).

According to Wang Jisi, a professor at the University of Beijing who was the first to suggest the need to rebuild the Silk roads to Southern and Central Asia in October 2012, The OBOR plan should not be viewed as a reaction to the United States' presence in the West and Pacific. Even if the United States, Russia, and the European Union are putting in place strategies to enhance their influence in the East, China should not limit its foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region, but should insist on its "march towards the West".

According to Li Ziguo, deputy director of the "One Belt, One Road" research center (affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' China Institute of International Studies), the OBOR is a new model of economic cooperation, born with the goal of building a community

of interests and security between China and its neighbors, rather than in response to America's and Russia's activity in Asia (Clemente 21).

President Xi Jinping's announcement of the New Silk Road at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's September 2013 meeting in Kazakhstan, as well as the New Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia in October 2014, sparked what has now become the greatest burst of infrastructure development on a global scale in history, along with the BRICS initiative. The only comparable process was Franklin D. Roosevelt's massive infrastructure construction in the United States in the 1930s—except this new process is global in scale. Xi Jinping has even personally urged President Barack Obama to join the process, which aims to bring the entire world together to raise the human race's standard of living and production through a "harmony of interests" that America previously championed as its own (Billington 20).

Ironically, the ongoing renaissance in China is affected greatly by the "Harmony of Interests" that characterized the original American System of political economy, which was introduced into China perhaps by its greatest citizen, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the father of the Republican Revolution in 1911, overthrowing the imperial Qing Dynasty and bringing Alexander Hamilton's American System to China. Unfortunately, in the Bush and Obama eras, that American System was methodically undermined, even if it is still alive and well in China (Billington 25).

Cooperation and people-to-people connections, which are two of the OBOR's essential components, have received little attention. The media, as well as specialists, neglect the intricate roles that culture and history play in the implementation of such mega initiatives. OBOR, according to critics such as Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang, is a "debt trap" for poor countries, particularly Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Several studies on OBOR concerns have been undertaken, with the majority of them focusing on policy issues connected to OBOR projects (Lo 2).

Chapter One

Conceptual framework: US Foreign Policy

Obtaining collective action around the "national interest" is crucial in foreign policy. Given the dangers that exist in the international system, Americans have a phrase that "politics stops at the water's edge," which Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican, advocated in 1947, indicating that the country should join together to achieve its common foreign policy goals. The notion of national interest is just as significant in foreign policy as historical memory. George Washington once called for the US to have "as few political ties as feasible" with foreign nations. Despite the fact that this, America's oldest foreign policy foundation, still persists in our political culture, the United States has evolved into a substantial international power with dynamic and strategic ties to the rest of the world. The goals of American foreign policy are discussed in this chapter, as well as their implications for United States and China relations.

1.1. United States Foreign Policy

Scholars have defined the phrase "foreign policy" in a variety of ways, but they all agree that it refers to a country's behavior toward other countries. For example, Hermann describes foreign policy as "the discrete purposeful action that results from an individual or group of individuals' political level choice. It is the visible result of a decision made at the political level. It is a result of the decision, not the decision itself" (qtd. in Neack 2007). As can be seen from this, Charles Hermann defines foreign policy as a state behavior.

Diplomacy is synonymous with foreign policy. It is the development and maintenance of a formal relationship between countries that govern their interactions on issues such as tourism, trade taxation, and plane landings on each other's runways. While diplomatic ties are not always bright, when they are, it indicates that things between the countries are doing well. The exchange of ambassadors serves to formalize diplomatic relations. Ambassadors are

country representatives who live in the other country and keep an office known as an embassy. Calling them home symbolizes the conclusion of the partnership, much as swapping ambassadors formalize the bilateral relationship between countries. When the US government is trying to resolve a disagreement with another country, diplomacy is usually the first step (“Diplomacy: The U.S. Department...”).

George Modelski identifies the fundamental aims of foreign policy as those components of policy that try to influence states' current behavior. Foreign policy, on the other hand, entails not just change, but also the continuation of behavior across time. It is concerned with both change and the status quo to the extent that both serve the national interest (Cottam 98).

Isolationism and non-interventionism were the national policies of the United States for the first 200 years of its history. After 20 years of service to the United States of America George Washington penned it near the end of his second presidential term, just before stepping down, he counseled American citizens to see themselves as a unified unit and to avoid political parties, as well as to be careful of foreign alliances and entanglements. George Washington's farewell address is frequently credited with laying the groundwork for America's non-interventionist tradition: "In extending our commercial contacts with foreign nations, the most important rule for us is to have as little political connection with them as possible." (“George Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796”). In his inauguration address on March 4, 1801, President Thomas Jefferson expanded on Washington's principles, saying, "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none" (“The History of American Foreign Policy”).

In 1799, Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry 1977:

I am for free commerce with all nations; political connection with none; and little or no diplomatic establishment. And I am not for linking ourselves by new treaties with the quarrels of Europe; entering that field of slaughter to

preserve their balance. ... The first object of my heart is my own country. ... I have not one farthing of interest, nor one fibre of attachment out of it, but in proportion as they are more or less friendly to us. ("The History of American Foreign Policy")

President Thomas Jefferson argued that trade and economic pressure might give logical alternatives to war for the country. He was an outspoken supporter of land-based expansion across North America. He believed that such development would allow the United States to remain an agrarian republic, and he referred to the country as an "empire of liberty" as it grew: The more land it acquired, the more yeoman farmers it employed, the greater its independence from Europe ("Jefferson on Politics and Government").

Throughout the nineteenth century United States' non-interventionism policy was maintained. President James Monroe stated the most well-known United States policy toward the Western Hemisphere, Monroe Doctrine in 1823, cautions European nations that the United States will not allow future colonialism or puppet monarchs. The doctrine was created to address immediate issues, but it quickly became a watchword for US strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Which some have construed as non-interventionist: "In the conflicts of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it correspond with our policy, so to do. We only resent hurts or prepare for our defense when our rights are violated upon or substantially threatened" (qtd. in Quinn 77).

The French Emperor Napoleon III invited the United States to "join in a protest to the Tsar" after Tsar Alexander II put down the 1863 January Uprising in Poland. Secretary of State William H. Seward flatly refused, defending "our policy of non-intervention—straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may appear to other nations," and insisting that "the American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress by the wisdom with which

they should exercise their powers of self-government, turning down foreign alliances, intervention, and interference at all times and in every way" (qtd. in Seward 107).

The United States was able to remain neutral during World War I, but after Wilson Woodrow's reelection in 1916 with the slogan "he kept us out of war", Woodrow concluded that America could no longer remain neutral. In 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. Wilson proceeded to Europe after the war and stayed for months to work on the post-war treaty, which was the longest time any President had ever been outside the country. Wilson's "universal association of nations" was renamed the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles (Quinn 98).

In the late 1930s, as Europe got closer to war, the US Congress continued to demand American neutrality. The Neutrality Acts were passed by Congress between 1936 and 1937, much to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's chagrin. In September 1939 the break of the World War II, President Roosevelt promised the Americans that he would do everything possible to keep them out of war. His remarks, on the other hand, revealed his actual intentions. Roosevelt stated that: "When one country's peace is shattered, the peace of other countries is jeopardized". Despite his commitment to neutrality as the United States' official position, he warned of the risks of remaining out of the conflict. He also warned the American people not to let their desire to avoid conflict at all costs took priority over the country's security (Peters and Woolley13).

The European conflict divided Americans into opposing sides: non-interventionists and interventionists. The two factions disagreed about America's role in World War II. The interventionist argument was based on the dread of a German invasion. Non-interventionists based much of their reasoning on historical precedent, citing incidents such as George Washington's farewell address and World War I's failure. Isolationists believed that national security was more essential than any international conflict. The Roosevelt administration's

actions made it increasingly evident that the United States was heading toward war. The President's policy shift took place in two stages. The Fourth Neutrality Act, sometimes known as the 'Cash and Carry Act,' was passed in 1939 which allowed belligerents to buy war materials as long as they paid cash and carried the goods away in their own ships. The Lend-Lease Act of early 1941 was the second phase. This act gave the President the authority to "lend, lease, sell, or trade weapons, ammunition, food, or any defense information to any government whose defense the President deemed critical to the United States' defense"(qtd. in Quinn 95). The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, put an end to debates about American involvement in World War II in both the Pacific and European theaters. With only one dissenting vote, Congress declared war on Imperial Japan the day after the attack. Japan's allies, Germany and Italy, retaliated by declaring war on the United States. Faced with these facts and outraged by the attack on Pearl Harbor, ordinary Americans rallied to support the war effort. Isolation wasn't an option any longer (Quinn 95).

In the years following WWII, the United States was mostly directed by containment, or the goal of preventing communism from spreading beyond the countries where it already had a foothold such as in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, by contributing supplies, munitions, and occasionally troops. The program was implemented in a world torn apart by the Cold War, a conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment no longer made sense with the falling of the Soviet Union. As United States sole remaining superpower, by 1989, the United States had military alliances with 50 countries and had sent 526,000 troops to dozens of countries, with 326,000 in Europe (two-thirds of whom were in west Germany) and around 130,000 in Asia (mainly Japan and South Korea). During the 1990s, the United States largely reduced its foreign policy and cold war defense budgets, which totaled 6.5 percent of Gross Domestic product, in order to focus on domestic economic development under President Clinton, who succeeded in establishing a budget surplus in 1999 and 2000. While the United

States continues to be a powerful economic and military force, developing powers such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia, as well as a united Europe, have posed a threat to US dominance (Quinn 97).

1.2. The Principles of United States Foreign Policy

In the areas of commerce, diplomacy, defense, intelligence, foreign aid and global environmental policy, the president, Congress, and others pursue a range of goals and face a number of problems as they carry out US foreign policy. United States maintains relations with more than 180 countries in the world as well as many international organizations. *According to American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* book: “The goals that a state’s officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them” (Wittkopf et al.49). This definition Focus on some of the most important aspects of US foreign policy, such as national goals abroad and how the US attempts to achieve them

Protect the United States and Americans; throughout history, the United States has prioritized the security of its people and nation, and has attempted to achieve it. For example, in the nineteenth century, America had maintained an isolationist policy to avoid wars, which continued until the twenty-first century, when the president implemented containment and détente with communist countries to avoid wars between them. American security began at home, but it also went beyond its borders. In the name of homeland security, The State Department assists Americans who want to travel, do business, or reside overseas safely (“The U.S. Department of State”).

The safety of the United States and its inhabitants' lives both in the United States and when they travel abroad is important. The goal of defending the country's partners, or countries with which the US has a favorable and mutually beneficial relationship, is linked to this security purpose. Threats and risks in the international domain can take many forms, including

military threats from other countries or terrorist groups, as well as economic threats from boycotts and high trade tariffs. In an economic boycott, the US stops trading with another country until that country alters a policy that the US opposes. When commerce is suspended, items from the United States cannot be sold in that country, and goods from that country cannot be sold in the United States. For example, as Iran's nuclear energy program progressed in recent years, the US and other countries imposed an economic boycott on the country. The recent Iran nuclear deal is a contract in which Iran pledges to suspend nuclear development in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions by the US and six other countries, allowing trade with Iran to resume. Tariffs, or costs charged for transferring commodities from one country to another, are also trade barriers. Protectionist trade policies boost tariffs, making it more difficult for imported items to compete on price with domestic goods, which are now more expensive. These trade restrictions are hoped to be reduced by free trade agreements (“The U.S. Department of State”).

Advance democracy, human rights, and other global interests; America's second objective include human rights and democracy. It not only minimizes the likelihood of wars or conflicts, but also improves peaceful relations with foreign nations. Democracy acknowledges people's freely expressed wishes, decisions, and equal rights that applied to both men and women. Peace and tranquillity are the payoffs of other US foreign policy aims, such as stability. While considering its own strategic interests when considering foreign policy strategy, the United States still tries to support international peace through many aspects of its foreign policy, including foreign aid and support for and participation in international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization of American States. The militarization of US foreign policy is inextricably linked to the militarization of its own society, whether in terms of policing, incarceration and deportation, mass surveillance, or the increase of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and racism. The United States' goal, both at home

and internationally, is to commit to advancing liberation policies and working to deconstruct policies that oppress Black, brown, and other marginalized groups. The goal of US foreign policy is to promote the same principles of human rights, fairness, and self-determination that are sought at home through bolstering intersectional grassroots movements (“The U.S. Department of State”).

Economic Prosperity and Security; A third primary purpose of American foreign policy is economic development, which is mostly achieved through trade policy. American foreign economic strategy strives to increase employment in the United States, maintain access to foreign energy supplies, promote international investment in the United States, and cut prices for American consumers. The US has maintained economic policies that have effectively boosted global competitiveness and economic growth. The United States has generally had lower tax rates, less regulation, lower levels of unionization, and greater openness to foreign trade than other industrialized democracies. Growth, capital formation, and competitiveness have all been strong in the country. Trump's first three years were marked by the continuation of the Obama administration's robust economic growth (Daalder and Lindsay⁵).

The goal of US foreign policy is to ensure that the country has access to critical resources and markets around the world. Natural resources, such as oil, and economic resources, such as foreign capital investment in domestic infrastructure projects such as buildings, bridges, and weapons systems, are examples of resources; having access to the global market also means having access to things that American consumers would be interested in. Foreign policy in the United States also aims to promote the interests of American businesses, both in terms of selling domestic products in overseas markets and supporting global economic development especially in developing countries (Daalder and Lindsay⁶).

The way the United States interacts with other countries to facilitate the flow of commerce, commodities and services between them is known as trade policy. When a government

refuses to allow other countries to sell goods and services within its borders, or charges them exorbitant tariffs (or import taxes), it is considered to be indulging in protectionism. A free trade strategy, on the other hand, is one in which a country allows unrestricted movement of products and services between itself and other countries. The United States has been a proponent of free trade at times and protectionist at others. The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1991 was perhaps its most pro-free trade measure. Trade obstacles and other transaction expenses for commodities travelling between the United States, Mexico, and Canada were abolished as a result of this agreement. The link between a country's inflow and outflow of goods is known as the trade balance. Although the United States sells many goods and services around the world, it has a trade deficit, meaning that more goods and services are imported from other nations than are exported to be sold outside. The current trade imbalance in the United States is \$37.4 billion, indicating that the value of what the US imports from other nations exceeds the value of what it sends to other countries. Some have advocated for protectionist trade measures as a result of the trade deficit (Daalder and Lindsay⁸).

Promote international understanding of American values and policies; the third goal is mutual understanding between Americans and individuals from other countries helps the United States advance its national goals by establishing a sense of shared interests and values. For this reason, the State Department engages international audiences on problems of foreign policy, society, and values in order to contribute to the creation of an environment that is favorable to US national interests.

The US created new tactics and activities in the early 2000s to refocus public diplomacy on new security problems, including supporting the worldwide war on terrorism. However, by 2021, it is clear that their attempts have failed. Indeed, there is growing bipartisan acceptance that Beijing has been more effective than the US in advancing its interests and expanding its

authoritarianism through the use of national power instruments. As the People's Republic of China commits to utilizing technology to undermine human rights and democracy around the world, the risks of this strategic imbalance grow. "China's rise as a key player in the digital domain that uses its clout to promote digital authoritarianism raises fundamental security, privacy, and human rights concerns for the United States and the international community at large," the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations warned in a 2020 Democratic staff report (qtd. in Lips7).

1.3. America as a Global Hegemonic Power

The previous multi-polar system was replaced with a bipolar system after World War II ended. For four decades, the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) dominated the global system. The Cold War was a global struggle between two opposing great countries with significant economic, military, political, and social clout (Varisco2013). This was bolstered by the realist idea that sovereign states in international affairs balance each other's power (Nye Jr. 84). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there was a lot of discussion about the future of world politics. In the 1930s, Mearsheimer envisaged a multipolar system (Welsh2013). Huntington offered his self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly the "clash of civilizations," which Fukuyama said would spread liberal democracies throughout the world (Korany 61). He claimed that the interaction of Western and non-Western civilizations will now dominate international politics, resulting in conflict. Krauthammer devised a notion he called the unipolar moment in opposition to these assumptions and hypotheses (qtd. in Oezel 2).

The overall character, purpose, or direction of the United States' participation in international affairs, as well as the country's overall connection with the rest of the world, is referred to as its role in the world. The United States' role in the world can be viewed as providing an overall context or framework for United States policymakers to develop,

implement, and evaluate the success of United States policies and actions on specific international issues, as well as for foreign countries or other observers to interpret and understand U.S. actions on the global stage. While descriptions of the United States' role in the world since WWII vary in details, four key elements can be identified: global leadership, defense and promotion of the liberal international order, defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemony in Eurasia. The United States' role as world leader has resulted in substantial American involvement in foreign issues, which has been defined in a variety of ways. An internationalist foreign policy, a foreign policy of global engagement or deep engagement, a foreign policy that provides global public goods, a foreign policy of liberal order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony, an interventionist foreign policy, or a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony have all been described as goals pursued by the United States. The liberal international order was established by the United States with the help of its allies in the years following WWII. At the time, the United States was the only country with the ability and the will to create a new world order. It is widely regarded as reflecting United States governments' determination to avoid repeating the fatal major wars, extensive economic dislocation and suffering during the first part of the twentieth century (O'Rourke and Moodie 19).

The liberal order emerged in 1945 at the end of World War II and was propelled by the establishment of the United Nations system; the Bretton Woods Institutions; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, the liberal ideals were expanded by the various specialized agencies of the United Nations. The focus of the agencies among others has been to promote international peace and security and importantly, foster a common ground for development. This was

stimulated with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which guaranteed human rights within economic, social and cultural contexts (Amadi 2).

Defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights is also seen as a key component of United States soft power because it can encourage like-minded governments, as well as organizations and individuals in other countries, to collaborate with the US, and because it has the potential to shape the behavior of authoritarian and illiberal governments that are acting against US interests by shaming them and inspiring pro-democracy organizations. Since World War II, one aspect of the United States role in the world has been to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, which US politicians do not frequently say clearly in public. This is also known as maintaining a division of power in Eurasia, preventing key regions in Eurasia from falling under the dominance of a single power, or preventing the emergence of a spheres-of-influence world, which could occur as a result of the emergence of one or more regional hegemons in Eurasia. Eurasia is not reliably self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, implying that Eurasia's countries cannot be relied upon to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons through their own actions, and may require assistance from one or more countries outside Eurasia to do so (O'Rourke and Moodie 20).

A shift in the United States' leadership might have significant, perhaps profound, implications for the country's security, freedom, and prosperity. It has the potential to have a considerable impact on US policy in areas like relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights. Some observers, notably Trump supporters, claim that the US role in the world has changed less and been more consistent during the Trump administration, while conceding that the Trump administration has changed US foreign policy in comparison to the Obama administration's policies. Also argued that if the US role is changing, it began under the

Obama administration because of the calm response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and more broadly, its unwillingness, at least for the time being, to fully acknowledge and adapt to less cooperative and more confrontational relationships with Russia and China (O'Rourke and Moodie 21).

Given China's and other countries' tremendous development in wealth and power in recent years, the United States is no longer as powerful globally as it once was, and is becoming less dominant over time, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to continue to play a role of global leadership. Other world powers, such as China, have their own notions about international order, which differ from the existing liberal international system in many ways. The American economic hegemony can be seen in and through several characteristics. First, the dominance of its currency the "American Dollar" since it is considered as the global exchange currency. Second, due to its adaptation of the Capitalist system –the dominant economic system of the globe-, the United States gained its important position and its hegemonic powers. In addition, the worldwide spread of the United States' products and firms. It has also effectively spotted the technology industry. Capitalism was portrayed as a figure of success for America as an economic system that is solely different from the other existing systems at that time (O'Rourke and Moodie 21).

1.4. United States-China Relations 1949-2021

It is one of more significant relations between the United States and China, because it touches on a variety of problems including security, currency exchange, financial issues, and human rights issues. China's advancement directly affects the lives of around one-fifth of the world's population and indirectly affects the lives of a billion others around the world.

Since 1949, Sino- American relations have changed from a tense of war to a complex combination of more fierce diplomacy, increasingly fierce international competition, and increasingly close economic ties. For over half a century, relations have alternated and have

developed between the countries among cooperation, negotiation, and competition. Furthermore, Sino- American relations started to increase economically, educationally and exchanging cultures. Equally, the period (1970-1978) is considered as the beginning of warming relations between the two countries, especially after President Richard Nixon's announcement that he is planning to visit China. This visit according to MacMillan (2008) was a huge turning point in Sino-American relations. It was also considered as a major change in American foreign agenda. He commented on the United States' President Visit to China asserting that this historic visit to Beijing by Nixon is considered as the first step to normalizing ties with the Chinese Communist (PRC) in which it has finished the 25 years of separation between them. The American President Nixon called his "eight-day visit" to China as "the week that changed the world" (qtd. in Zhang 8, 20).

After 1979, American President Ronald Reagan has declared that constructing a strong lasting relation with China is an important goal of the foreign policy of the United States' administration. "Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia" (qtd. in Lawrence et al.22). On the 40th anniversary of the US-China' diplomatic relations, the two countries involved in a prolonged argument over trade, as well as competition that is spilling over from political and military areas into a growing number of other spheres, including technology, finance, and education, severely straining ties. Both countries top the globe in terms of the size of their economies, defense spending, and global greenhouse gas emissions. Both countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). They were each other's major trading partners in 2018 (Lawrence et al.22).

During Trump's presidency, competition has ruled the relationship, while areas of cooperation have reduced. Both China and Russia, according to the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), intend to "attack American power, influence, and interests, striving to

degrade American security and prosperity" (qtd. in Lawrence et al.26).To put pressure on China to improve its economic policies, the US has put tariffs on roughly half of its Chinese imports and proposed taxes on the remaining goods on September 1, 2019, and December 15, 2019. Tariffs imposed by the United States and retaliatory tariffs imposed by China have reordered global supply chains, mainly harming American farmers and businesses. The matter has not been settled after 12 rounds of negotiations. To pressure China the administration has placed limits on US corporations' ability to supply the PRC telecoms giant Huawei. The US has also attempted to warn other countries to avoid doing business with Huawei and cooperating with China on infrastructure projects under the framework of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Lawrence et al. 26).

The increased friction in the relationship today is due not only to the Trump Administration's obviously more confrontational attitudes, but also to more forceful actions by China under Xi. In November 2012, Xi took over as Chairman of the Communist Party of China, and in March 2013, he was appointed as President of the People's Republic of China. Later that year, China began constructing military bases in the South China Sea, and Xi launched BRI, an ambitious initiative to increase economic connectedness and China's global influence. China began implementing a slew of national security legislation in 2015, shrinking the space for independent thought and civil society, subjecting ordinary citizens to increased surveillance, and imposing severe conditions on foreign corporations operating in China (Lawrence et al. 26).

The same year, China introduced its "Made in China 2025" plan, with the goal of reducing China's reliance on foreign technology and diverting the state's vast resources toward promoting the development of "national champion" Chinese enterprises in ten vital industries. In 2017, at the completion of his first five-year tenure in Party leadership, Xi charged China's military with becoming a "world-class" force by mid-century. In the same year, his

government began pushing over a million of his Turkic Muslim neighbors in the northwest region of Xinjiang into re-education camps. In March 2018, China's Communist Party-controlled legislature altered the state constitution to eliminate presidential term restrictions, allowing Xi to remain in power indefinitely (Yuqun et al 21).

The United States and China appear to be increasingly attempting to divide other countries into competing camps—those who agree to sign (often vague) BRI cooperation agreements with China (some 125 countries as of April 2019, according to China's count), and those who do not; those who do business with Huawei, and those who do not; those who publicly condemn China for its actions in Xinjiang, and those who do not. Allies of the United States are sometimes in China's "camp". China provides "a new sort of challenge", according to Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, since "it's an authoritarian state that's economically connected with the West in ways the Soviet Union never was"(qtd. in Yuqun et al 14). Important areas of remaining US-China cooperation include maintaining pressure on North Korea to curtail its nuclear weapons and missile programs; supporting the Afghan peace process; managing international public health challenges ranging from tuberculosis to influenza; and stemming the flow of Chinese-produced fentanyl, a class of lethal synthetic opioids, into the United States (Yuqun et al 14).

Many of the Trump Administration's critics share the Administration's worries about PRC policies and actions, but disagree with the Administration's framing of the relationship and specific measures. The signatories of an open letter on China written to the President and Members of Congress and published in The Washington Post on July 19, 2019, admit China's "troubling actions". Nonetheless, they contend that China is not "an economic opponent or an existential national security threat that must be tackled in all spheres; nor is China a monolith, nor are its leaders' beliefs fixed in stone. If the United States forces its friends to see China as

an economic and political adversary, it will undermine its connections with those allies and may wind up isolating itself more than Beijing" (qtd.in Yuqun et al 28).

Many experts blame the Trump Administration for giving up power over China by withdrawing from international accords and organizations, allegedly failing to prioritize solid ties with allies, and engaging in inconsistent rhetoric on trade, human rights, and other problems. The Administration informed the 11 other parties to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a planned free trade agreement (FTA) of Asia-Pacific countries (excluding China), In January 2017 that it would not approve the deal. The administration announced its departure from the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2018 (Yuqun et al 29).

Consider what has become known as the Hainan Island incident as an example of how international relations play out when countries come into conflict. A US surveillance plane crashed with a Chinese jet fighter near Chinese airspace in 2001, where US planes were not allowed. The pilot of the Chinese jet fighter died in the crash. The airliner from the United States had to make an emergency landing on the Chinese island of Hainan. China retrieved the plane and apprehended the American pilots. Ambassadors from the United States then attempted to negotiate their release. These negotiations took a long time and included members of the president's cabinet, but they were successful in the end. If they hadn't succeeded, an escalating set of options would have likely included diplomatic sanctions (removal of ambassadors), economic sanctions (such as a trade and money-flow embargo), minor military options (such as the establishment of a no-fly zone just outside Chinese airspace), and more significant military options (such as the establishment of a no-fly zone just outside Chinese airspace) (such as a focused campaign to enter China and get the pilots back). Soft power refers to the use of nonmilitary measures to influence another country, such as economic sanctions, whereas hard power refers to the use of military force (Kan et al 12).

To sum up, United States had adopted many foreign policies that most importantly to protect its land and people. United States presidents all shared a common ideology which is “America First” even when US entered to war it was for defense of its land and allies. United States set many principles that work out for its safety and to achieve its goals. The previous multipolar system was replaced by bipolar one after the end of WW2. When the Soviet Union collapsed the world claimed US as a superpower and the world’s largest economy.

Chapter Two

China Foreign Policy and Economic Reforms, Overview of the New Silk Road

The People's Republic of China is frequently mentioned in the popular press as a possible superpower. The Global Language Monitor has named China's ascent as the most important news story of the twenty-first century. China has dominated the economy for the past two centuries, and as it rises, many believe it has met the criteria for superpower status, citing China's growing political strength and economic leadership as reasons. China demonstrated by its share of trade in its domestic products and its strong foreign policies that had allowed China to create political and economic ties with many countries. China's purpose in announcing The New Silk Road, also known as The Built Road Initiative (BRI), was to enhance economic growth and connectivity. This initiative attracted the attention of numerous Western countries and sparked competition.

2.1. China's Political Reforms

China adopted a highly dysfunctional political- economic model from the Soviet Union in 1949, and this reality has shaped the People's Republic of China's foreign relations ever since. China's government gradually abandoned the Soviet economic model of comprehensive economic planning in 1978, after thirty years of attempting to make it work. China's leaders oversaw the transition from a planned command economy to a globalized market economy with remarkable success over the next three decades. China kept the political half of the Soviet model while rejecting the economic half. As China transitioned from a planned to a market economy, that political half underwent significant changes, but the core aspect remained the same: a Leninist state in which a centralized and disciplined party maintains perpetual control over the state while dictatorially suppressing autonomous political activity.

With the move from a planned to a market economy, the methods in which China's Leninist party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and its state, the People's Republic of China (PRC), related to Chinese society changed dramatically. However, major mechanisms of party control over the state that date back to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s are still in place. This has had major ramifications for the CCP party state's legitimacy as well as the PRC's ties with liberal democratic powers (Garver 18).

Deng Xiaoping Chinese leader concluded in 1982 that more nationalistic indoctrination of China's youth was vital to restrict the appeal of bourgeois ideas streaming into China with the opening. Deng concluded that nationalism would be a more effective bulwark against "bourgeois liberal" notions than traditional Marxism-Leninism. The CCP's propaganda apparatus gradually elaborated the story of China's century of national humiliation during the 1980s. The treatment of China's traditional heritage saw the most significant change. That heritage was derided as "feudal" and "counterrevolutionary" throughout the previous leader Mao Zedong era. After 1978, China's imperial past was rehabilitated and extolled as a rich source of the Chinese people's pride and grandeur. Between 1979 and 1989 during this time, Mao's totalitarian agenda was quickly abandoned, and a large space for individual freedom was created. China entered a period known as post-totalitarian communism in post-Stalin Eastern Europe (Garver 36).

Economic institutions stemming from the Soviet Union were gradually phased out, and China began to rely on advanced capitalist countries' inputs through market-based transactions. During this period, the major domestic driver of China's foreign relations was acquiring broad and deep access to inputs from advanced capitalist countries in order to produce rapid increases in China's standard of life, regaining popular support for the CCP's rule. Because of a diversity of viewpoints within the CCP leadership, as well as Leader

Deng's approach of balancing reformist and conservative factions, the possibility of political liberalization arose during this period. Liberal principles drew a high popularity among China's youth and intellectuals, posing a serious threat to the regime's survival in spring 1989 (Garver 37).

2.2. China's Foreign Policy Reforms 1979

In the history of Chinese foreign policy, the year 1979 marked a watershed moment. This year, China prioritized economic development and implemented a reform and openness program. This shift in strategic priorities had far-reaching consequences for China's foreign policy. It advocated that Chinese diplomacy prioritize economic development before military security and international position. That created a necessity for China to objectively learn and understand the rest of the world in order to maximize the benefits of the outside world's developmental opportunities, and also started a process of conceptual transformation. China eventually began to see its ties with the rest of the world as a non-zero-sum game, and it became more interested in international engagement and cooperation as a result. Finally, China underlined its desire to work with the international community to create a stable and mutually beneficial international order (Garver 38).

The People's Republic of China (PRC) became fully connected into the global economy over the period 1990–2015, resulting in dramatic gains in living conditions. Despite this, democratic movements, the fall of world communism, and the popularity of liberal ideas propelled by unprecedentedly powerful information and transportation technology swept the globe. A coalition of liberal democratic countries dominated the world, with enormous faith in the wisdom and universal validity of their values and unprecedented global power. In ex-communist countries like Yugoslavia and Cambodia, as well as regional concerns like Iraq, liberal democratic powers have shown a new willingness to engage in armed intervention. These interventions highlighted the US military's huge military dominance, as well as China's

military's continued backwardness. The common resistance to the Soviet Union had previously supplied geopolitical ballast to the PRC-US relationship, and Washington was able to emphasize ideological concerns about China's domestic governance. Perhaps most dangerously, the Marxist-Leninist concepts that had previously been employed to legitimize CCP control were no longer convincing to a large portion of the Chinese population. In this circumstance, the CCP used aggrieved nationalism and its own role as savior of the nation to re-legitimize its rule while fighting bourgeois liberal ideals relentlessly. In a world dominated by liberal states and swept by liberal principles, China emerged as a nondemocratic but dominating world power (Garver 40).

The Chinese government has increased its efforts to liberalize its foreign commercial contacts and commerce in recent years. It decreased China's overall import tariffs by 60% between 1993 and 1997, for example. It has also recently stated its intention to cut existing tariff levels even further, with overall levies on imported goods falling to 15% by 2000 and 10% by 2005. Recent measures to gradually open China's financial, insurance, and other service sectors to the rest of the world have expanded China's integration with the rest of the world. As a result, in China's foreign policy, the promotion of economic and trade links with other countries has become increasingly important (Pfaller 4).

China has already been a member of a number of international organizations and by embracing the reform and openness policy, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, China's reasons for participating in these international organizations at the time were basically two: the first was to improve China's international legitimacy by replacing Taiwanese officials in these organizations, and the second was to raise China's international status. China has been denied entry to the United Nations on numerous occasions. When relations with the United States improved in 1971, Beijing eventually earned China's seat. The UN ejected Taipei's delegates, who were replaced by

Beijing's. China's engagement in international organizations reflected the two main objectives of its independent foreign policy: encouraging domestic economic development through international cooperation and fostering peace and stability through equitable relations with other states (Pfaller 5).

China's growing economic ties with the rest of the world have given it a greater stake in international peace and prosperity. With a foreign trade volume of US\$ 325 billion in 1997, China became the world's tenth largest trading partner. It also attracted foreign direct investment worth US\$ 45 billion, second only to the US. China's foreign reserves were second only to Japan's at \$140 billion by the end of 1997. The advanced nations, led by the United States, allowed China into the WTO once they determined that China's economy had sufficiently changed to meet WTO rules (Pfaller 5).

2.2.1. China's Entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO)

China began to open its economy in the early 1980s, signing a series of regional trade agreements. China was granted GATT observer status in 1986 and began working toward full membership in 1987. China became a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991, and in 1995, it applied to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). China wanted to join the WTO as a founding member (which would confirm its status as a global economic power), but on November 15, 1999 the US, European countries, and Japan demanded that China first modify several tariff policies, such as tariff reductions, open markets, and industrial policies (Kan et al. 24).

Despite the confluence of events that drove China to submit an offer to the United States in April 1999 that granted its membership in the WTO, the process remained rocky. For internal political concerns, President Clinton turned down the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's offer. The United States bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May, disrupting relations and discussions. After resuming negotiations, the US and China ultimately signed

their bilateral agreement on November 15th, 1999, after numerous sessions and seemingly little progress. The House of Representatives voted 237 to 27 in support of granting China Permanent Normal Trading Rights (PNTR) on May 24, 2000, followed by the Senate voting 83 to 15 in favor on September 19th. Although the PNTR vote was not essential for China's WTO membership, it meant that when China joined, the US would be in line with WTO rules, and the US economy would benefit from the negotiated deal (Prime 7).

The US–China Relations Act of 2000, which offered China permanent normal trade relations status PNTR (previously known as Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status), which is one of the reasons China is seeking full membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). On October 10, 2000, Bill Clinton, the president of the United States, signed it into law. The WTO's common standard was the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. The MFN ensured that all members have access to each other's markets under the most favorable terms possible, which would otherwise necessitate multiple rounds of negotiations. As a result of joining the WTO, China quickly benefited from tariff reductions and access to the world's most important trading markets. Giving access to a potential competitor with China's economic clout sparked criticism from many smaller WTO members, that was why China's WTO entrance took fourteen years, from 1987 to 2001. At the same time, China was stepping up regional economic cooperation through APEC, and had begun offering tariff reductions to its members (Pradt 111).

On a sub-regional level, China pushed for more economic cooperation among ASEAN members. In the mid-1990s, the first proposal for establishing a free trade zone was made. China signed the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area Agreement on November 4, 2002, committing to build a free trade zone between ASEAN member nations and China by 2010. In the mid-1990s, economic contact in Asia with China as the driving factor gained significant traction. The creation of free trade areas (FTAs) was especially important in boosting

economic engagement and enhancing regional commercial relations. Starting from a relatively low point in the early 1990s, when there were no functional FTAs, the Asian Development Bank identified 134 negotiated FTAs within the Asian region in 2015, with another 67 FTAs planned - a remarkable result of Asia's expanding economic integration (Pradt 111).

The most commonly cited reason for China's interest in joining is that proponents of liberalization regarded it as a vehicle to continue the reform process. Since the mid-1980s, for example, several proposals to restructure and reinvigorate state-owned firms have been launched, but only minimal progress has been accomplished. With many industries now open to international competition, it is envisaged that many state-owned enterprises will either have to rise to the challenge and compete successfully, or they will be forced to close. The banking system, which has a significant burden of non-performing loans, supports the state sector. To avoid a severe crisis, serious banking reform is required. For many Chinese people, the Asian crisis brought this point home and produced a sense of urgency. Foreign corporations and banks would enhance their presence in the Chinese market as a result of WTO membership, setting an example and increasing competition for the domestic system (Prime 5).

Exports are another issue to consider. Throughout the reform period, China's exports have expanded significantly, allowing the country to earn foreign money for essential imports and driving growth through demand. Increases that continue to be made, on the other hand, are troublesome. Political pushback to what is perceived as unfair trade in terms of China's readiness to reciprocate is putting countries' willingness to open their markets even further to Chinese goods to the test. Within the WTO framework, this difficulty would be considerably lessened because China would be considered a member of the fair trade system. Furthermore, as part of China's membership, limits restricting greater Chinese imports will be phased away. Both of these developments will aid China's export growth (Prime 6).

During China's 20th anniversary of WTO membership, Ambassador Chenggang Li, Permanent Representative of China to the WTO, said:

We have seen significant changes; China's entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) significantly expanded its market for products and services. The current average tariff rate on manufactured goods has been reduced from 14.8 percent to 7.4 percent, which is 2.8 percent lower than the accession obligations. Nearly 120 service trade sectors have been opened up, which is 20 more than what was agreed upon at the time of accession. China's development was significantly aided by continuing reform and opening up. China's economy has risen from sixth to second largest in the world in the last 20 years, with its GDP expanding 11-fold to about USD 15 trillion. (qtd.in “High-Level Forum...”)

2.3. China's Emergence as Global Economic Power

China became a prominent world's economic power over the next three decades after adopting a new policy of opening and market-oriented reform in 1978. China went from being an economically decrepit and impoverished, but egalitarian, country that was nearly entirely cut off from world trade, capital, and technology flows to being a major global player in each of those areas.

China's economy has developed significantly quicker since economic reforms were implemented, and the country has avoided serious economic upheavals for the most part. China's real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a nearly 10% yearly rate. China has "seen the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty", according to the World Bank. China has become a world leader, in terms of total size and pace of growth, volume of exports and role in international trade, global financial flows, and the acquisition and development of technologies for industrial production (Garver 674)

As a result, China's economy has been able to double in size in real terms every eight years on average. The worldwide economic slowdown that began in 2008 had a major influence on China's economy. Early in 2009, Chinese media stated that 20 million migrant workers had returned home after losing their jobs due to the financial crisis, and that real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 had slowed to 6.8% year-on-year. The Chinese government responded by enacting a \$586 billion stimulus program geared primarily at supporting infrastructure and relaxing monetary policy to boost bank lending. As a result of these efforts, China was able to mitigate the consequences of a dramatic drop in worldwide demand for Chinese goods. China's real GDP growth averaged 9.7% from 2008 to 2010. However, throughout the next six years, the rate of GDP growth fell, falling from 10.6 percent in 2010 to 6.7 percent in 2016. In 2017, real GDP increased to 6.8%, but fell to 6.6 percent in 2018, (although it rose to 6.8 percent in 2017). China's GDP overtook Japan as the world's second-largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2010 (Garver 676).

China as the world's largest manufacturer has surpassed the United States, According to the World Bank. China's need for energy and raw materials of all kinds increased as it became the world's leading low cost manufacturing center. In order to get needed raw resources, Chinese companies increasingly travelled abroad, often with government assistance. Chinese firms used their experience and economies of scale to build the solid infrastructure that underpinned China's development in the 1980s and 1990s to make highly competitive offers to build similar infrastructure in other countries: harbors and cargo handling facilities, railways, highways and urban subways, high-rise buildings, and telecommunications systems. China has grown to be a major provider of engineering services for infrastructure around the world, with its companies working in areas that are sometimes sensitive to other countries' national security concerns (Garver 675).

Consumer and capital goods from China became more competitive than those from earlier Western industrializers. China's high-speed train technology, for example, began to compete with Japan's. Oil-rich countries, many of which had high birth rates and hence big young populations that needed to be employed proved to be attractive consumers for Chinese infrastructure and development projects as they emerged as a global economic power. Many developing countries that had struggled to industrialize for decades (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, India, and Egypt) began to worry that cheap Chinese imports were "hollowing out" their domestic industrial base. Those countries were sometimes raw material exporters to China while importing manufactured commodities from China, resulting in a familiar pattern of "dependence" that alarmed many in developing countries. China's trade increased dramatically, particularly with its neighbors. China was the top trading partner with practically all of its neighbors by the second decade of the twenty-first century. China's economic orbit has become increasingly entangled with that of its neighbors (Garver 676).

China has become a large consumer of global Foreign Direct Investment FDI as well as a major provider of FDI outflows, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). China received \$139 billion in foreign direct investment in 2018, making it the world's second largest beneficiary of FDI behind the United States. After 2005, China's FDI outflows increased quickly, eventually surpassing FDI inflows for the first time in 2015. China's FDI outflows peaked at \$196.1 billion in 2016, but fell in 2017 and 2018, reflecting the Chinese government's crackdown on wasteful investment and increased scrutiny by foreign governments of China's efforts to acquire advanced technology enterprises and other key assets. Nonetheless, China was the second-largest source of FDI outflows in the globe after Japan (Morrison 20).

China is the US's largest merchandise trading partner, third-largest export market, and largest source of imports at the moment. Many American businesses have large operations in

China to sell their products in the developing Chinese market and to take advantage of lower-cost labor for export-oriented production. These activities have aided some U.S. corporations in remaining internationally competitive, as well as providing a variety of low-cost goods to U.S. consumers. The federal government has been able to pay its budget deficits thanks to China's large-scale purchases of US Treasury securities (which reached \$1.1 trillion as of April 2019). This has helped keep US interest rates low (Morrison 5).

2.4. China's New Silk Road

Mentioned for first time in September 2013 at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, the 'One Belt One Road', as it was named by Chinese authorities, is a geopolitical and economic initiative inspired in the ancient Silk Road that once allowed the economic, cultural and knowledge exchange between China and Europe. As mentioned before, the New Silk Road is better defined as a Chinese strategic vision, a wide policy aiming to solve great internal and external challenges (Llandrich 24).

The primary idea behind this program is to create a dense network of infrastructures that will facilitate the movement of goods, knowledge, and culture not only between China and Europe, but also among the countries participating in Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This platform, according to d'Hooghe "seeks to facilitate the flow of commodities, services, and people between Asia, Europe, and Africa with the goal of expanding intraregional trade and investment while simultaneously spurring economic development"(49). In order to accomplish so, Beijing is willing to make a total financial contribution of over 1.4 trillion dollars (Casarini, 2015). (qtd. in Llandrich 25).

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which includes some EU Member States and a \$40 billion Silk Road Fund, will play critical roles in financing the initiative's most essential projects. However, OBOR should not be viewed solely as an infrastructure network, but as a platform for promoting and bolstering economic integration among those countries.

There is no official list of the states that are taking part in this effort. Regardless, experts and Chinese official sources believe that more than 60 countries are expected to participate. Even though there is broad agreement on which states are the most significant in this plan, experts frequently disagree when identifying all of them, because some states' role is not as clear as others. As a result, aggregated data differs when discussing the New Silk Road. According to Casarini, this project will cover 55% of the world's GNP, 70% of the world's population, and 75% of known energy sources (2). According to Garcia-Herrero and Xu, "the EU-China union accounts for 64% of the world's population and 30% of global GDP. According to Stephen L. Jen, the New Silk Road will connect 64 countries, 4.4 billion people, and roughly 40% of the world economy. He goes on to say that this project will be 12 times larger in absolute monetary terms than the Marshall Plan, accounting for 9% of China's GDP and costing twice as much as Washington did in reviving postwar Europe" (qtd. in Llandrich 25).

The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Silk Road Maritime Belt are the two main roadways or economic corridors of the New Silk Road (MSR). The former road intends to build a variety of facilities connecting China and Europe via Eurasia. According to Mações, "the land element is called a belt to pinpoint that its ultimate goal is the creation of a densely integrated economic corridor rather than transportation network linking two points" (4). This plan's itinerary encompasses not only its ancient course, but also adjacent regions. According to Wang Yiwei, an OBOR expert from Renmin University of China, the SREB has three routes through Eurasia: "the Northern Route with the Eurasian Land Bridge as its main part (Beijing-Russia-Germany-Northern Europe), the Middle Route with oil and gas pipelines as its main part (Beijing-Xi'an-Urumqi-Afghanistan-Kazakhstan-Hungary and the Southern Route, which includes transnational roadways (Beijing-Southern Xinjiang-Pakistan-Iran-Iraq-Turkey-Italy-Spain)". The significance of railways in the SREB is striking. For China, this mode of transportation provides a speedier and more cost-effective alternative to the country's

present reliance on maritime freight transit. Indeed, since 2013, Chengdu, the capital of the Chinese interior and densely populated province of Sichuan, has been linked by train to the Polish city of Łódź. However, as Shepard (2016) notes out in Forbes, twelve Chinese cities now have direct links with nine European cities. “Suzhou is now immediately linked by rail to Warsaw; Lianyungang to Rotterdam, Chongqing to Duisburg, Yiwu to Madrid, and Zhengzhou to Hamburg” (qtd. in Llandrich 26), for example. As a result, cargo trains, which are still less cost competitive than ships, are becoming more important in EU-China trade (Llandrich 26).

In terms of maritime transportation, OBOR aims to improve current sea transportation and is inspired by Chinese commander Zheng He's naval excursions to Africa during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). This path, however, goes beyond such explorations. According to Wang, "China will work with other countries to build large secure and efficient transport channels, enhance exchanges with neighboring countries and regions, and establish a market chain connecting major economic plates such as ASEAN, South Asia, West Asia, North Africa, and Europe" (25). China has already made significant investments in the Old Continent to create this marine network, which will improve transportation between China and Europe. The acquisition of the Piraeus harbor in Greece is undoubtedly the most important, followed by the construction of railway infrastructure from the Balkans to Central Europe to support such trade. This group of infrastructures in the continent's southeast is intended to significantly shorten transportation time from China to the continent. According to some analysts, many OBOR-labeled initiatives predate the introduction of this program, but many have been repackaged' and fitted to this new platform (Llandrich 26-27).

The 'going-out' strategy and China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 provided a boost to the Chinese economy, which was the target of massive sums of FDI and rapidly became the 'factory of the world,' consolidating a significant portion of global industry. Its economy was so powerful that it did not even bear the brunt of the financial crisis

that has afflicted the West since 2008. However, as the first decade of the twenty-first century progressed, the rate of growth began to decelerate, ushering in a new era known as "The New Normal". In this new environment, GDP growth was cut from double digits to 6-7 percent, which was positive but nonetheless painful for an economy that had previously grown considerably faster. According to Grieger, China's slowdown is the result of the Chinese economy shifting "from a development model dominated by exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) to one dominated by domestic consumption, innovative sectors, and services"(8-9). In this perspective, the New Silk Road offers the Chinese economy the opportunity to develop new markets for its products that do not fit into the overcrowded local markets. Improving transportation facilities and achieving stronger trading agreements with a large number of nations are likely to enhance its industry and tackle the significant problem of overcapacity production that it has been suffering recently. Lowering transportation expenses for its goods will also assist to offset the Chinese industry's rising production costs. Aside from being able to better, cheaper, and faster export its products, the New Silk Road is also intended to improve access to energy and key resources. The new connections planned with neighboring nations may provide Chinese industry with safer access to such resources. Infrastructures connecting the Middle Kingdom to Central Asia and Russia, for example, could be valuable for such reasons (Llandrich 27).

In reality, since the beginning of this decade, this country has been the world's second-largest economic powerhouse, trailing only the United States. Since Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began opening up China's economy in 1978, Beijing has gradually gained quotas of power in both political and economic terms (Llandrich 30).

Scholars like Curran, 2016 and Sabin, 2017 have compared the New Silk Road to the American Marshall Plan, which spurred economic growth in postwar Europe. However, as The Economist notes out in a comprehensive article, "OBOR and the Marshall Plan differ in

fundamental respects" because "China's Belt and Road Initiative is built on loan finance rather than aid or even foreign direct investment"(5), Nonetheless, Shen (2016) observes that both American and Chinese programs share similarities in that they serve as a tool to achieve geostrategic aims such as increasing exports, exporting currency, diminishing rival influence, generating strategic divisions, and winning diplomatic backing. Furthermore, "the project also signifies a change for China toward a more proactive foreign policy that aims to affect the nature of its broader environment, something the US has been involved in for decades but which is a new trend for China" (qtd. in Llandrich 32).

Further reasons for creating this plan According to a European Parliament briefing on the New Silk Road, this initiative "is likely to significantly expand China's political and economic leverage over its neighbors, because most of the countries receiving Chinese funds for new infrastructure will eventually be drawn deeper into China's trade and finance orbit and be expected to support its rise in all respects"(qtd. in Llandrich 32). Furthermore, OBOR has consequences for big nations because it directly links Russia and India which is establishing its own Maritime Silk Road with the Mausam project. Even while the program is nominally accessible to everybody, the United States is de facto excluded from it, despite the fact that it has the potential to influence some United States' geostrategic interests in the region (qtd. in Llandrich 32).

2.5. Previous Attempts to Revive the Old Silk Road

This is not the first time a government has proposed the establishment of a new set of activities to resurrect the ancient Silk Road; which enabled the first significant and continuous interactions between different Eurasian civilizations. Japan began talking about Silk Road diplomacy as a way to increase its presence in Central Asia as early as 1998. The United States took the lead in 2011 with the notion of a "New Silk Road" introduced by former US State Secretary Hilary Clinton during an official visit to India. And, with the beginning of the

"Mausam Project" in 2014, India has indicated a desire in gaining more influence over the other countries on the Indian Ocean's coasts. The Kremlin has spent decades developing its own integration strategy, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). However, less strong powers, such as Kazakhstan or Korea, have proposed comparable schemes. However, only China appears to be able to capture the true interests of its neighbors and accomplish its design. In fact, its first goal is to build a development-oriented community in which all of its partners are eager to share China's development rewards (Clemente 44).

To sum up, China's foreign policy of opening up to the outside world has given it a high position in the world. As a potential great power, China appears to transfer its economic performance into political leverage economy by focusing on its economy and trade relations with its primary partners. Participating more actively in global governance and dominating as the world's second largest economy for the past two centuries. China strengthened its public worldwide image by unveiling the OBOR project as an ambitious strategy aimed at boosting domestic growth and as part of the country's economic diplomacy strategy. Many countries reacted positively to China's Initiative including United States; However, Americans found it challenging and controversial to step aside while China forms economic ties with the world. The coming chapter illustrates that the competing superpowers are attempting to exert pressure on one another, as part of a larger global conflagration.

Chapter Three

US Response to China's New Silk Road

With China's spectacular ascension to major power status, the US will soon face an all-around near-peer competitor. The challenge for the United States will be to project and defend its political, economic, military, and technological interests in the rising strategic battle that is detaching from China to the point of forming a new Cold War. This chapter will address the United States' reaction to China's military dominance and economic prosperity as a result of the One Belt One Road initiative's expansion and development.

3.1. US-China Struggle for Global Leadership

The concept of the "rule of law" is critical to a properly functioning society in the United States and much of the liberal West—the idea (at least in theory) that the law is impartial, independent, and applied evenly and consistently to all, and that it serves to protect the innocent, including from the state. China's leaders, on the other hand, adhere to the concept of "rule of law," in which the legal system is used to ensure Communist Party dominance; courts serve as forums for imposing the governments will. It is about the principles and precepts that govern how countries, businesses, and individuals interact on a global scale, a competition over whether the world will be one of the "rule of law" or the "rule by law" (Schuman 2).

The primary goal of the West's initial policy of engagement with China was to avoid exactly this situation. The thinking went that by integrating Beijing into the US-led system, the Chinese leadership would see the benefits and come to support it. On some level, the plan was successful. China has reaped significant benefits from the American order, possibly the greatest of all. The US order fostered security, trade, and cross-border investment, propelling China's rise from poverty, while Beijing eagerly embraced US-backed institutions such as the World Trade Organization (Schuman 6). Yet today, China's supreme leader, Xi Jinping, appears to regard the American system as a constraint on Chinese power. For a proud

autocracy, the American order can appear hostile, even dangerous, a place where liberal political values reign supreme and the Chinese form of government is perceived as illegitimate, Chinese companies and officials are vulnerable to foreign sanction, and Chinese ambitions are constrained. According to Xi, it is critical that Beijing rewrite the rules to better suit its own interests and, more broadly, the interests of authoritarian states. Simply put, Xi intends to flip the global order, putting illiberal governments and ideals at the top (Schuman 5).

Beijing is promoting its own ideas about global governance, development, and international relations, gaining influence at institutions such as the United Nations to infuse these ideas into global discourse, and using its growing wealth and military might to challenge the American world system's existing norms. China's gains at the United Nations demonstrate how the country is eroding the American order from within. Beijing is using its clout to promote the Belt and Road Initiative. It also uses its growing clout to instill its own ideological principles in the institution, such as human rights and state sovereignty. At the UN Human Rights Council in 2020, 53 countries supported China's controversial imposition of a national-security law on Hong Kong, allowing authorities to crack down on the city's prodemocracy movement; at this year's UN General Assembly, more than 60 members echoed China's position on human rights basically, that a nation's rights violations are none of the world's business. However, it's unclear what Xi's world order will look like. He has not articulated a comprehensive vision for a replacement system. On the surface, the language he proposes to describe the workings of a new order appears harmless. He speaks of a "community of common destiny," with diplomacy based on "win-win cooperation" and "mutual respect," and in which various social and political systems are accepted. But this is code for undermining democracy. Unlike the current order, which holds liberal democracy up as the sole legitimate

form of governance, Xi's version elevates authoritarianism to equal, if not superior, status (Schuman 6).

The concept of a rising "China threat" began in the aftermath of the Tian'anmen Square incident in the United States, and was fueled by perceptions of China's growing military capabilities and behavior toward its neighbors in the early 1990s. Furthermore, China urged a shift in global order from a hegemonic US-dominated system to a multipolar one, as well as a problematic alliance policy with North Korea, Myanmar, and, increasingly, Russia (Pradt 10). Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, public view of China significantly improved. The Al-Qaeda terrorist network's strikes altered the danger perception in the United States, launching a counter-terror effort called the Global War on Terror. China allied with the United States and supported counter-terrorism measures; Zhao Suisheng stated that the "Bush administration's strategy toward China has shifted in recent years from perceiving China as a danger to treating China as a partner" (qtd. in Pradt 15)

In the end, the United States and China are unlikely to agree on what the global order should be, and they are unlikely to follow each other's rules. (Schuman 7). Neither power can fully enforce its version of the rules. They both prefer it that way to some extent. The major powers do not want impartial independent adjudication of their behavior under existing international norms; instead, they prefer to settle matters themselves (Schuman 8).

3.2. The Threats of the New Silk Road to the American Interests

Any military battle between the US and China would have massive regional and global ramifications. Both Beijing and Washington maintain that their aims are primarily defensive, while accusing the other of being aggressive. Today, the notion prevails in both the US Administration and Congress that China, like Russia, is a revisionist power attempting to challenge US dominance and destroy the rules-based international order.

3.2.1. The Security Threat

China, as seen from United States, does not yet pose a direct threat to the continental United States. Nonetheless, three aspects of China's military developments are viewed as a threat to America's security and vital interests. For starters, the United States sees China's ongoing naval expansion as a threat to its role as a world power. The United States has dominated the world's oceans, as Great Britain once did, and has used that power to ensure sea freedom. Navigation is a global common good on par with the skies, outer space, and cyberspace (“Strategic Rivalry”).

The United States, like China, sees the oceans and sea routes as the foundation of its own economic strength, accounting for more than 90% of long-distance international trade and secure supplies of raw materials and industrial products. However, the oceans also allow for power projection and military intervention. As China's armed forces improve, they are increasingly in a position to block the US Navy's access to the Asia-Pacific region, undermining America's status as a global power (“Strategic Rivalry”).

China's expensive commitment to developing aircraft carriers is one way in which US political and military officials have linked the BRI to the fast expanding People's Liberation Army Navy. The development of aircraft carriers is of particular concern because China does not require aircraft carriers. To compete with regional competitors, particularly the United States, to maintain its maritime security; considering the proximity of China's air and naval bases to its neighbors' defense facilities in the surrounding seas, particularly those in Japan, Taiwan, and South China Sea countries. Without carriers, China already has enough air and naval strength to secure its regional interests. As a result of China's aircraft carrier construction, US officials have concluded that China wishes to project power out across the enormous Pacific Ocean, far beyond its regional sphere of influence (Andresen 8).

3.2.2. The Military Threat

Both the United States and China are expanding their militaries, but there are differing views on this. The US's justification is defense, whereas China is viewed as a threat to Asia and the world. China only made limited arms purchases in the late 1990s, but this policy radically changed at the start of the new millennium and was further intensified following 9/11. China's arms imports remained persistently high in the years that followed (minimum US\$ 2 billion per year), peaking in the years 2004–2006 with imports of weapons systems totaling US\$ 9.774 billion during these three years. In succeeding years (2007–2014), China's yearly arms purchases were only in the range of US\$ 1–1.5 billion (Pradt 15).

In pre-confirmation testimony in April 2018, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, admitted that China's development of military bases in the South China Sea has rendered it "capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States." While China's rapidly expanding military presence in the South China Sea has garnered the most attention, China watchers are quickly discovering a growing list of concerns, including China's first overseas military base in Djibouti and its recent acquisition of a 99-year lease to a 15,000-acre Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Extrapolating from the South and East China seas, many now fear that China will continue to utilize its rising military force to assert its interests wherever they arise. As a result, they believe the BRI will serve as a vehicle for military superiority as well as economic expansion (Pradt 17).

For many, the naval base in Djibouti is merely the beginning of many, and the BRI provides a blueprint for both commercial and "naval expansion." The major mechanism for converting what is publicly defined as development support for commercial ports into future naval expansion is land concessions obtained through "debt-trap diplomacy." Observers are increasingly pointing to debt-financing as a strategy that China is utilizing to seek global

control and influence while also sustaining its own military ambitions. To put it another way, China is accused of “seducing cash-poor countries with infrastructure projects that are unlikely to generate enough revenue to cover the interest on the loans that funded them.” According to the Centre for Global Development in Washington, DC, eight BRI countries are at “special risk of debt distress.” These include Djibouti and Pakistan, the latter of which has a port in Gwadar that many believe would house China's second overseas naval station. The main example is China's recent purchase of a 99-year lease on the 15,000-acre Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka received a loan from China for the port's construction. When Sri Lanka fell behind on loan payments, China negotiated the long-term land concession. Although the Hambantota Port cannot be utilized for military reasons without the specific approval of Sri Lanka, experts point out that all of the ports on the BRI's “Road” are capable of dual civilian and military usage. Analysts say the Hambantota Port is just one example of high-risk debt financing that will be followed by land concessions. They expect that many more incidents of land concessions to avert loan defaults will occur in the future. These examples appear to validate the idea that Belt and Road is about China's growth as much as it is about international prosperity (qtd. in Andresen 9.10).

3.2.3. The Economic Threat

Economic relations between the United States and China are now far less complementary and far more competitive because of China's meteoric economic and technological rise. It has become more difficult for US companies to increase sales and profits in the Chinese market, particularly as administrative restrictions have increased rather than decreased, and many service branches in which US businesses have competitive advantages remain closed to them. In contrast, the US has become hesitant to transfer technology. And, now that China's purchases of US treasury bonds have declined as a result of shrinking current account surpluses, Chinese savings have ceased to contribute significantly to financing America's

domestic economy. While complementarity is dwindling, competition is increasing, particularly in manufacturing. China's rise to become the world's leading industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural change, particularly in the United States, and has triggered social upheavals in the country's "Rust Belt," which is concentrated in specific sectors and regions. The impact of this "China shock" was felt far more strongly in the United States ("Strategic Rivalry").

China's challenge to the United States extends beyond industrial competition to its position and status as the world's leading trading and economic power. China is already the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. At market prices, China's GDP already has the highest gross fixed capital formation and the highest industrial value creation. In absolute terms, China is the largest contributor to global economic growth, as well as the world's largest exporter and trader. If current growth rates continue, China will overtake the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030, though this is far from certain ("Strategic Rivalry").

Another issue with this geoeconomic shift is that America and China have opposing views on international order. Washington questions whether the Chinese economic model (a politically authoritarian, interventionist, mercantilist state capitalism) is compatible with a liberal-based global trade and finance system. The question has become more pressing as the West's expectation that China would become more economically and politically liberal has been disappointed, an expectation that was primarily linked to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization. Indeed, under Xi Jinping, the influence of the party and the state on the economy has grown, and the exercise of power has become more authoritarian and doctrinal. As a result, the trade conflict is also viewed as a system-to-system conflict ("Strategic Rivalry").

Aside from expanding China's economy and military growth, The New Silk Road seeks greater influence and a more positive international impact through self-consciously "Win-Win" framing aimed at increasing other states' willingness to cooperate with China in more ways. Westerners and their governments have vital long-term interests that would be well served by the success of the NSR. If the United States and its allies want to keep global warming below 2°C, they should want Beijing to succeed in implementing NSR. However, one of the consequences of implementing the NSR will be to make it even more difficult for Asian states to take a firm stand against China. In the economic realm counterproductive hardly begins to describe a prospective effort meaningfully exclude China from global economic life. Success in realizing One Belt One Road will only reinforce this reality (Leverett and Bingbing 19).

3.3. The American Strategies to Face the Rise of China

The United States was concerned that China's rapid economic development and military expansion would change the liberal order. The rise of an increasingly authoritarian and hostile China under Xi Jinping is the single most significant challenge confronting the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century. China's desire for leadership in worldwide development may appear to be a natural continuation of the country's growing weight. Nonetheless, many American observers are concerned over the Belt and Road Initiative. The US responded to the BRI in a friendly, even supportive, manner throughout the Obama administration and initially during the Trump administration.

3.3.1. President Obama's Response

China's rising prominence in US politics did not happen by chance. Gideon Rachman characterized the post-2008 world as "the age of anxiety," as compared to the period from 1991 to 2008, when "a contracting economy and a rising China transformed the way America thinks about the world" (qtd in Coulson 5). His sense of fear in the United States is analogous

to what Richard Hofstadter referred to as "the paranoid style" in American politics, a type of wide crises in the national consciousness that leads to humanitarian or aggressive responses. With this worry in mind, Barack Obama made the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, a huge multistate free trade pact, a cornerstone of his Pacific policy, with one of its key goals being to isolate China in the region. Obama's biggest foreign policy achievement has been his widely publicized and widely criticized "pivot" or "rebalance to Asia." In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, economic anxiety over the United States' status in the world, particularly in relation to China, has become not merely campaign fodder in US elections, but a widespread concern in US politics. Others focused on the United States and Chinese economies' economic interconnectedness. (Coulson 15)

At the APEC summit in Japan on November 13th, 2010, Obama stated that the United States is "seeking to boost trade and business throughout the Asia-Pacific... That is why we want to pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would facilitate trade and open markets across the Asia-Pacific region" (qtd. in Coulson 282). This was the essence of the capitalist logic's imperatives. Under Obama, the United States saw Asia as a chance to increase markets and commerce. A few months later, Obama would clarify that there was opportunity for economic collaboration with China in his interpretation of capital logic. On January 19, 2011, Obama addressed the growing economic interdependence between the United States and China during a welcoming ceremony for Chinese President Hu Jintao. (Coulson, 282)

We have an enormous stake in each other's success. In an interconnected world, in a global economy, nations including our own will be more prosperous and more secure when we work together" he said, repeating that the US "welcomes China's rise as a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations. (qtd. in Coulson 282)

In this scenario, the logic of capital served to limit the basis for a military clash between the United States and China.

China started a proposal to create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a more regionally focused development bank modeled after the International Monetary Fund. Although China officially claimed that it would not compete with existing global institutions, it sparked concerns about the development of power and international order in East Asia. XiJinping has even personally invited President Obama to join the process of bringing the world together to increase the human race's standard of living and production in a "harmony of interests" (Billington 2). That America previously championed as its own. In uncommon bluster, President Barack Obama indicated that United States will not participate and encouraged its traditional Western allies to do the same." This reluctance mirrored US concerns about China's desire to compete with the US for regional economic power, potentially undermining US-led and allied-led international financial institutions (IFIs) including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Nonetheless, Obama eventually toned down his comments on the AIIB, stating that the bank may be a wonderful thing because it could contribute to regional prosperity, but if it's not run correctly, could be a terrible thing. Obama also never completely criticized the New Silk Road or proposed a viable alternative (even though the Trans Pacific Partnership was intended to solidify US regional leadership). He even offered some encouraging, if generic, words of encouragement, noting that "Asia requires infrastructure... So it's a good thing that China wants to invest in development projects throughout the region." During Xi's visit to Washington in September 2015, a White House factsheet on bilateral economic relations noted that the US "welcomes China's growing contributions to financing Asian and global development and infrastructure." The best answer is that Obama was just more concerned on other issues in Sino-US relations, such as climate

change and Iran's nuclear program, and saw no gain in opposing Xi on his hallmark program (Wuthnow 5).

During the 2012 Presidential debate in Florida, where Republican challenger Mitt Romney frequently brought up China, Obama conceded that “China is both an adversary but also a potential partner in the international community if it's following the rules” How the US perceived China at the time was dependent on how strictly China adhered to the standards of international behavior as viewed by the US. The argument was particularly critical because Obama would make TPP's geopolitical role apparent. He stated that

we believe China can be a partner, but we're also sending a very clear signal that America is a Pacific power, that we are going to have a presence there...And we're organising trade relations with countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure about meeting basic international standards. (qtd. in Coulson 289)

Obama was effectively adopting a modernized version of Taft's dollar diplomacy, in which US economic might was used to alter the behavior and nature of other states, not merely for economic benefit in and of itself, but also for more explicit and larger geopolitical purposes (Coulson 289).

Obama administration attempted to promote engagement at initially, emphasizing the significance of deeper cooperation in dealing with common concerns such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and the global economic slump. These programs, along with their more immediate benefits, were intended at pushing China to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the existing international system. This sympathetic attitude may have unwittingly fostered perceptions of American weakness and fueled Chinese aggression (Friedberg 8).

President Obama has struggled to find the right recipe for dealing with Xi Jinping's China during his second term, holding out the prospect of enhanced cooperation and improved

relations while also attempting to counter Beijing's ongoing military buildup and stymie its creeping expansionism in the maritime domain. As the administration prepares to leave office, the results on both counts are dismal. On closer scrutiny, the much-touted advancements in climate change and cyberespionage reveal less than meets the eye. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, hailed as the economic core of the rebalancing, appears to be doomed from the start. Instead of just accepting its place as an upstanding member of an American-led international system, China appears to be increasingly keen on questioning several key features of the current order. Meanwhile, the US military's ability to respond to China's expansion is hampered by budgetary restraints, even as Beijing continues its "land reclamation" and militarization program in the South China Sea. Rather than waiting for a crisis to force the issue, whomever is elected in November 2016 should use the chance to conduct a complete review of the United States' China strategy and the ideas that underpin it (Friedberg 9).

3.3.2. President Trump's Response

Donald Trump's election to the US presidency has heightened tensions between the US and China, as he has taken a more hostile approach against China during his presidential campaign. Although criticism of China before US elections is now a regular theme, Trump has argued for a modern type of unilateral mercantilism toward China based on the notion that China is deliberately undermining the US economy. This is the finest, but regrettably, it is demonstrated by his assertion that "we can't continue to let China to rape our country" (Coulson 305).

In October 2017, the Trump administration initiated quiet negotiations with its allies on how to construct alternative funding methods for developing countries in need of foreign investment. The Trump administration, for example, increased funding for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) fund from \$29 billion to \$60 billion. Memorandums

of understanding were signed with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Association of European Development Finance Institutions (AEDFI) to promote cooperation on sustainable investments in developing countries, as well as democratic values, self-sustaining societies, and the strengthening of best practices. Furthermore, the International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) was formed in collaboration with Australia and Japan to support and assist US enterprises engaging in overseas digital infrastructure initiatives. In December 2017, the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU) formed an informal alliance within the World Trade Organization (WTO) to resist "unfair market distorting and protectionist activities by third nations," largely referring to China (Arežina 300).

The Trump administration, in its early months prioritized the BRI over other, more critical bilateral concerns. Addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis, on which Trump wanted Xi's help, and reducing bilateral economic imbalances, which was a recurring theme of his presidential campaign, were far more crucial. In a joint statement issued in May 2017, the Trump Administration stated that it recognizes the importance of China's One Belt, One Road initiative and affirmed that a senior official would attend the next Belt and Road Forum (clearing up doubts about whether the White House would send any delegation at all). However, the BRI was the joint statement's final and least specific item, likely included to create a favorable environment for the forum—most Xi's important foreign policy event of the year—and to facilitate Xi's collaboration on higher priority subjects (Wuthnow 6).

The Trump administration's initial positive (though muted) language on the BRI was swiftly eclipsed by more critical, even hostile propaganda. Most notable were remarks by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who argued in an October 2017 speech that Chinese development finance and infrastructure development projects were causing recipients numerous problems, including failing to promote jobs for the people they claim to help, burdening poor states with

massive amounts of debt, relying too heavily on foreign (i.e. Chinese) labor, and including provisions that result in default and debt conversion. Tillerson said that China's economic efforts should "take place inside the framework of international laws and standards, and One Belt, One Road appears to want to set its own rules and norms." Secretary of Defense James Mattis made a similar remark during a Senate hearing in 2017 October: "I think in a globalized world, there are many belts and many roads, and no one nation should put itself into a position of dictating 'One Belt, One Road'" (Wuthnow 8).

Trump did not discuss or endorse the BRI during his November 2017 visit to Beijing Despite Xi's request. Later, in an address to Vietnamese authorities and business leaders, Trump subtly criticized the BRI by contrasting US investments with "state-directed schemes with many strings attached." The administration's first National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, bolstered these arguments by arguing that the United States could provide a stark contrast to authoritarian states' corrupt, opaque, exploitative, and low-quality deals in the area of foreign infrastructure development. In his Senate confirmation hearing, Michael Pompeo, who took over for Tillerson in April 2018, did not directly address the BRI, but did speak broadly about China as a rival. As the anniversary of Xi's Belt and Road Forum came, there were no indications that the BRI's verbal U-turn would be reversed (Wuthnow 10).

In addition to criticizing China's policies, Trump's team proposed a series of interconnected attempts to create alternative development finance sources for the region. Domestic bureaucratic reform came first. Trump has urged that US development finance institutions be improved in order to better incentivize private sector investment in your economies. during his speech in Vietnam. Similarly, the National Security Strategy pushed for improved "development finance tools so that US companies have incentives to capitalize on opportunities in developing countries". To realize this vision, Trump proposed a "new, enhanced United States Development Finance Institution" in his 2019 budget request to

Congress, which would combine functions from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and other related agencies, such as USAID's Development Credit Authority, into a single entity, reducing fragmentation and increasing operational and cost efficiency. OPIC reforms, which provide loans, risk insurance, and strategic advising services to US companies looking to enter emerging countries, were long overdue, according to some analysts. Bipartisan legislation to establish this new institution began moving through Congress in February 2018. The BUILD Act established a US International Development Finance Corporation, which, unlike OPIC, would be able to make abroad equity investments and issue grants. The amount of money it might lend to US private companies would be capped at \$60 billion, more than OPIC's existing lending ceiling. This institution, if realized, would not compete directly with China's huge development banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, but it might provide chances for US companies to play a larger part in Eurasian development (Wuthnow 12).

The United States diplomatic effort to uphold liberal development finance principles came in second. In a joint statement with visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in June 2017, Trump said that a set of common principles for the region" should include "bolstering regional economic connectivity through transparent infrastructure development and the use of responsible debt financing practices. OPIC and its Japanese counterparts signed two memorandums of understanding in November to increase cooperation by "mutually cooperating on projects that fit policy objectives and coordinating company development activities." Trump praised the accords in Tokyo, calling them a "major development that will advance our shared interests in the region" (Wuthnow 13).

Changing United States diplomatic and strategic interests can provide some insight into the Trump administration's shifting tone on the BRI. On two major topics, China failed to meet Trump's early expectations diplomatically. First, Pyongyang's ballistic missile tests in spring

2017 dashed early hopes among US officials that Beijing would be able and willing to persuade Pyongyang to dial back its nuclear goals. Trump tweeted in June that China's efforts on this front had "failed," and two months later, the Treasury Department announced sanctions on six Chinese companies accused of violating UN Security Council resolutions. Second, despite the newly formed US-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, no significant progress in decreasing the bilateral trade deficit was made, and by August, the US Trade Representative had begun an investigation into unfair Chinese trade practices. Disappointment with China's solutions on these concerns undermined a basis for US policymakers to back Beijing's high-priority initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Strategically, US criticisms of the BRI coincided with the consolidation of the Trump administration's broader strategic perspective on China. Although Trump has always referred to China as an economic enemy, the conclusion of an interagency study during his first year as president expanded on those worries and put them in geopolitical terms. Unlike Obama's final National Security Strategy, which emphasized China's value as a partner on major global security, economic, and environmental issues, Trump's first edition of the document, released in December 2017, concluded that Beijing "seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor" (Wuthnow 15.16).

Only when China announced its "Made in China 2025" strategy did Trump's White House openly claim that the majority of the BRI projects are "debt trap diplomacy." In an August 2018 letter to Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Secretary of Treasury Steven Mnuchin, 16 US Congress people indicated, citing President Xi's statement at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), that individual countries' participation in the BRI projects led to their indebtedness, citing Montenegro, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Djibouti as examples. The congress people also argued that borrowing from Chinese financial

institutions would harm these countries because they would become dependent, and the final consequences are often borne by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); to which the United States is the largest contributor. In order to save them from excessive debt and bankruptcy, for these countries' debts frequently lead to financial default and debt-to-equity conversion, which is a strategic security dilemma and possibly leading to changes in these countries' foreign policy decisions. That can be seen when they vote in international organizations in favor of Beijing (Arežina 301). Furthermore, in order to increase pressure on Beijing and restrict Chinese competition in telecommunications, the US began to accuse ZTE and Huawei of being security threats due to alleged "wiretapping" of their device users by the Chinese government. Arrests of Ms. Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in Canada, and Wang Weijing, the company's Regional Director in Poland, a ban on the use of Huawei technology in the US, and Washington's warnings about suspending cooperation with countries that continue to do business with Chinese companies flagged as security risks have forced countries around the world to reconsider their 5G telecommunications network contracts with Huawei (Arežina 302).

The US-China relationship deteriorated further during the pandemic, reaching its lowest point since 1970. the US president threatening China with "paying a terrible price" for the Corona virus, which he referred to as the "Chinese virus" Trump was scathing in his criticism of Beijing for concealing the epidemic, which originated in Wuhan and has since grown to become a pandemic that has paralyzed the US economy. Trump encouraged the United Nations General Assembly to "hold China accountable for their conduct" in a speech on Tuesday. In a pre-recorded White House speech, Trump blamed the Chinese government for the global spread of COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic also has a long term effects on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The temporary shutdown of economies around the world has affected global supply chains, causing huge delays and cost increases in BRI infrastructure

projects. For the time being, China and BRI partner nations will have to focus their attention and resources on combating the virus's spread and offering economic assistance. As a result, a significant slowdown in the BRI is unavoidable. China is eager to continue with the BRI nonetheless (Mouritz 11).

3.3.3. Biden's Administration's response

President Joe Biden of the United States used the sidelines of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, often known as COP26, to promote his vision for a green, collaborative global infrastructure program that he claims will provide a "sustainable path to net-zero emissions by 2050." The proposal might serve as a viable alternative to China's vast Belt and Road Initiative. "The Build Back Better Initiative, the Clean Green Initiative of the United Kingdom, the Global Gateway Initiative, and the Clean Green Initiative are all part of a joint effort among the G-7 partners to deliver high-quality, sustainable infrastructure," Biden said at a roundtable event in Glasgow, Scotland (qtd. in Widakuswara 2) As a hallmark effort to fulfill the developing world's climate, health, and technological challenges through a values-driven, high-standards, transparent, and catalytic approach to investment, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh led an interagency group to Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama to hear firsthand from a variety of Latin American stakeholders in order to better understand the region's infrastructure requirements. Biden's domestic Build Back Better initiative has been met with opposition from members of his own Democratic Party, and the proposed legislation has been drastically trimmed in recent weeks. The administration has claimed that the services offered in the multibillion-dollar infrastructure and expenditure plans are desired by the American people, and that Congress is delaying approval. Biden said that he "I'm continuing to push very hard for the Democratic Party to move along and pass my infrastructure bill and my Build Back Better bill" (qtd in Widakuswara 4).

A formal B3W (Built Back Better World) launch event in the United States is scheduled for early 2023, with specifics on some initial projects targeted at reducing the \$40 trillion needed by developing countries by 2035. However, it is still unclear whether B3W will be a viable alternative to the enormous BRI. A White House official recognized that the strategy still has a long way to go. Voice of America (VOA) the largest U.S. international broadcaster explained. "We're only getting started, whereas BRI has been operating for years and years"(qtd. in Widakuswara 5). Countries will be looking for evidence that the US is offering a healthier alternative to BRI, which has been tarnished by negative environmental and social impacts, a lack of transparency and corruption, and has been criticized for leaving governments around the world strangled by debt as American officials embark on their B3W tour (Widakuswara 5).

3.4. Trade War Intensifies

The election of President Donald Trump in January 2017 signified that the United States will change its focus from global to national concerns in the future years, in accordance with his "America first" policy. Given President Trump's unpredictable approach, it is highly likely that US relations with its allies would be jeopardized as a result of Trump's opinion that the US has long been the victim of terrible trade accords and unfair trade practices. He adopted an aggressive position in order to change current accords in order to build and promote free and "fair" trade with all major partners. In this sense, the process of renegotiating trade accords deemed harmful to US interests has begun. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (US-Korea FTA) have both been studied and revised. To achieve the same goal, President Trump initiated renegotiations with Beijing to reduce the United States' massive trade imbalances with China. Following multiple failed rounds of talks with Chinese officials, the Trump administration launched a trade war by raising import tariffs and imposing other restrictions on the import with China in

March 2018, blaming unfair Chinese trade practices and intellectual property theft in the United States (Arežina 287).

In July 2018, the US imposes 25% tariffs on around US\$34 billion in Chinese imports, including automobiles, hard drives, and aircraft parts. China retaliates by placing a 25% duty on 545 US-made items worth \$34 billion, including agricultural products, autos, and aquatic products. August 2018 Washington slaps 25% duties on additional \$16 billion in Chinese exports, including iron and steel, electrical machinery, railway supplies, instruments, and apparatus. China replies by imposing 25% tariffs on US commodities worth US\$16 billion, including Harley-Davidson motorcycles, bourbon, and orange juice. The United States identifies China as a "currency manipulator In August 2019. "The US promptly labeled China after the yuan went below the critical 7-to-US-dollar level, which the PBOC had previously maintained. It was the first time since 2008 that it had slipped below the psychologically significant level. (Mullen Par 2-3-4) Shortly after, Beijing replied by raising tariffs on US products, primarily those from states that supported President Trump. So far, figures suggest that President Trump's initiatives have failed to lower current trade deficits with China. Specifically, after the implementation of protectionist measures, the deficits climbed from \$347 billion in 2016 to \$375 billion in 2017 (Arežina 289).

On December 13, 2019, all parties reached an agreement on a partial Phase One accord. In it, the US (and China) renounce the recently announced hike in special tariffs, while China guarantees \$200 billion in extra imports from the US in 2020 and 2021. China also promised improved intellectual property protection, a halt to coerced technology transfer, and improved market access in financial services. However, the former preferential rates will remain in effect. And the debates over subsidies, state enterprises, and technology have yet to be settled. It seems improbable that these issues can be resolved in a second partial agreement before the US presidential elections. Even if this happens, the basic political disagreement will remain

unsolved, and a new trade policy escalation is likely at any point. Furthermore, China's increased US imports are expected to result in fewer imports from Brazil, the European Union, Japan, and other countries, sparking new controversies. Furthermore, Washington remains divided on how far the US economy should detach from the Chinese. China, too, has lost faith in the American president's dependability and integrity, and is hence unlikely to be willing to make compromises (Lippert and Perthes 24).

3.5. The Effectiveness of American Response

Prior to US President Donald Trump imposing tariffs on China in January 2018, China's foreign reserves stood at \$3.14 trillion. These dropped precipitously in October to roughly \$3.05 trillion, an 18-month low, but have since rebounded marginally, settling at \$3.098 trillion in April. The Trump administration imposed tariffs on an extra \$300 billion in Chinese goods, as well as limits on Huawei's ability to access American technology. Meanwhile, as China pushes the sprawling infrastructure project known as the new Silk Road, which aims to gain influence and prestige across Africa, Asia, and Europe, Beijing is forced to choose between investing in its domestic economy and continuing to fund projects in far-flung places such as Pakistan and Zimbabwe. According to Moody's Investor Service's Michael Taylor, China has grown more "selective in which BRI projects it would pursue," as evidenced by the value of new Chinese-led BRI contracts and direct investment declining significantly for the first time in 2017 (qtd. in Swaminathan 1.3)

BRI spending has dropped from a peak of roughly \$143 billion in 2016 to \$116 billion in 2017, and the total value of BRI projects in the first half of 2018 was just 42 percent of what it was the previous year, according to their data. Aside from the reality that China is running out of funds for new projects, existing projects may come back to haunt the country if repayment obligations are not satisfied. Brookings Institution senior fellow David Dollar told Yahoo Finance. "It is difficult to implement large infrastructure projects, so there is a risk that China

would finance some substandard projects, resulting in unpayable debts for some borrowing countries, Chinese banks would then have to write off part of these obligations, potentially contributing to China's financial vulnerabilities" (qtd. in Swaminathan 4).

According to a report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, China has demonstrated that it can pressure countries into policy positions by the way it negotiates, disburses, and structures loan repayments with its borrowers, such as when it persuaded Cambodia and the Philippines to reconsider military or diplomatic ties with the US. (Hillman) As China "continues to create money to develop the BRI on very risky loans, sometimes in excess of the borrowers' entire GDP," any form of unfavorable economic effect "would severely impair the [BRI's] short term success," according to short seller and GeoInvesting Co-Founder Dan David. And, whereas Scissors of the American Enterprise Institute China believed that China has reached a tipping point and that the BRI is financially unsustainable, David was far more doubtful of China's massive initiative genuinely failing. "Aside from overextending its own country's loans, there have been no 'failures' on China's part in the OBOR plan so far," David remarked. "If or when China is or is not paid back on onerous conditions, China can grab the territory and enhance military presence, which arguably is what the OBOR is in part intended to do" (qtd. in Swaminathan 8).

President Trump's refusal to contain the Covid 19 pandemic and failure to protect the American economy by announcing a trade war is one of the most catastrophic failures of leadership in American history. The trade war not only harmed the American economy, but the tariffs also forced American businesses to accept lower profit margins, cut wages and jobs for American workers, and raise prices for American consumers or businesses. On the other hand, China's trade surplus hit a record \$535 billion in 2020, up 27 percent from 2017 (rabouin 5).

When Donald Trump withdrew America's support for the Paris Agreement, China seized the opportunity to assume global climate governance leadership. In November 2016, China announced the South-South Climate Cooperation Fund at the 22nd Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP22) in Marrakesh, Morocco. Similarly, when the US withdrew from the TPP, claiming that it would cost American jobs, China emphasized the importance of speeding up negotiations on the APEC Free Trade Agreement (Hodzi and Yu-Wen 20).

In terms of the TPP, the Australian Prime Minister even suggested that the remaining 11 signatories, excluding the US, proceed with a possible admission of Beijing. Even if Beijing does not become a member of the TPP, the mere suggestion by a US ally that Beijing be included indicates a loss of trust and confidence in the US. As a result of TPP's demise, there is no viable alternative to China's default position of trade liberalization, primarily in goods, backed by strong mercantile governments. The cancellation of the TPP by President Trump was a gift to China. China's support for globalization and the climate change agreement, as well as its offer of alternatives to the TPP, is calculated to demonstrate that China is a more trustworthy partner than the US, feeding into an already existing concern among US allies about the direction of US foreign policy under the Trump administration (Hodzi and Yu-Wen 21).

To conclude, the reactions of Obama and Trump to the BRI reflected a moderate win for Chinese diplomacy. Although neither administration tried to join the Asian infrastructure investment bank or wanted more formal collaboration within the BRI (such as approving a bilateral framework agreement), both identified the initiative's importance as a priority for Xi and were thus willing to trade positive words and actions, such as sending a delegation to the Belt and Road Forum, for Chinese cooperation in other areas. This gave the BRI some credibility while also shielding it from the negative impacts of stronger US opposition. In the

United States, China's economic and military expansion is increasingly viewed as a threat to its own dominating position in the international order. According to the Trump Administration's policy documents, China is fundamentally a revisionist state seeking regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and, in the long run, global domination.

General Conclusion

This thesis attempted to explore the American response to China's New Silk Road Initiative. It also shed light on how the United States interests have been threatened at all levels by this project and what strategies it has been implementing to face the rapid growth of China.

United States had adopted various important foreign policies that kept it safe and away from war and contributed in shaping its status nowadays. It had ignored the outside world and focused solely on its economy within its borders during the period of time before the break of World War I. However, US was obliged to change its foreign policy and make allies that permitted it to trade arms.

Following the WWII, the United States pursued an interventionist policy in an attempt to limit the communist influence abroad. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new world order emerged. Consequently, The United States has promoted foreign policy concepts to guarantee its peace and the security of its citizens, advance democracy and human rights, assure economic success, and promote international goals by fostering a sense of common interests and values. While the United States remains a powerful military and economic power, rising nations such as China have challenged its global supremacy. The United States felt frightened by China's rapid progress and that it was no longer as globally strong as it once was.

In order to know how China has become the second largest trader after the United States, it was important to explore China's openness to the rest of the world. So as to fulfill global economic standards, China developed new foreign policies, modified its ideology, and broke out from the Soviet Union's fundamentally flawed economic model. In 1979, China opened up to the rest of the world, and economic reforms began. In barely four decades, China went from being a poor country to the fastest growing global economic power. China began to

establish relations with the rest of the world, and it became more interested in participating in international organizations to assist it realize its aim of establishing a favorable international order and raising its standing. Growing economic ties with the rest of the globe was one of the reasons that enabled China to join the World Trade Organization, which acknowledged that China's economy matched WTO requirements.

After entering the WTO, China's GDP surpassed Japan's to become the world's second largest economy. In addition, it has surpassed the United States as the world's largest manufacturer. Capital goods from China competed with those from Western countries. China's rapid economic growth has resulted in bilateral commercial relations with the U.S. Because of the American's fear of China's goals and progress as a commercial partner, their relationship has become complicated. The launch of the New Silk Road has drawn all eyes on China, attracting US attention despite its refusal to participate.

The focus of this thesis was on how the United States has been affected by the NSR and what policies it has been implementing to hinder the growth of this project. The research also showed the different American foreign policies toward China. Many US presidents were in continuous debate on how exactly they should understand China. Previous administrations were resumption of harmonious relations with United States and China, goods were traded freely between the two countries. Describing Obama's foreign policy toward China as either containment or an attempt to restrain China missed the main point: US foreign policy toward China has been about building a China that would aid in the administration of the international order, as the US perceived it. What this revealed was a sense of worry existing in US discourses about China in terms of the US's relative position and domestic way of life, as well as a less overt sense of uneasiness about international politics in general.

China announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 to increase economic integration and connectivity (such as infrastructure, commerce, and investment) with its neighbors and

trading partners in Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. The Belt and Road Initiative solicits joint contributions and has a clear goal: to promote infrastructure construction and connectivity, strengthen economic policy coordination, improve complementarity of development strategies, and boost interconnected development in order to achieve common prosperity. This effort originated in China, yet it belongs to the entire world. It has been concentrating on the Asian, European, and African continents, although other partners have been welcomed.

Although Beijing invited The US president Obama to join the BRI he did not host BRI investments and like many other major countries, did not sign a formal cooperation agreement outlining the terms and circumstances for the US engagement in the BRI, despite the fact that certain US enterprises had engaged on an individual basis. Nonetheless, China has been closely monitoring and attempting to influence US policies and perspectives for two reasons: Active US opposition alone or in collaboration with allies and partners—could damage the BRI by casting doubt on China's motivations and presenting options to Asian states in need of development finance for large-scale infrastructure projects. China needed US support to prove its legitimacy. However, despite its status as a Pacific power, the US has remained on the margin of China's BRI from the start. Former President Barack Obama's most significant initiative to establish his administration's legacy in Asia was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade deal aimed at offsetting China's rapid rise. It flopped with voters of both parties in the United States because there is no indication that the TPP would result in additional American jobs. While the TPP would not compete with the BRI, it would strengthen any Indo-Pacific strategy by reaffirming Washington's regional commitments. The BRI plan had the potential to significantly strengthen China's economy and soft power image. China is seeking to improve the return on its foreign exchange reserves, open up new international commercial prospects for Chinese enterprises, opening up new markets for industries that are

currently overcapacity, and boost economic development in China's poorest regions. However, if borrowers do not repay loans or if recipient countries do not see the Belt and Road Effort as helping them, the initiative may cause financial risks.

President Donald Trump heightened tensions between the United States and China by taking a more aggressive attitude in his campaign against China, claiming that since China joined the WTO, the United States lost jobs. In January 2018, Trump began imposing tariffs and other trade obstacles on China in order to force it to modify its alleged property theft and unfair trade practices.

The Trump administration's "America First" foreign policy has undermined the fundamental pillar of globalization: multilateralism. The exit of the United States from some political and trade agreements has heralded a period of global insecurity in which protectionism and the perception of securing national interests rule, while cooperation and partnerships were ignored. The competition between the United States and China, in particular, had a substantial impact on the growth of emerging economies and global trade. Trump was unable to secure genuine concessions from Beijing because, like other great powers, China refused to bow to unilateral demands. On the other hand, China's recent negotiating positions with both the European Union and the United States imply that China is willing to make a number of concessions in exchange for anything in return.

China replied to Trump's unilateral demands with counterproposals of its own throughout multiple rounds of negotiations with the Trump administration, as is customary in trade negotiations. Ironically, many of China's recommendations involved reverting to the rules-based system that the US helped to establish during and after WWII, a system that Washington backed until Trump. However, a significant thrust of Trump's approach was to reject the global trading system's institutionalized infrastructure in favor of unilateral demands. Many described Trump's approach as "transactional" rather than legalistic, but this

is now clearer than ever. This is demonstrated by Biden's common strategy for rebuilding connections with America's friends, who were regularly depicted as adversaries during Trump's presidency. While Biden has stated his intention to be tough with China, Russia, and other perceived US rivals, he is more likely to revert to "business as usual" in order to protect the financial interests of global American corporations. For example, Biden is likely to oppose Trump's efforts to target both friends and foes with high tariffs that violate World Trade Organization rules. This is likely to pave the way for improved commercial relations between the US and China, eventually leading to a negotiated end to Trump's trade war.

As China's imports and exports grew, so did the necessity of protecting the Sea Lines of Communication that carried that trade. To protect China's SLOCs, more focus was placed on upgrading China's naval capability. Recently the Biden administration's goal is to establish a "balance of influence in the world that is maximum advantageous" to the United States, as it seeks to strengthen peace across the Taiwan Strait and ties with South Korea and Japan. The invasion of Ukraine by President Vladimir Putin is projected to increase military spending in other countries, particularly in Europe. Germany has already put aside 100 billion euros (\$109 billion) in defense budget increases. Beijing has refused to condemn the invasion, heightening fears that Chinese President Xi Jinping would launch military action against Taiwan, the democratically governed island Beijing claims as its territory. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen has dismissed fears that the European war may spark a similar catastrophe in Asia, claiming that the two circumstances are "fundamentally different".

In addition to providing military assistance to Ukraine, the United States, its NATO allies, and other democratic nations have imposed unprecedented worldwide economic penalties on Russia. Japan, South Korea, and even notoriously neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden are included.

The US is trying to secure its interests and protect its world's leadership. But China now is proving that it has an increasing influence in the international affairs, especially in crisis and wars. Consequently, new powers are emerging and a new world order system is reshaping.

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ملخص

الهدف من هذه الأطروحة هو مناقشة عواقب تطور طريق الحرير الصيني الجديد على سياستها الخارجية مع الولايات المتحدة. تم إطلاق هذه المبادرة في عام 2013 من قبل الرئيس شي جين بينغ ، وتهدف إلى تعزيز دور الصين كقوة اقتصادية عالمية وكذلك بناء علاقات اقتصادية مع العالم الخارجي

يهدف طريق الحرير الجديد ، المعروف أيضًا باسم "حزام واحد ، طريق واحد" ، إلى تعزيز التجارة وتقوية الروابط الاقتصادية بين المملكة الوسطى وأوروبا من خلال تكامل الأسواق وربط شبكة واسعة من البنى التحتية في أوراسيا وبعض المناطق الأفريقية ، بما في ذلك الموانئ البحرية ، المطارات والسكك الحديدية وخطوط الأنابيب. بسبب نطاقه ، سيكون لطريق الحرير الجديد تداعيات سياسية واقتصادية وأمنية بعيدة المدى لجميع البلدان المعنية وخارجها. نتيجة لذلك ، وبالنظر إلى الشكوك و عدم الايمان الذي يحيط بهذا المشروع ، فإن البحث المستمر في عواقب تطويره في مختلف المجالات مطلوب.

يزعم المسؤولون الصينيون أن جميع الدول المشاركة ستستفيد بالتساوي من هذا المشروع ، ويعتقد بعض الخبراء أن الاقتصاد العالمي سيستفيد خاصة أنه من المتوقع أن يعزز التجارة والاستثمار والوصول إلى أسواق جديدة مع تعزيز الاتصال من خلال بناء وتحديث البنية التحتية. من ناحية أخرى ، تخشى الولايات المتحدة من أن تستخدم بكين طريق الحرير الجديد لزيادة نفوذها على القارة القديمة ، مما قد يشكل شكلاً جديداً من أشكال الاستعمار. حافظت الولايات المتحدة في البداية على موقف ودي بينما رفضت قبول طلب الرئيس الصيني للانضمام إلى البنك الآسيوي للاستثمار في البنية التحتية من أجل تقريب العالم من بعضه البعض (تناغم المصالح) .

ومع ذلك ، تدهورت العلاقات لاحقاً في ظل رئاسة ترامب حيث تبنى استراتيجيات عدوانية لإحباط تقدم الصين.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الصين؛ القوة الاقتصادية؛ تناغم المصالح ؛ طريق الحرير الجديد الحزام الولايات المتحدة