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Recognition and Reification in the Philosophy of Axel Honneth

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Dedication:

**To my loving father,
who believed in me and made me, believe in myself.**

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General Introduction

General introduction:

Contemporary philosophy has witnessed, to this day, an intellectual production that made it distinguished from other previous philosophies, due to its interest in studying and understanding the human phenomenon, in an attempt to restore human dignity. As a result of the radical changes in the way of life experienced by man, that begun in the last century, on the one hand. On the other hand, as a result of the severe social, economic and psychological effects of the First and Second World Wars, and the political transformations that followed. In the midst of these changes, an important turning point occurred in the course of contemporary European philosophical thought with the emergence of the Frankfurt Critical School in Germany, which tried to diagnose the various conflicts and struggles between individuals, and the various social pathologies that contemporary human suffers from. In order to reach solutions that allows society to advance and prosper.

On this basis came the theory of recognition as a solution to these conflicts and social diseases, including the phenomenon of reification and the state of alienation. This theory is one of the most important contemporary philosophical and social theories as it established a basic paradigm for the humanities in contemporary thought. Especially in the field of law, politics, economics, ethics...In this way, it seeks to respond to reificatory view of human, which transformed relations between human beings, which are similar to relations between things, to become mechanical, inhuman relations. The roots of this theory go back to modern philosophy, especially with Hegel, who formed a paradox compared to what was prevalent at the time. Where it has been revived in contemporary thought and has become one of the most widely used concepts among researchers in the social and political fields, and many philosophers have opened discussion about it such as Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, in addition to Axel Honneth, who is the subject of my research.

Axel Honneth is one of the most important pioneers of critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and today he is considered the representative of the third generation of this school. This is because of his formulation of a distinct intellectual structure through his paradigm marked by "recognition", which linked it to "various forms of social disrespect" on the one hand, and the phenomenon of "reification" on the other. This is with the aim of rebuilding the critical theory anew and filling in the deficiencies and gaps in which the pioneers of the first and second generation of this school fell, as he renewed the concepts of this theory through his approach to the issues and problems of the contemporary social, political and moral world. Thus, he formed

two turns: the first turn was to go beyond what the pioneers of the Frankfurt School had presented. While the second turning point is the renewal in the process of recognition theory.

On this basis, my attempt to study this subject was based on the following problem: What is the essence of the recognition theory of Axel Honneth? And How can a civilized society be established free of social ills (reification, forms of disrespect) through this theory?

A number of sub-problems fall under this problem, as follows:

- How Honneth transcends traditional materialism theory? What are the most important philosophical references that he relied on to rebuild a new critical theory?
- How did Honneth move from the concept of modernity to the concept of reification? Was he able to surpass the singly interpretation of reification and present other dimensions of it?
- What are the solutions and criteria provided by Honneth to achieve the personal identity of individuals and to overcome the phenomenon of reification and the various forms of disrespect?

In order to address this problem posed, which occupied a large space in contemporary Western thought, and to answer these sub-questions, I had to follow a logical and sequential arrangement in my research, so I relied on the analytical and critical approaches as a method for it. In addition to the comparative approach, which features in the second and third chapters.

As for the reasons and motives for choosing the research, some of them are objective, and some are subjective:

As for the objective reasons:

- This contemporary topic deals with issues that most contemporary Western and Arab societies suffer from.
- Also, given that this topic has not received sufficient Arabic studies yet.
- In addition, Axel Honneth is considered one of the most important philosophers of the era, both on the German and international levels.

My personal conviction also had a role in this through:

- My desire is to study Western philosophy in general and the Frankfurt School in particular.
- My tendency to topics related to social issues and human reality, as the most important field worth studying.

This study is also of great importance, as this importance is represented in:

- It deals with the current social situation of contemporary Western societies and highlights the crisis of contemporary Western man.
- It also shows us the mechanisms of establishing a society that preserves human dignity and achieves his humanity.
- In addition, the wars and conflicts experienced by contemporary societies, especially our Arab societies, require us to engage in such issues.

As for the aims, I aspire to achieve:

- Identifying the various social diseases that contemporary societies suffer from and that stand as an obstacle to the establishment of a healthy moral society.
- Identifying the standards and conditions necessary to achieve the various moral values such as justice and tolerance that contribute to the establishment of a healthy and integrated society.
- The extent to which this theory is compatible with Arab societies.

Accordingly, I divided my work as follows:

An introduction, which included the subject of the study and its importance, as well as the main problem and the most important sub-problems that fall under it. It also identified the curricula adopted in this study and the most important reasons and motives for choosing this topic, in addition to the objectives that this research aspires to, noting the approved plan and the most important sources and references.

This work has also been divided into three chapters, where each chapter contains basic topics. In the first chapter, I dealt with the most important various intellectual references "philosophical, sociological, and psychological" that Axel Honneth relied on to reach a deeper understanding of the social mechanisms on which the recognition paradigm is based. Then I went back to the criticisms made by Axel Honneth to the first and second generations of the Frankfurt School, from In order to rebuild the critical theory anew so that it is in line with the social, political, economic and cultural transformations that contemporary societies have known. It was entitled: Honneth and the Reconstruction of Critical Theory.

The second chapter was entitled: The position of reification in the social theory of Axel Honneth. In it, she touched upon Lukàcs' theory of reification as the founder of this concept as a first stage. And an attempt to present a critical study of this concept and search for other dimensions of it within the ontological, social and ethical visions based on the analyzes of both

Heidegger and John Dewey of this concept, in order to present a clear and accurate perception of it as a second stage.

While the third chapter entitled: Honneth's Social Theory of Recognition was included. In this chapter, I moved to talk about the theory of recognition as the only solution to achieving a social life based on moral standards. Where she touched on the forms of disrespect as a barrier to the progress of society towards the better. After that, she touched upon models of intersubjective recognition and their role in establishing the personal identity of individuals through achieving their social and political freedom.

Finally, I ended this study with a conclusion, which was a comprehensive overview and a brief summary of everything that came in this research about reification and the recognition paradigm of Axel Honneth, and also dealt with the most important results extracted from this study.

I also relied in this study on a set of sources and references that helped me to know the subject of my research in depth and penetration within it. One of the most important sources I relied on: "The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts". And a book of "Reification: a New Look at an Old Idea". As for the references, it relied heavily on the books of Kamal Boumenir, among which are: Axel Honneth, the Philosopher of Recognition" and the book "The Right to Recognition". In addition, Christopher Zurn through his book "Axel Honneth", and Danielle Petherbridge in his book "The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth".

Chapter One

1. Honneth's Reconstruction of Critical Theory.

1.1. The Intellectual Influences of Honneth's Recognition Theory.

1.1.1. Philosophical influences (Friedrich Hegel).

1.1.2. Sociological influences (George Herbert Mead).

1.1.3. Psychological influences (Sigmund Freud).

1.2. Honneth's Criticism of the Frankfurt School's Critical theory.

1.2.1. Criticism of the first generation project (Adorno and Horkheimer).

1.2.2. Criticism of the second generation project (Habermas).

1.3. Modernism .

1. Honneth's reconstruction of critical theory:

Introduction:

The Frankfurt School is considered the most prominent contemporary critical social philosophical school due to its openness to the various major philosophical references: "Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist and psychoanalytic" on the one hand. On the other hand, it keeps pace with the complex problems posed in contemporary societies, and with the intellectual, social and political transformations of our contemporary world. Perhaps the most important characteristic of this school is that it has taken criticism as its method, where it has tried to conduct a critical study of Western civilization in order to reconsider its foundations and principles in light of the major transformations it is experiencing. As a result of modernity, especially since the age of lights, which is a fundamental turning point for modernity, which led to the emergence of various social diseases such as alienation, reification and loss of individual dignity. On this basis, the pioneers of the Frankfurt School presented a critical analysis of these societies.

The Frankfurt School has developed through three main phases. The first stage in which this school was founded at the beginning of the twenties of the previous century, which is represented by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. The second stage, represented by Jürgen Habermas. As for the third stage, it is represented today by Axel Honneth¹, who tried to rebuild critical theory in line with the current era. That is through critiquing both the pioneers of the first

¹ Axel Honneth is a German social philosopher, professor of philosophy at the Goethe University in Frankfurt and director of the institute for Social Research. (Honneth, 2008, p. 11). He was born in 1949, in the German city of Essen. He grew up in a bourgeois environment, his father Horst Honneth, a medical doctor. (Zurn, 2015, p. 2). He studied a variety of subjects in different places, where he studied philosophy, sociology and German literature at the universities of Bochum, Bonn and Berlin. (Honneth, 2008, p. 11). He got a master's degree in philosophy in 1974, and he got his doctorate in 1982. (Zurn, 2015, p. 2). In 1990, Honneth finished his major work, which was titled "struggle for recognition". After that, from 1991 to 1992, Honneth worked as a C3 professor of philosophy at the University of Konstanz. After that, he took a position in political philosophy at the free university of Berlin, where he was promoted to C4 professor. From 1992 to 1996. In 2001, He served as Director of the Institute for Social Research. Moreover, since 2011 till now, he has made many academic visits to some universities and gave many lectures to them, such as the University of Montreal, Canada and Kyoto University, Japan. Currently, he spends his time between Frankfurt and New York City. (Zurn, 2015, p. 3). He wrote many books and has written many articles on his new critical theory, among his most famous books are: the struggle for recognition 1992. Redistribution or Recognition 2003. Reification 2005. Freedom's Rights 2014. (Zurn, 2015, p. 4).

generation and the second generation, as a first stage. Moreover, his openness to a group of major philosophical references as a second stage.

1.1. Intellectual references for recognition theory:

In order to reformulate the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and build a new critical theory, Honneth started from the recognition theory presented by Hegel. Where he worked to reactivate it with his openness to social psychology and psychoanalysis by relying on the work of the American sociologist Herbert Mead (1863-1931) and psychoanalyst The Englishman Donald Winnicott (1896-1971). Where Honneth believes that through these works a real understanding of the social and structural mechanisms underlying the process of recognition and through which the social, political and economic problems of contemporary societies can be overcome.

The word recognition denotes several different meanings, depending on the context in which it is mentioned, but before we address these meanings, it is worth pointing out that recognition in its general meaning indicates gratitude, thanks and acknowledgment.

- Know again sb/ sth that you have seen, heard etc before.
- Admit that sth exists or is true-they -d the need to take the problem seriously.
- Accept and approve of sb/sth officially: refuse to-a new government.
- Give sb official thanks for sth they have done. (Oxford Learn's Dictionary, p. 358).

The word recognition also appears in Larousse's dictionary, "reconnaissance" starting from the word "reconnaitre" which means:

- Legitimacy of the recognition of rights, that is, the rights of individuals, as well as a beautiful recognition.
- It also means acknowledging the achievements of others.
- It also means recognition by governments and states among themselves of their legitimacy. (Larousse, p. 779).

Laland points out in his encyclopedia that the term recognition came in the sense of knowing and acknowledging where he knows it:

- The act of acknowledgment indicates in memory the re-production of memory, recognition and determination of its position.
- Acknowledgment of a fact, duty or right. (Laland, 2001, p. 1180).

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Jamil Saliba also used the word recognition, which is synonymous with the word recognition, as he defined it as:

“The mental act that consists in inserting an object into a perception, such as a sudden light that it is enough for you to feel so that you know that it is lightning”. (Saliba, 1982, p. 303).

In the international philosophical encyclopedia, recognition refers to three meanings:

Cognitive and psychological meaning: refers to a cognitive act linking a perception of a present and a memory. (Baghora, 2012, p.32).

Moral meaning: it is related to experience and expertise, where it appears through the exchange between the internal relations between the self and the other.

Faulty recognition: it indicates social meanings related to distorted recognition of some social groups as result of prejudices. (Ibid, p.33).

As for the philosophical meaning of the word recognition, it is difficult to determine, especially in Greek and medieval philosophy. Where we find that the establishment of the term recognition in the modern era, was its beginning with Descartes (1596-1650) when he considered recognition is contingent upon accepting a particular matter as true, and distinguishing between what is identical and what is different. (khowailidi, 2015, p. 4).

Recognition took another turn with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), where he considered that the desire for recognition is the result of feelings of fear of death in a state of nature characterized by war and aggression. (Ibid, p. 8). So the recognition came as a result of getting rid of the negative state of the conflict (the struggle for survival).

In the current era, we find Charles Taylor (1931 - to this day) talking about recognition in his book "The Politics of Recognition", where he considered that recognition means formally acknowledging the differences that exist between groups, given that each group has its own peculiarities. Recognition according to Taylor is a basic need for human self-esteem and ability to act freely in society. (Mostafa, 2016, p. 22).

1.1.1. Philosophical references (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 1770-1831):

Hegel is the first intellectual reference that Honneth relied on in establishing the theory of recognition, because Honneth extracted this theory from Hegel's philosophy. but he did not take this idea in an absolute way, as he moved away from the metaphysical and ontological

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concepts of this philosophy as a concept, the spirit, the absolute, the universal mind...(Boumenir, 2010, p. 105).

Honneth sees that Hegel's importance lies in the fact that he was the first to try to study social relations as relations between selves that seek to achieve mutual recognition through the so-called "intersubjective" that distinguishes human life from other beings. And Hegel formed a paradox compared to what was prevalent, where he goes out of the modern traditional framework and political thought, especially in both "Hobbes" and "Machiavelli", where there is no state of recognition but there is selfishness to crush the other, as humans struggle to achieve their own interests under the so-called "struggle for survival".(ibid, p. 105)

This conflict is a conflict in which human desires and wills contradict, in a way that leads to conflict and violence. Thomas Hobbes portrayed relations between individuals before the emergence of political society as a state of war and conflict between individuals based on the survival of the strongest. Since every human being seeks to achieve himself in a selfish way at the expense of others. Where human becomes a wolf for his brother human being and considers all individuals to be his enemies. This state of nature that prevailed is characterized by misery, limitation and brutality.(Boumenir, Facebook).

Hegel, according to Honneth, was seeking to reformulate the model of social conflict in a different way, not based on the survival instinct, but rather on a set of moral principles. On this basis, Hegel considered that the conflict that takes place between the selves is not a struggle for survival but a struggle for recognition, as this conflict is not a biological conflict but rather a moral conflict, because human existence is achieved only through ethical recognition between selves. The human being is on himself through the other, which is considered complementary to him.(Boumenir, 2010, p. 131).

The recognition according to Hegel: It is that human experience that includes the awareness of each subject that their freedom is limited by the freedom of the other self to participate in it in human life.(Boumenir, 2018, p. 77).

Hegel emphasized that the recognition movement that forms the basis of the moral relationship between individuals consists of alternating stages between conflict and reconciliation, as this conflict that arises between them represents something moral, because through the conflict the identity of individuals is completed and fully recognized.(Honneth, 1996, p. 17). The self in the beginning does not accept other selves easily because it seeks to control any self that it sees as threatening its independence and trying to destroy it. Considering itself to be the only independent existence, but it soon becomes clear to it that if it destroys the other self, it is thus destroying itself because the self when it contemplates the other it

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contemplates itself, and thus retreat from the control of these selves. This is what appears in the system of slavery between the master and the slave, where the master is considered the owner of the independent existence, while the slave represents just a thing. (Stees, 2005, p. 42).

Hegel clarifies the relationship of the self with other selves, considering that

"Other is only for itself as it sublates itself as existing-for-itself, and it is for itself, and it is for itself only in the being-for-itself of the other. Each is the mediating middle to the other, through which each mediates itself with itself and integrates itself with itself. Each is, to itself, and in that of the other, an essence immediately existing for itself, which at the same time is for itself in that way only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other". (Hegel, 2018, p. 110).

This means that the self is aware of itself and is aware that it is another self in relation to the other, and this self cannot be aware of itself except through the other, and therefore the relationship between the self and the other must be a relationship of mutual recognition.

The self seeks to open up to other selves because it is not closed to itself, as it recognizes itself by entering into relationships with other selves. Based on this, the identity and existence of the individual is based on his association with the society in which he lives, and thus his completeness depends on this connection and mutual recognition. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 104). This is what is clarified by the "dialectic of the master and the slave", according to Hegel, which is based on the idea that self-awareness ends with the recognition of other selves through the conflict between them, as self-awareness appears in the form of a desire that the self seeks to achieve through the non-self. In the "dialectic of the master and slave", we find that the self (the master) when it turns to the other, considers it just something (slave) it seeks to possess, and tries to control it through its attempt to deny recognition of it. But the realization of desire in the truth of the matter can only be achieved through recognition, which the self reaches through conflict. But the question is here, how do subjects move from a state of conflict to a state of recognition through the dialectic of the master and the slave? Hegel answers that this conflict occurs when each individual tries to prove himself through the other, as each becomes in danger and faces death, this struggle continues until one of them fears death and does not risk his life and obeys the order of the other (the master). Therefore, here he took the position of the slave because he refused to put his life at risk in order to achieve recognition, unlike the master who was able to impose himself and obtain recognition. But this master will find that his independence and self-awareness depend on the slave, because the master leaves all his work to the slave, so he loses his independence because he depends on the other, on this basis the slave realizes that the independence of his master is linked to him and achieves self-awareness of his master. The

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master and the slave each came to know themselves and the other, and each accepted the other as self-awareness, which represents a mutual recognition between individuals that arose through conflict.(Imam, 1985, pp. 52-54).

And in order for Hegel to explain this conflict more and the stages of recognition it goes through, he relied on the crime, and this is the example that Honneth relied on his study of Hegel. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 98).

Hegel sees that the first social relations, through which the individual is liberated from the life of nature and natural morals help to achieve independent growth on the other, this individual development initially develops through two stages of mutual recognition and then reaches the third stage of recognition. The stages are separated from each other so that each of them is associated with a certain level of personal identity.

The first stage is the relationship between parents and children. In this relationship, individuals get to know each other based on the emotional need that is relied upon in raising children to unify their feelings. According to Hegel, this relationship represents “the peaceful reciprocal work and formative education of human beings.” As for the second stage, it is related to exchange relations, based on contracts (between property owners), which imposes a set of laws to regulate these exchanges, in this relationship individuals get to know each other as each of them is a "property owner".(Honneth, 1996, pp. 18-19).

Here Hegel introduces the concept of crime as a reaction to biased laws, where he tried to link crime and its stages of development to the life of the individual so that it can clarify the individual's transition from one relationship to another, as crime represents the stage of natural morals – Mechiaville and Hobbes- (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 98). According to Hegel, a conflict occurs between the owners, each of whom seeks to take the property of the other. This conflict continues unless one overcomes the other and seizes his property, and this is what Hegel describes as theft. But the criminal in this case denies what he did and seeks to defend himself under the pretext of defending His honor, and the other is also trying to prove himself and recover his property. Through this conflict, each of them seeks to re-establish his honor and try to convince others that he is a person worthy of appreciation. This represents the third stage of relationships that are related to the honor of individuals through which the individual seeks to appreciate himself and publicly recognize his integrity. Where honor is linked to the characteristics and capabilities of the individual that he struggles to be recognized, for this reason Hegel sees that the individual recognizes himself when others recognize his abilities, traits and characteristics, Hegel used the concept of honor to describe a positive relationship with the self. (Honneth, 1996, pp. 21-24).

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What should be noted here is that Hegel considers the negative behavior of the criminal to be the result of not fully acknowledging him, as this insufficient recognition is the cause of the spread of the crime, and thus the criminal begins to struggle for his recognition. Therefore, crime is just a means through which to reveal relationships recognition.

Hegel identified three forms of negative interaction:

- 1- Bodily harm, extermination and destruction.
- 2- Relationships between property owners and refers to acts of theft and burglary.
- 3- It is represented in personal struggles for honor, such as the relationship of the master to the slave, the relationship of revenge, battles and wars.(Petherbridge, 2013, pp. 97-98).

Corresponding to these passive forms of interaction, three forms of recognition are distinguished by the question "how" and "what":

- 1- In the emotional relationship of recognition: in the family, individuals are recognized by their emotional desires and needs.
- 2- In the legal relationship of recognition: they are recognized as equal persons.
- 3- In the emotional relationship associated with the state: they are recognized by their special abilities and traits.

On this basis, Hegel sees that individuals must be able to understand each other, in order to form independent individual subjects, but in order to achieve their independence there must be a struggle for the achievement of mutual recognition through which they realize their own demands.(Honneth, 1996, p. 29).

In spite of this, Honneth sees that Hegel was not his goal, the individual's access to self-awareness, as it also appears through the recognition he gave that he was interested in the practical forms that lead to the normative understanding of the self, and neglected the cognitive relationship of interaction that is self-awareness of itself. As Honneth asserts in his book *The Struggle for Recognition* that Hegel, although he was a forerunner in talking about recognition and conflict, his theory was based on the metaphysical tradition.(Boumenir, 2015, p. 47).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Honneth's theory of recognition did not come from a vacuum. Rather, he had a major reference that he relied on, which is Hegel, who is credited with formulating this theory, especially with regard to the conflict between subjects through which forms of recognition are achieved and this is what Hegel explained in his book "Phenomenology Spirit" through the "master-slave dialectic" and through the idea of crime. Honneth has tried to re-improve this theory based on the recognition of moving away from metaphysical concepts in accordance, with the requirements of the current social and moral

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times, as his attempt is a continuation of Hegel's project, which remained in the middle of the road.

1.1.2. Sociological references (George Herbert Mead):

Mead's work is fundamental to Honneth's theory of inclusion. Honneth employed sociological theories to reinforce the concept of recognition that Hegel presented, because Mead, according to Honneth, provides a means to reshape Hegel's theory of struggle for recognition away from metaphysical concepts, through which the process of forming the personality and identity of the individual can be clarified. Hegel did not mention it. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 125). In order to reach a deeper understanding of the network of social relations and human behaviors and how to organize them. Mead contributed to the development of the basic principles of the symbolic interactive theory, through his study of the self in society, as evaluated by the individual and as evaluated by others. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 106).

Mead tried to explain self-awareness in a practical way, as he sees that the process of self-formation depends on what he calls "social interaction" or "interactive exchanges". Through this intersubjective interaction that takes place between individuals, the individual acquires self-awareness, and awareness of the way in which he can achieve himself. (Boumenir, 2013, p. 1594). Where Mead started from the question: What are the conditions in which self-awareness appears? First Mead consider that self-awareness is a personal thing and specific to each individual, as the individual reaches this awareness through human interaction as an internal social experience. On this basis, Mead concluded that solving problems Psychological is related to the interactive context between individuals, as the individual is conscious of himself in a correct way through his dependence on the processes of linguistic and behavioral expression on the psychological states in which he lives. Thus, Mead moves from the metaphysical interpretation, considering that psychological states are not related to what is metaphysical, interpreting them through "symbolic interaction". (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 128).

Mead was interested in studying the relationship of the individual to the group and society through the process of symbolic interaction in small groups. in order to reveal a layer that constitutes the self and the mind on the one hand, and constitutes what is social and cultural on the other hand, and then the method of forming the relationships between the two sides and their connection to behavior, human action and social action - whether a practical activity or a symbolic statement- for interpretation. The symbolic system, especially language, becomes a key factor in the interaction process that links between the formation of the self, the mind, and what is social. This symbolic system includes everything that can express meaning from signs of

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gestures or bodily movements..., which have connotations within the community. (Ibrahim, 2008, p. 120).

Honneth sees that Mead seeks to try to explain the internal experience, considering that it can only be analyzed if it is expressed in the form of an external behavior or an activity that can be observed. On this basis, Mead emphasized that social psychology is a behavioral science in the sense that it begins with an activity that can be observed and then analyzed, and studying it practically, without ignoring the internal experience, which is a basic internal stage and an integral part of this activity. and Mead confirms that the analysis of this activity starts from the outside to the inside, meaning the study of behavior and then presenting an analysis of the internal experience.(Petherbridge, 2013, p. 129).

On this basis, Mead asserts that psychological awareness contributes to building disjointed coordination, which reshaping and building perceptions and concepts, through organic work situations and the action stage. The organic work stage is considered unquestionable, as it is free of problems. As for stage of action, a set questions are raised that lead to rebuilding of things with new meanings, for example, the idea of burning is formed in a child. When a child sees a burning candle directly, he touches it. This represents the stage of organic action. Then he discovers that the candle is the cause of his burning. Here he rebuilds his concept and perception about the candle based on the experience that He went through it and this represents the stage of action. This is why Mead asserts that it is not possible to separate between the internal subjective elements and the external objective elements of experience. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 130).

Mead asserts that we must distinguish between “I” as a subject, which indicates that the individual has consciousness, and “I”, which denotes the subjective action of the individual as an object in the sense that it refers to the individual as the object of consciousness. Therefore, the work of the self is related to two different fields, but at the same time, they are related: the first field is the empirical self. The second field is the subject of the function is the reconstruction of things in the world. And rebuilding the work of the job, and through these two fields a new individual and a new world are formed. In addition to this, Mead asserts that self-awareness is not complete except in a social framework through mutual interaction between individuals based on the idea of “taking the role of the other”, meaning that the individual sees himself as the other sees this what creates a kind of cooperation among them. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 131).

Mead explains this idea through the experience of socially beneficial work, as the self cannot understand itself as a lonely person, but through its interaction with its partners at work,

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where it contributes positively to this interaction through the performance of its function, which makes others recognize it. And this cooperative interaction is not limited to Interacting with people only, but even interacting with things, through the cooperation of things with the actions of the individual, as the individual seeks to try to understand these things. (ibid, p. 132).

On this basis, Honneth sees that Mead is of fundamental importance because it unites three basic elements: human size, human application and shared subjectivity with others. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 128). Thus, Mead's symbolic interactionist theory is based on three basic ideas:

- The necessity of focusing on the interaction processes between the actor and the social environment and nature, assuming that the reality of the environment focuses on the individual's interpretation of his surroundings.
- Looking at the subject and his relationship with the world, as each of them is variable.
- Looking at the actor as a being capable of interpreting the world around him, meaning he is able to read and reconstruct meanings in his social and natural world. (Ibrahim, 2008, pp. 114-115).

Through this perception, Honneth considered that Mead was one of the first who was interested in studying the mutual interaction between selves. as Mead is considered the first to present the problem of the self and its social effectiveness with an independent and clarified framework, considering that the self is achieved only through this interaction and through its relationship with the “generalized other” by taking the role of the other. (Dahmani, p. 242).

Through what Mead presented in his theory, Honneth sees that all Mead and Hegel share the idea that self-awareness of itself depends on the existence of the other and on the other's vision of this self. However, Mead linked this perception to human behavior, considering that self-awareness starts from the external world and then moves to the internal experience, unlike Hegel who linked self-awareness to concepts this is metaphysical. On the one hand, and on the other hand, Honneth linked them through Hegel's idea of right and Mead's "generalized other", given that individuals understand that, there are mutual rights among themselves, so the individual cannot enjoy his rights Unless he realizes that there are obligations to others that he must abide by. On this basis, Honneth considers Mead as a way to reconstruct Hegel's theory and reformulate the three concepts of recognition identified by Hegel: love, right, and solidarity.(Petherbridge, 2013, pp. 137,140).

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In addition to this, Honneth sees that there are two main ideas that Mead was unable to clarify, the first idea being: the idea of "I" as a subject or consciousness and "I" as a subject of consciousness, he could not explain how It is up to the individual to perceive himself as a subject. (Ibid, p. 135).The second idea is that Mead was not able to sufficiently and clearly distinguish the forms of action that are essential criteria in the process of mutual recognition, so Honneth turned to psychoanalysis to clearly reformulate Mead's theory. (Ibid, p. 145).

1.1.3. Psychological references (Donald Winnicott):

Although Honneth turned to Mead for self-reconstruction, he was not satisfied with that but also worked to expand this analysis by drawing on Winnicott's interactive psychoanalytic theories. That is through the theory of object relations in the recognition pattern, specifically the early primary relationships. In order to reconstruct Hegel's concept of love as the first form of recognition, and the basis for building this theory on the one hand and on the other hand to develop Mead's thought about the "I" through psychoanalytic terms. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 147).

Winnicott set out in his analysis of human problems by providing a new view of human beings, as he moved away from Freud's theory of the repressed unconscious, and directed to define it from the perspective of the theory of human nature through the dynamic human relationships of the self and its experience with things. (Rebeiro, p. 34).

Winnicott's importance is highlighted by his socialization theory, which emphasizes the importance of early primary relationships - at the birth of a child - in shaping the self by balancing independence and attachment. On this basis, Winnicott proceeds from Freud's idea of "primary narcissism", which Winnicott calls "the stage of pregnancy" or "the unity of mother and child", which means the basic coexistence and integration of the child with his mother in its early stages.

For this, he worked to move beyond the classic interpretation of the self that held that the child lived in isolation from his mother, as Winnicott asserted that there could be no differentiation between mother and child. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 150). Because the child cannot build himself and his personality and develop it alone due to his lack of sufficient ability to do so, as the process of forming and building his personality takes place through mutual interaction with another person, which is the mother because she is considered a source of psychological, emotional, physical and social care. (Bon Ha Gu, 2018, p. 1).

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Winnicott sees that there is a basic relationship between mother and child, which is represented in the "primary binary activity" which he calls "shared subjectivity" which means the unity of mother and child. Where the mother takes care of her child, protects him, and seeks to achieve his demands and needs, all of this is done through love. A loving environment has the effect of successfully meeting the needs of the child. Through his mother, he acquires the ability to be independent, as he understands that he forms a self-distinct from his mother, as he realizes that there is a difference between "I" and "Not I," thus distinguishing between his own inner world and the outer world separated from him, and between subjective experience and objective reality. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 151).

Based on this, Winnicott sees that the child's independence from his mother takes place through three stages: absolute dependence, relative dependence, and independence.

Absolute dependence: It is also called the stage of adherence, in this stage the child depends on his mother, where the mother provides adequate psychological and physical care to meet all the wishes of the child, at this stage he lives in a state of dependence.

Relative dependence: At this stage, the mother begins to separate from her son, and begins to recognize the independence of the child from her, as she works to help her son adapt by using some means, what Winnicott calls "transitional phenomena". Such as games used by the mother to compensate for her absence, and the child begins to gradually integrate with his world and begins to discover its environment based on experience. (Petherbridge, 2013, pp. 137, 153). It is also at this stage that the child feels frustrated thinking that his mother has abandoned him. But Winnicott emphasizes this stage as part of the process of self-formation, because if he does not pass this stage, it will encourage him to continue to rely on his mother. Therefore, a healthy childhood, according to Winnicott, must pass this emotional crisis, no matter how painful it is, so that he can develop his control over himself and rely on it. (Bon Ha Gu, 2018, pp. 2-3).

Independence stage: the child is completely separated from his mother, and becomes a distinct individual with his own self.

But in the event that these stages are not relied upon, and in the absence of good motherhood, he will face many difficulties and setbacks that hinder the continuity of his existence, thus he will not be able to achieve his needs and harmony with his world. Where he cannot distinguish between "I" and "not me". On this basis, Winnicott established the origins of primitive psychopathology through the concept of "false self" and "true self". (Bon Ha Gu, 2018, pp. 5-6).

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Finally, we conclude that the first premonitions of Honneth's recognition theory were beginning with Hegel through his theory of the struggle for recognition. Which Honneth worked to develop by moving away from ontological and metaphysical concepts and giving them a realistic, social character, based on sociological analysis presented by Mead and psychoanalysis presented by Winnicott. Based on this, Honneth worked to reformulate the practical recognition theory and presented it with a new conception as the only solution to reconfiguring the self and reaching all levels of personal identity.

1.2. Axel Honneth criticism the Frankfurt school:

First, it should be noted that the representative of the third generation of the Frankfurt School, "Axel Honneth", was at the beginning of his path influenced by the pioneers of the first generation, "Max Horkheimer", "Theodor Adorno" and "Marcuse", As well as the pioneers of the second generation, especially Jürgen Habermas. But he differed with them on many points, and this indicates the critical sense he acquired from this critical school that takes criticism as its basis (Boumenir, 2015, p. 15). Which made him open up to many of the works of great philosophers such as: Hegel, Lukàcs, Heidegger..., and psychologists Like Sigmund Freud and Donald Winnicott, and sociologists: George Herbert Mead and Max Weber... in order to establish a new social philosophy (Boumenir, 2018, p. 7). It seeks to achieve mutual recognition between selves, as well as to eliminate all forms of conflict in society, for this reason he made an analytical critical study of the critical theory of the first and second generation.

On this basis, Honneth worked to reconstruct the Frankfurtian philosophical tradition on two levels:

The first level: It is represented in a critical examination and evaluation of the various philosophical concepts presented by the critical theory in order to discover its strengths and weaknesses, and to know the reasons for its inability to effect social change.

The second level: Reconstruction of critical theory, and the need to take into account the historical transformations of contemporary societies from various social, political, and economic aspects...etc. (Boumenir, 2015, pp. 16-17).

1.2.1. Criticism of the first generation project (Horkheimer and Adorno):

The Frankfurt School was distinguished by its critical tendency towards society. Criticism in its constructive sense is a tool that this school relies on in order to overcome the current state of contemporary man, which was created by a reality that relies in its structure on

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“authoritarianism” in all its forms: psychological (which is one's control over oneself). The political (ranking the levels of power from lowest to highest). And the economic (represented in the control of multinational companies that present another image of life to individuals from their products, in order to be able to distribute their production and consumption by individuals).

This is what helped the emergence of critical theory as a contemporary philosophical trend, and the Frankfurt School became very important because of its pioneers in its various generations who enriched philosophical production. Where has this school become a critical task for the reality of Western societies in terms of economics, due to the dominance of the capitalist economic system, and politically due to the domination of fascist and authoritarian regimes, to reveal the contradictions of this current reality. And the search for an alternative, which lies in the adoption of a social, political and economic system based on reason, through which man is liberated from all forms of tyranny. A task of this complexity can only be performed from building critical theory based on interaction between philosophy and social sciences.

On this basis, we find the pioneers of the first generation, especially Horkheimer and Adorno, who presented a critique of the philosophical thought that preceded them and contemporary philosophical thought. Where they focused in their criticism on the philosophies of the Enlightenment and the instrumental mind.

Enlightenment dialectic :Horkheimer and Adorno do not use the word dialectic there in the Hegelian concept, but they want through it to shed light on the different aspects of the Enlightenment and mentality in contemporary philosophical thought.

As they presented a radical implementation of the Enlightenment project, these two, Horkheimer and Adorno, through their book "The Enlightenment Table," said that the Enlightenment project, in the midst of historical development, became far from realizing the principles and the human values. on which it was based, and is no longer able to liberate human from the various forms of control that threaten the existence of the individual, especially in light of the tyranny of totalitarian political and economic systems, in which freedom and reason are absent , and turned from a state of progress to a state of decadence. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 12)

This is what Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out in the introduction to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, saying:

“We had no doubt that freedom in society is inseparable from enlightened thought. This was a starting point Rather; we had to clearly realize that the concept of this thought, not to mention the concrete historical forms and institutions of society in which this thought resides,

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contains the seed of this decline that we suffer in our days everywhere. Consolidating his own destiny” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2006, p. 16).

On this basis, both Horkheimer and Adorno searched for the possibility of rationality to be liberated in the current era through the criticism of reason itself. They arrived at this through two issues: First, considering the myth as a form of rationality of reality, because the ancient primitive man tried to get rid of his fears towards nature and liberation from it through his creation of the myth. Where both Horkheimer and Adorno see that myth is the reconfiguration of nature according to the human vision, and thus myth becomes the rationalization of nature. Second, modern man took the same path as the first man in rationalizing all things and this is what led to the creation of myth anew ,because the mind builds these partnerships and institutions that are considered as a tool to achieve interests without contemplating them, solving them or saving them. Instead of criticizing the mind itself, it turned into a legend. Where progress and development have become linked to domination over the mind, which has become a tool, and the best solution to get out of this is for the mind itself to be rational, because leaving the mind is not considered a solution, as it leads to irrationality.(Ramadan, 1993, p. 43-44).

Horkheimer and Adorno consider that the philosophies of the Enlightenment aimed at liberating man, but it devoted the ancient slavery to the first human anew, where primitive human was subordinate to nature, today he has become subordinate to contemporary society that enslaves freedom and depends on relationships based on domination and submission.(Ramadan, 1993, p. 45).

Criticism of positivism and instrumental reason: The Frankfurt School sharply criticized the positivist tendency, which was concerned with the study of social phenomena, an objective, scientific, empirical study, through the use of observation and experiment, and linking causes to their causes, in order to understand the phenomena in an accurate scientific understanding. Where positivism is concerned with describing phenomena without interpreting them, because the interpretation according to them is linked to philosophical and metaphysical reflections.(Mahdi, 2018, p. 140). This was confirmed by Adorno in his book "The Dialectic of Negation", considering that society as a whole can only be understood through the individual. And the individual, too, can only define his features through society. Therefore, positivist philosophies cannot comprehend the tension between the individual and society caused by the collapse of the mind and its transformation into a myth. He also stressed that the study of the human phenomenon by relying on the empirical method appears to help advance the human sciences. But in fact it leads to the failure to change any social system and this system remains

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constant, because the natural scientist does not seek to change the phenomena he is researching, but is limited to Present what is in front of him. (Ramadan, 1993, p. 56).

On the other hand, we find that the instrumental view of the mind has made it a mere tool that is used in a negative way to serve companies. What led to the usurpation of justice, the freedom and dignity of individuals and the emergence of the phenomenon of reification. As this control was not limited to the mind only, but also included the emotions, desires and body of the individual. And this is when the individual became a mere consumer subject to the means of advertising, publicity and the media, and he became based on one dimension, which is the consumer dimension. Because instrumental rationality has come to offer new forms of repressive means and methods that crushed man and robbed him of his freedom, in an attempt to convince him of false freedom. (Boumenir, 2014, pp. 22-23). With this, the instrumental mind succeeded in refining the human being and using it by the economic and political institutions based on perpetuating interest and hegemony in its various forms. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 15).

Hence, the pioneers of the first generation worked to establish a critical rationality to confront instrumental rationality. If instrumental rationality is based on the mind as the primary method of looking at things and ideas, then, Horkheimer considers critical rationality to be able to transcend the prevailing situation as it is not subject to what is prevalent because it is based on the criticism of ideas and institutions that dominate the individual. From this criticism, the process of human liberation is realized and the phenomenon of alienation and reification is overcome. (Mahdi, 2018, pp. 149-150).

Proceeding from the criticisms presented by the pioneers of the first generation of the Frankfurt School of the instrumental mind, we find that Honneth stands on a set of points, which are as follows:

Honneth considered that both "Horkheimer" and "Adorno" were unable to free themselves from what he calls "functionalism", which appeared as a result of their influence on the economic tendency of "Marx" that was prevalent in their time, That is why he considered it the main reason for not being able to understand and realize the nature of social life. On this basis, Honneth considered that they interpreted individual psychological dimensions and social and cultural phenomena on the functional bases of the economic structure, and thus neglected the social activity that contributes to the emergence of moral principles and which have a fundamental role in social life. (Bouzar, 2017, p.178).

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That is why the first monetary theory is considered to have a single economic view, and it was not able to diagnose the various social pathologies that were prevalent at the time. Because of this one-sided view, it could not see the social reality, where did the pioneers of this generation take criticism as a means to reconsider the social reality. (Boumenir, 2015, pp. 29-30).

Honneth also sees that they ignored the concept of social interaction and did not give it any importance, even though it is considered the main center on which subjects are based, given that they share with each other through it. In addition to this, Honneth considered that they focused on the economic aspect at the expense of the other aspects: the moral aspect, the social aspect, the psychological aspect... (Boumenir, 2018, p. 36). Through this, it is clear that the pioneers of the first generation, due to their marginalization of these dimensions, were unable to know and realize the forms of control and suffering in the moral and social aspects of individuals within their society. Which constituted an epistemological and theoretical obstacle to them in realizing the nature of social life (Boumenir, 2015, p. 30). Where they remained focused only on social relations, which are productive relations determined according to the category of work, ignoring the sociological content. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 37)

In addition, we find both Horkheimer and Adorno convinced that the various forms of domination that existed in their time were the result of instrumental rationality that caused the suppression of freedom and authoritarianism. And that it controlled various fields of social life, as this control took a complete character on contemporary societies. On this basis, Honneth criticized them for not being able to free themselves from the pessimistic nature contained in their book "The Dialectic of Enlightenment." (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 40-41). Which we find the continuation of this character in Adorno's book "The Negative Dialectic" (Boumenir, 2015, p. 31) This tendency, according to Honneth, led to the formation of the so-called pessimistic historical vision, and this is what made instrumental rationality dominated all aspects and fields and the various forms of alienation and reification. The dominance of this instrumental rationality led to the emergence of a state of social unrest, meaning that the pioneers of the first generation interpreted all the phenomena in society as pathological phenomena as a result of the control of rationality over man and nature. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 41).

Based on this, Honneth considers that both "Horkheimer" and "Adorno" were not able to free themselves from the idea that the mind is based on instrumentality. so their conception that they were my tools par excellence, Although they talked a lot about this perception that has become characteristic of modern social life forms, they were unable to reveal the reality of daily

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life due to their lack of a set of sociological concepts represented in "action" and "interaction". Which were not able to access it, this what is withheld from them what is happening in the daily social life, which led to the overall control of the social life of individuals because of the instrumental rationality that even practiced on humans, which led to its reification. (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 43-44).

Honneth pointed out that her intellectual background was a Marxist of a scientific nature, as the Marxist background appears in their focus on one type of practice or action, which is "work" as a currency derived from the capitalist system. Which was the reason for not conceiving a form of social rationalization that would allow the integration of the moral dimension. This why Honneth stressed that the pioneers of this first generation failed to achieve its philosophical project, which took human liberation and the elimination of various forms of oppression and control as its goal. (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 44-45). For this, Honneth believes, this relationship must be reconstructed based on an ethical idea, starting from Hegel's philosophy.

On this basis, Honneth believes that work must shift from a social perspective to an ethical one related to recognition. Despite this, Honneth does not deny the role of work in the recognition it achieves, because he considers that social work is the result of all forms of disrespect. For this, Honneth asserts, it is necessary to extend human activity to include both work and recognition at the level of social relations. In this regard, Honneth presented an example showing how work leads to lack of recognition: If the worker is deprived of his work and is fired, this will lead to unemployment, which makes him feel marginalized and social injustice, which leads to the absence of social appreciation and recognition.

Therefore, Honneth links work and recognition closely, as he affirmed what he calls "the category of work", and that is all that occurs social interaction and positive integration in all aspects: social, political, and economic relations... (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 46-48)

1.2.2. Criticism of the second generation project (Habermas):

Honneth was not limited to pointing out the weaknesses in which the first critical theory of the Frankfurt School fell, especially its focus on the criticism of instrumental reason. He also worked on criticism of the representative of the second generation, "Habermas", but before proceeding to present the criticism that Honneth directed him to Habermas, we must first identify the most important of what the latter presented.

Habermas tried to overcome the impotence and impasse in which the poles of the first generation, "Horkheimer and Adorno", fell. Represented by their inability to transcend the

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instrumental mind and find an alternative to it, as we find that Habermas distinguished between two levels of rationality:

Instrumental rationality: It is rationalism that seeks to control human and nature, and it represents the first level.

Communicative rationality: It is the alternative presented by Habermas and represents the second level (Mahdi, 2018, p. 150).

In other words, consider the instrumental reason is a human being, and therefore it is unable to transcend the past to live in the present and anticipate the future, while the communicative reason aims to link the individual to the other and integrate with him. (Bouzar, 2017, p.161). Where Habermas means by the communicative action:

“that interaction formulated by symbols, it is necessarily subject to the established norms that define the aspirations of mutual behaviors so that they must be understood and recognized by at least two active persons”. (Habermas, 1973, p. 22).

This means that communication according to Habermas is based on language, which must be understood as it lead to interaction between two or more people within a single society.

Habermas presented his analysis in the theory of communicative action based on the discovery of the relationship between the system and the living world, and his criticism of contemporary capitalism that struggles with the culture of society. For Habermas, culture is the only way to make life meaningful and worthwhile in capitalist societies. (Edgar, 2006, p. 8). On the one hand, and on the other hand, he rejected, through this theory, the pessimistic view of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, which was represented in the instrumental relationship between man and nature, as he emphasized the necessity of the actions of the mind in order to reach an agreement that can only be with language. (Haw, 2010, pp. 86, 93).

Which Habermas considers:

“A structure that helps within a neighborly relationship to express the individual through general statements. The hermeneutic understanding must serve this same structure, which performs the function of systematic organization of the communicative, daily experience of understanding with oneself and with others.” (Afaya, p. 66).

The communicative act requires the establishment of a social relationship between two or more people. The more these selves merge from each other, the more mutual consideration

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and understanding are achieved, as this communication between individuals takes place from the normal language.(Edgar, 2006, p. 21). Therefore, interaction, according to Habermas, is a symbolic practice that takes place in ordinary language, as this communicative expresses coexistence in one framework through language. (Bouzar, 2017, p. 159).

When we say language, we mean the process of “dialogue,” which, according to Habermas, contributes greatly to avoiding pathological situations that afflict society at some point, and through which social integration is achieved and become effective, hence, language is the one that organizes social actions and through which the communicative act takes place. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 120). It is through this dialogue, social integration is achieved through agreement and understanding without any pressure, coercion, or the abolition of the freedom of the other. (Boumenir, 2014, pp. 34-35).According to Habermas, it is not enough for us to present ideas only, but we must rely on the dialogue that determines the extent of their validity and the extent of their acceptance among the subjects (Boumenir, 2010, p. 119).As this communicative action, aims to achieve spending based on mutual convictions between individuals within the group, thus achieving a rational consensus that can change the course of instrumental rationality. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 50).

On this basis, Habermas confirms that the function of communication is limited to communication and transfer of information only; it takes into account the cultivation of individuals. This renews Habermas three communication functions: Transfer of information, establishing social relations with others, expression and direct or indirect views. And to achieve these functions, some conditions must be provided,First: Others must use the same language used by the individual. Second: The execution will understand the same way as an individual. Third: They are in the same sense and social traditions.Fourth: They understand whatever the individual through an expression and its features. (Edgar, 2006, p. 22).

Habermas sees that the communicative mind aims at liberation from all forms of control, given that language leads to the emergence of what is known as “scientific interest”. Which is concerned with human interaction, that is, how we interpret our actions and how we understand them, and how we interact with each other in a social framework. This interest leads to the emergence of the interpretive sciences, which in turn leads us to another interestcalled “the interestof emancipation”. Which is also linked to language and leads us to interaction and communication, thus achieving freedom, as it works to rid communication of everything that distorts it and reform it.(Iban, 1999, pp. 308-309).

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For this reason, Habermas worked on the rationality of criticism based on the communicative reason to be libertarian rationality, and this is what emerges in his book "The Theory of Communicative Action" and "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity", as this liberation is based on several bases: linguistic, social, political, ethical...etc. And it is by discussion to become a rational social authority, and through it we reach an agreement of a social nature (Afaya, 2014, pp. 71,74). This means that the communicative action includes the dimension of human liberation. The possibility of achieving dialogue or rational discussion embodies for us the actual process of liberation, which would not be without the intersubjective acts of communication and understanding, and that the mind is achieved within the forms of this mutual understanding through language. (Boumenir, 2015, p. 37).

Based on this, we continue to say that the alternative presented by the representative of the second generation of the Frankfurt School of instrumental reason is the communicative action, which is based on the intelligible and agreed language between two or more active persons within social life. This language achieves interaction, understanding and integration, for us, and thus eliminates all forms of control and achieves human freedom. Also, language is based on dialogue or discussion that does not impose any pressure or coercion on the other active self, and from this, the communicative action carries with it freedom.

Habermas is considered the first philosopher who was able to transfer critical theory from the paradigm of production to the paradigm of linguistic communicative, emphasizing his effective role. However, this did not prevent Honneth from directing some criticism of him, as he noticed that there are several shortcomings in the theory of communicative action presented by Habermas, which are as follows:

Honneth sees that the theory presented by Habermas is also one-dimensional, as this aspect is not represented in language, which Honneth considers a reductive and subjective measure of social life, and a neglect of other aspects without which social life cannot be complete. (Dahmani, 2016, p. 237). Because the understanding of social life, according to Honneth, is based on a set of characteristics of daily life: physical, emotional, psychological ... (Haw, 2010, p. 95). Focusing on only one dimension makes us unable to perceive the various experiences associated with forms of injustice and disrespect that individuals are exposed to it. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 107).

Based on this, Honneth considers that the theory presented by Habermas ignored the moral experiences of social injustice, which cannot be explained by linguistic understanding, but

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by forms of insult and moral abuse resulting from violating the principles of social justice, which shows his inability to rebuild the experiences, and moral aspirations of the subjects in order to formulate the actual experience of injustice. So Habermas's communicative tension never stops with the moral experiences of individuals. (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 57, 59). This indicates that there is a close relationship between the damages in the conditions that occur in social interaction and the moral experiences experienced by the subjects in the communication process, and therefore when these conditions are violated, the individual will feel a kind of disrespect for which recognition remains. (Boumenir, 2015, p. 39).

We also find that Honneth rejects Habermas' idea that the structures of symmetry and reciprocity lie in language, where recognition is considered possible or not. That is why Honneth asserts that these claims must be protected through legal rights so that individuals can achieve the desired competencies according to the ethics of the discourse. In this way, Honneth attempts to explain the physical and psychological relationships in recognition of the reliance on patterns of "cognitive communication" (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 17).

Also in the same context, we find that respect sense of moral can not be in another respect as an interlocutor sane person is committed to the terms of the argumentative debate, but as a person looking for the same realization and sought to recognize socially, morally and legally. This is why Honneth that Habermas was reduced moral experience in the linguistic experience. (Boumenir, 2014, p. 37). Thus, the ethical thinking of Habermas ignores the daily motivational contexts that take place through interaction between individuals. The ethics of discourse, according to Habermas, requires that there be a willingness on the part of the individuals participating in this interaction so that they can understand the normative questions, and this is done without relying on their relationships with others in the experience daily living (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 17).

Honneth also considers that limiting social relations to linguistic understanding only makes communication limited, and this is denied by reality because social relations are much broader than limiting them to language (Boumenir, 2014, p. 37). Honneth provides an example of this: the child lives very important interactions in his social and psychological life before the language stage, so social interaction can be limited to linguistic understanding only. (Boumenir, 2015, p. 41).

As well as the other criticism that Honneth addressed to Habermas in his disregard for the conflictual nature that exists in the various social interactions between the selves, through

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which the social and moral lifestyle is determined, that is, it has an active role within the social formations. Through it, individuals can achieve a deeper and true understanding of social life. (Boumenir, 2010, p. 123). On the one hand, and on the other hand, Honneth suggests linking recognition to the moral sphere, because the existence and expansion of morals depends on the struggle through which the individual achieves his personal identity. (Petherbridge, 2013, p. 16).

We also find that Honneth opposes Habermas in the idea of distinguishing between "system" and "lived world". As Habermas considered that modern societies are either subject to system or subject to the lived world. This is what Honneth rejected, because he considers that this contradiction between them can be excluded, and a moral structure can be found within the system, just as the living world may find conflicts and struggles at the social level (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 64-65). We also find that Honneth rejects this distinction because it leads to what he calls "theoretical illusion." The lived world, according to Habermas, is the world that is based on communication and linguistic understanding without any pressure or coercion. As for the systemic world, it is that which contains functional coercion and power relations. This leads to a problematic conceptual division between the areas of work, the market and the state. Where Honneth considers that this distinction can be transcended by presenting a conception in which the conflict relations of the communicative sphere coincide with institutional forms of the standards of the lived world from a functional point of view. (Boumenir, 2014, p. 38).

This means, according to Honneth, that it was necessary for Habermas to analyze social relations based on communication in order to be able to identify the forms of disrespect that may affect these relations. So he should not pay much attention to distinguishing between the system and the lived world. Rather he must direct his attention to the social factors responsible for the violation of the conditions of recognition and the deterioration that affects the social relations of recognition. And thus it was necessary for Habermas to change his critical view, and this communication theory is not sufficient to explain what is happening in society of conflicts and struggles. (Boumenir, 2015, p. 42).

We conclude from the above that Honneth stood on a set of shortcomings that he found in both the first and second generation pioneers of the Frankfurt School of Criticism, where he worked on criticizing them in order to highlight this deficiency and try to overcome it. Honneth criticized both Horkheimer and Adorno in that they were not able to diagnose the various sociological data, so they were unable to identify the causes of the pathological conditions that were prevalent in society at the time. This is what resulted from their narrow view represented in their reductionist view of society based on the paradigm of production (labor), which also led

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them to pessimism because they could not find solutions to the control of the instrumental mind. In addition to this, Honneth criticized their inability to break free from their closed view of social reality as being under the control of this instrumental mind. This explains their failure to achieve their main goal, which is the liberation of man from various forms of control.

He also worked on the criticism of Habermas in two points: First, he also focused on only one dimension, which is language, through which communication and understanding between selves occur within the framework of social life, thus forgetting other dimensions of social interaction such as physical movements, and therefore his view was a reductionist view as well. The second point is represented in Habermas' neglect of the conflict nature within society, which plays an active role in the process of determining the moral and social lifestyle.

From here, it becomes clear to us that Honneth worked to reconsider what the pioneers of the first and second generation presented in order to fill the shortfall they left, and to try to crystallize his critical theory of social philosophy as a transgression for both generations. However, it cannot be denied that Honneth used the Frankfurt tradition and benefited from Habermas, as the theory presented by Honneth is an extension of the Habermasian project.

1.3. Modernism:

The term modernity denotes the social, political, scientific and philosophical reality experienced by Western societies beginning in the eighteenth century. Where this era is known as the post-enlightenment era or the modern era.

Historically, it can be said that modernity began with the emergence of the Renaissance, after the church lost its influence on the minds of people in Europe, and after realizing the materiality of nature and the centrality of human through enlightened rational thinking. In addition to discovering the value of the individual as a creative subject, which added an essential element of Modernity, according to modernity, the individual's value stems from himself, neither from his sect nor from his tribe. And this is the essential value of the developments and changes that affected Europe and led to the ignition of the bourgeois revolutions that ended the church's control over people's minds, and then eliminated the old feudal system that prevailed through its reactionary ideas Throughout Europe for more than 1,200 years, from the fifth century AD to the seventeenth century.

Hence, "the success of the bourgeois political revolutions in Holland at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and in Britain from 1641-1688, then the Great French Revolution in the

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eighteenth century (1789), was the real announcement of the birth of the Renaissance and Enlightenment or the era of modernity. Western Europe moved from a society of nature governed by the theory of divine right to civil society. A society of democracy and the great scientific revolution that caused an earthquake in modern European thought, one of the main results of which was the “transition of the subject of philosophy from the relationship between God and the world, to the relationship between man and the world and between mind and matter.

With these revolutions, Western Europe achieved its modernizing transition from a society of nature to a civil society. Of course, all of these revolutions played a role in building modernity thought, thus rejecting the sanctity of ideas and placing them all within the circle of systematic doubt, analysis and testing.

This era is considered the era of progress, as scientific discoveries led to many technological developments in Europe and America, which led to the emergence of the industrial revolution, and many inventions.

This scientific development extended to other fields. In the economic field, the economy moved from organized unions and household industry to the capitalist economic system, and the agricultural sector was industrialized through the development of agricultural machinery. As for the political aspect, the influential people and businesspersons are controlling this field. In addition to this, in the moral aspect, Christian morals declined as a result of the diminishing authority of the Church, which led to the emergence of utilitarian morals. (Abbas, 2011).

The salient features of modernity are:

- Materialism, i.e. considering nature as an independent and self-existing material entity, governed by recognizable principles, laws, and systems, and considering man as part of nature.
- The continuous critical spirit, that is, the rejection of the authority of the familiar, the authority of the predecessor and the authority of the unseen, the de-sanctification of things and relationships, and adherence to the scientific mind is the main authority of judgments.
- Revolutionary, i.e. realizing the historical nature and human society, and realizing the perceived self as a social force in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy.
- The non-existence that reaches its climax in secularism.
- Considering scientific knowledge as an intrinsic value and absolute independence, as it does not accept any authority or restriction imposed on it from outside.

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- Humanism, i.e. belief in man, his creative ability, independence, and self-freedom, and considering him a source and basis for every value. (Abbas, 2011).

On this basis, Honneth considers that modernity has led to the expansion of the domain of control and the subjugation of man to the system of things. This also led to the spread of the technology and machine system and the disappearance of the moral system. This negative structure of modernity has resulted in a kind of individualism. Honneth expressed the concern of modernity in many terms in his philosophical system, such as social pathologies, social suffering and social unrest. (Boumenir, 2012, p. 11).

Conclusion:

Honneth worked on reformulating critical theory in order to establish a socio-ethical theory that would keep pace with developments in contemporary Western societies. Where was his start with Hegel through his theory of struggle for recognition, which Honneth worked on developing by moving away from metaphysical concepts based on sociological analysis presented by Mead and psychoanalysis presented by Winnicott. On this basis, Honneth presented a new conception of recognition theory as the only solution to rebuilding the self and achieving all levels of personal identity.

Honneth presented a critique of the Frankfurt School across its different generations, where the pioneers of the first generation criticized Horkheimer and Adorno because their perception was confined to "functionalism" as a result of their influence on Marx, and their focus on the criticism of instrumental rationality without finding solutions to it. That is why they were unable to understand the process of social life and overcome social pathologies. The representative of the second generation also criticized Habermas in his reduction of social life to the forms of linguistic communication, because this reduction obscured the disclosure of the experiences of injustice prevailing in society.

However, despite this criticism presented by Honneth, we find that he preserved the general heritage that distinguishes the Frankfurt School, which is the ability to criticize society and social practices based on the standards of a philosophical institution, on the one hand. On the other hand, he benefited from Habermas regarding the consolidation of the relationship between theory and practice, and the preservation of the harmonic, subjective character versus the instrumental mind.

Modernity worked to bring about a comprehensive radical change in the Middle Ages, which was prevalent. Where it transcends all religious and spiritual constants. And with this,

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values lost their place and importance in light of this scientific and technological progress, and they became just something like other things. And it did not stop there only, as it projected its material nature on all beings, including human, which made him fall into the phenomenon of reification.

Chapter Two

2. Situating Reification in the Social theory of Axel Honneth.

2.1. Lukàcs's Theory of Reification.

2.1.1. Theory of reification.

2.1.2. Honneth's critical study of Lukàcs's theory of reification.

2.2. Reification after Lukàcs.

2.2.1. Martin Heidegger.

2.2.2. John Dewey.

2.3. Honneth's Theory of Reification.

2. Situating Reification in the social theory of Axel Honneth:

Introduction:

Modernity represented in western thought an intellectual project aiming at a comprehensive change in medieval thought that prevailed, as it surpassed all religious and spiritual constants, as it made man a standard of knowledge and a center of thought. As the essence of this modernity is the scientific and technological progress that has revolutionized change in these western societies and kept them away from spiritual and religious value, where values have lost their status and importance in light of this scientific and technological progress, and became a thing like other things. Modernity did not stop at this point only but secularized everything and dropped its materialistic character on all beings, including human, without taking into account his peculiarities. Where it did not separate in that between humans and the rest of beings, which led to a compromise between humans and animals, to move later to conformity between human, and thing, then this materialistic view transferred from individual to society where the technology (technical) adopted to organize the society.

As a result of this view that man lost his value, some opposing philosophies that wanted to restore human dignity appeared. Moreover, it came as a reaction to the material sciences, which consider the experimental method the only method that can achieve precision in the various sciences, including the humanities. In addition, as a reaction to scientific progress that dominated western civilization even it made a human being merely a physical thing. Which is inconsistent with the essence of human and his living nature. Among these philosophies, we find Marxism, which holds that human is under the capitalist system his spiritual values and various relationships have become mere commodities whose value measured by the profits they generate. Thus human values became measured by the commodities produced by the human being and by the production relations it contained. (Abderazak, pp.291-292). That is why Marx asserts that the capitalist system is a commodity-producing system, and all of its economic organizations strive to this end. These commodities are basically human production, but once they enter the market, they have their own existence independent of their human origin, because they have become subject to the laws of the market that control the process of commercial exchange of commodities. These laws become dominant in the human sphere, and the production of goods becomes what regulates relations within society, whether it is the relationships between the self and others or between individuals and society, this is what Marx calls "Fetishism". (Abderazak, p.295).

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Based on this Marxist concept, Georg Lukàcs (1885-1971) formulated the concept of “reification”, as he considered the first to define this concept in contemporary philosophical thought, where he preserved the ontological character of this concept. Lukàcs knows reification “*that a relation between people has taken on the character of a thing*”.(Honneth, 2008, p.21).

Where this term expresses the state of loss experienced by the individual in the world of matter, which transforms him into a thing or commodity subject to exchange, which makes the human gradually lose its humanity in favor of the world of matter and things.(Bahri, 2013, p.58).

Lukàcs talks about the concept of reification in his book “History and class consciousness”, published in 1923, in which he devoted a whole chapter talking about it. As this book in general and the subject of reification in particular received the attention of many philosophers and sociologists, it also received the attention of the pioneers of the Frankfurt School, especially Theodor Adorno. However, after the Second World War, this interest began to wane, as sociologists began to address various social issues such as justice, equality and democracy...but without addressing the concept of reification. However, recently, some studies and trends have emerged that reject the prevailing situation that dominated by reificatory character and call for change. Honneth cites four indications that confirm this call for change. The first is literary works and novels, where we find some writers who dealt with part of this problem in their works, such as the American writers “Raymond Carver and Harold Brodkey”, and German writers “Elfriede Jelinek and Silk Scheuermann”. These writers attempted to present a picture of the social life of individuals who dominated by the character of reification, as they turned into mere machines without feelings. Secondly, what related to feelings and desires, and this is what we find in social psychology and cultural sociology. Where studies have confirmed that there are some individuals who hide what they live, and pretend some feelings and desires that they live it in reality to the extent that makes them believe that they live it and that it is part of their personality and their reality. The third clue is the standard aspect of reification as it relates to etiquette and moral philosophy. Which seeks to provide analyzes about the phenomenon of reification as presented by Lukàcs and try to understand it theoretically, by attempting to identify human behavior in which moral principles violated because of the reificatoryview of the human being that stripped him of his peculiarities and feelings, and considered him merely a commodity. In addition, the concept of reification has come to used clearly without reference to the meaning in which it appeared for the first time. This is what we find, for example, in “Martha Nussbaum”, who expressed the concept of reification by instrumental practice that takes place between individuals. The fourth evidence relates to scientific and an experimental approach that has become adopted in various research related to

humans. Without taking into account the peculiarities of the human phenomenon and without taking into account the ethical aspect. Where human became a mere thing or just a machine, this is what appears through discussions in the field of research related to the brain and its social consequences and effects. These four evidences confirm the return of interest in the subject of reification; in order to find solutions and change the prevailing situation, based on this, Honneth confirms that relying on the concept of reification does not lead us to understand the world correctly. (Honneth, 2008, pp.17-20).

The aim of Honneth's study of the phenomenon of reification is to try to identify various social pathologies that contemporary societies suffer from, especially after the scientific and technological development. That is why Honneth started from Lukàcs studies on the phenomenon of reification, as he the first to include this concept, and then moved on to make a comparison between Lukàcs, Heidegger and Dewey in order to reformulate the concept of reification and provide a clear and accurate conception (perception) of it. And for emphasize the role of recognition in overcoming various forms of reification. (Boumenir, 2013, pp.80, 88).

2.1. Lukàcs's theory of reification:

2.1.1. Theory of reification:

Lukàcs talked about modern human in his various writings from many different intellectual, existential and philosophical aspects, in response to the technology that made human a mere material and thing. Trying to restore consideration to the human being, as his beginning based on studying the history that he considers impotent in front of the dominance of the material market, which based on the exchange of commodities, which made the individuals of society loser their identity as subjects who have relations. Lukàcs's philosophy based on a set of basic statements that served as an epistemological base that formed the core of his philosophical thought. And what interests us among these statements, the statement of reification. (Bahri, 2013, p.44).

Lukàcs deals with the phenomenon if reification as a remnant of the capitalist system that calls for individualism and self-independence on the one hand, and it glorifies capital and goods at the expense of human on the other hand. (Ibid, p.58). Where Lukàcs stresses that the essence of goods and commodities lies in the value of their exchange, and this is what represents the true aim of production. As the exchanged goods have use values for all partners or owners, and this does not coincide with capitalist societies where usage values transformed into barter and commercial exchange value, this is a result of the supremacy of commodities and their control

over human. (Lukàcs, 1971, pp. 84-85). In order to clarify this, he set out in his analysis of the phenomenon of reification in the capitalist system from Marx's economic studies on commercial goods as human production. But these commodities, although they are human-made, and although their essence is related to human work, they are separate from it, this is because these commodities have transformed human's relations and work into something inanimate, independent of the human world. As the human being has become instead of controlling the various things surrounding him, such as factories, these things became the ones that control him, and instead of a person, trying to change the things around him according to what is compatible with his needs, as primitive human used to do. He changed himself and his nature in order to conform to the nature of things, and thus things became the engine and determinant of human life. (Boumenir, 2013, pp.80-81).

Honneth believes that reification as a concept is characterized by totalitarian and breadth, because Lukàcs linked it to the economic aspect, considering that the most practical activity that brings individuals together is commercial exchange. And since the relationship between the self and the other became the relationship of exchange of goods, necessarily it will gradually turn into areificatoryrelationship, since the process of trade exchange leads a self to:

- The self becomes interested in the quantitative aspect of the subject, as he makes it just something that is used only when needed.
- Instrumental with others, whereby the other- as a partner in the process of commercial exchange- becomes a mere commercial deal through which the self-achieves profit.
- The self considers its own capabilities merely and things that can be used economically to increase profits and gains. (Honneth, 2008, p.22).

Through reification, individuals became commodities, since the human character was excluded from the relationships existing between the individual and himself and between the individual and others, and these relations became subject to the logic of commercial exchange. This is how the social world turns into the world of things, and thus becomes independent of human work like natural phenomena that are independent of the laws that govern them. (Boumenir, 2013, p.81).

However, Honneth believes that Lukàcs has researched the concept of reification beyond this because beyond this, because he was interested in analyzing the phenomena that Marx calls "fetishism". (Honneth, 2008, pp. 22-23). Because the internal processes that contribute to the formation of fetishism create external social structures, through which humans become mere puppet and their submission for it. (Boumenir, p.81). On this basis, Lukàcs moved from the

economic interpretation of the reification statement to the search for the extent of its impact on the daily life of individuals under the capitalist system through which subjects became aware of themselves and their own world through reificatory relations. In this way, reification moves from a first nature related to the economic sphere to a second nature related to the social sphere. Honneth sees that Lukàcs, in order to explain to us the way in which reification is transformed into a second nature, was hesitant to choose between two strategies:

The first strategy is related to the capitalist system, which seeks to employ capitalism in all areas of life, since reification is the basis of the commercial structure on which the capitalist system is based, when it is applied to the rest of the fields, these domains will take character. In this way, Lukàcs followed the path of Marx, and this represents the objective dimension. (Honneth, 2008, pp. 22-23). As for the second strategy, it is related to Max Weber's position on rationalization because Weber considers rationalization as a reason for achieving the effectiveness of the economic model, and its emergence as a model that destroyed the economic structure that -modern period as a first stage. And rationalizing the workflow whereby the human being is stripped of his identity and human characteristics and considered as a machine that performs its work according to what is stipulated in the laws as a second stage. So that the contemplative aspect of the worker is subject to this rationalization and proceeds in an automatic way according to its laws, whereby it becomes independent from consciousness and from any human influence. This is what represents the subjective dimension. On this basis was Lukàcs's attempt to explain the second nature of reification through two dimensions, objective and subjective. So reification move to its second nature through its effect on various fields of life and various social relations, and this happens as a result of the commercial structure that makes human stand against himself through illusion. (Boumenir, 2013, pp.81-82). That is why Lukàcs confirms that:

“It could easily appear at this point that the whole process nothing more than the “inevitable” consequence of concentrating masses of workers in large factories, of mechanizing and standardizing the process of work and levelling down the standard of living. It is therefore of vital importance to see the truth concealed behind this deceptively one-sided picture”.

(Lukàcs, 1971, p.173).

Where the rationalization makes individual illusion that work as an objective thing is independent of him and has its own laws, and that he must obey these laws. Thus, the individual becomes under of the commercial structure, where this control takes place on the objective and subjective levels. On the objective level: the world surrounding the individual is transformed

from a social world to a world of things, and depends on the same logic on which the world of commodities is based. And has its own laws, where these laws use the individual as a tool to serve their interests, without allowing him to engage in any activity that could affect its course or be contrary to it. As for the subjective level: human activity becomes a commodity subject to the commercial economy, independent of social laws. Consequently, this activity becomes just a commercial thing, as a profit or gain by which the human being to achieve his need like other commodities. (Boumenir, 2013, p. 82). Also, the exchange of interests between individuals generates pressures that lead to some behaviors from the self that affect its relation with the surrounding world. In addition, when the actor becomes permanently taking on the role of the partner in the exchange, the role of this actor turns into a contemplative and only observer. Where the self loses its special existence associated with the outside world, and is satisfied with isolation –what Lukàcs calls separation- and meditation only without participating in the interactive processes surrounding it. Thus, the self turns into a mere thing noticed, indifferent to what is happening around it, thus losing its interest in psychological and existential facts. For example, in the field of commodity and goods exchange, a set of arithmetic operations occur between individuals and these arithmetic operations are purely mental operations, devoid of emotions and feelings. It seeks profit and benefit only, so that the qualities of the self are linked to what is quantitative only, here the individual turns into a mere pensive partner of the exchange process. (Honneth, 2008, pp. 24-25). Within this context, Lukàcs says:

consequence of the rationalization of the work-process the human qualities and idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as mere resources of error when contrasted with these abstract special laws functioning according to rational predictions. Neither objectively nor in his relation to his work does man appear as the authentic master of the process; on the contrary, he is a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system. He finds it already pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not. As labour is progressively rationalised and mechanised his lack of will is reinforced by the way in which his activity becomes less and less active and more and more contemplatively. The contemplative stance adopted towards a process mechanically conforming to fixed laws and enacted independently of man's consciousness and impervious to human intervention.

According to Honneth, this is what Lukàcs meant by the second nature of reification, based on the subjective dimension. Subjects become aware of their relations to each other or to what surrounds them through the world of things, even if these subjects are not participating in

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the process of trade exchange because their social upbringing has become linked to the world of things. On this basis, it becomes Lukàcs's concept of reification from Honneth's point of view:

“Reification to be a habit of mere contemplation and observation, in which one's natural surroundings, social environment, and personnel characteristics come to be apprehended in a detached and emotionless manner- in short, as things”. (Honneth, 2008, p.25).

In spite of this analysis provided by Lukàcs, regarding the subjective dimension that is related to the rationalization, but Honneth believes that Lukàcs has abandoned it and did not talk about all the objective and subjective dimensions of society, where he followed Marx's strategy and he kept the objective dimension. (Boumenir, 2013, p.83).

Lukàcs connects the concept of reification with a basic element, which is the only element that defines the essence of reification; this element is “crisis”. Where this crisis occurs as a result of the entry of goods and commodities destined for commercial exchange to the field of competition, as the benefits of some goods increase while the benefits of other competing goods decrease, which leads to their loss and thus falls into the crisis. In this sense, a crisis is a tragedy experienced by individual, where he perceives three basic things: a) the seizure of his social existence. B) his relation with others is a reificatory relation based on exchange of goods. C) Its social value is determined through a set of laws on which the market is based, such as the law of supply and demand. When he achieve benefits, he has social value and loses this value when he does not make benefits. After this, this crisis moved from a crisis among commodities within the market to a crisis involving the economic system in general. And this crisis does not stop at this point only, but extends to include various fields of society, thus losing its principles and values because all its concern has become to achieve profits and gains in various ways. These various crisis lead to the disintegration of human relations, where the individuals becomes introverted and tends to isolate instead of interacting with members of society. This is a result of his feeling alienated, marginalized, and not belonging to his community, so he gradually withdraws from this material life that robbed his humanity and excluded his role in interaction and participation in this life. This is what makes the individual contemplate the prevailing situation, until he realizes that reification is the cause of all that he is.

On this basis, the individual begins to analyze, study, and critique this situation in order to find solutions to this crisis and change the situation for the better, and fight reification. This is what represent “the stage of critical consciousness”. Then the individual moves to another stage in which he tries to provide a broader and comprehensive understanding of this crisis by trying to understand the universals of history, the world and society. Consequently, society enters a new

stage, which is “the stage of class consciousness”, in which the classes of society reach a level of awareness where they demand the establishment of revolution through which they reject the domination of the world of things and matter over the various fields of life. (Bahri, 2013, p.59-60). This revolution is carried out by the proletarian class, as the historical subject that reject the prevailing situation dominated by the reification represented by the capitalist system, where this class is able to liberate by changing the reificatory structure of society. (Boumenir, p.83).therefore, this awareness move to another stage in which it is more mature to become “theoretical consciousness”, where this awareness is the last degree of the consciousness, which allows the individual to confront the tyrannical economic system and fight the phenomenon of reification.

We can represent the evolutionary process that society is going through as follows:

A tyrannical economic system → *Reification* → *Crisis* → *Critical consciousness*
— ~~Class Consciousness~~ *Theoretical consciousness.* (Bahri, 2013, p.61).

2.1.2. Honneth’s critical study of Lukàcs’s theory of reification:

With this analysis that Lukàcs provided on the phenomenon of reification, he occupied an important place in modern and contemporary philosophical thought, especially in the thought of the Frankfurt critical school. Where the theorists of this school relied in the first stage of establishing critical theory on Lukàcs’s analyzes of the phenomenon of reification, because Lukàcs used the concept of reification instead of the concept of alienation. Which helped them delve their philosophical and critical analysis related to social pathologies in contemporary Western societies, such as alienation, lack of affiliation, and the loss of the individual’s status in society. Nevertheless, that does not mean that they have not taken any notes on Lukàcs’s thought –especially with regard to the concept of reification- on the contrary, there were many criticism directed at him. And the most important of these are the criticisms made by Adorno, which left a great impression on all theorists of the following generations of the Frankfurt School. Among these criticisms:

Adorno considers Lukàcs’s theory of reification to have an ideological orientation because he linked this phenomenon to the process of commercial exchange in the capitalist system. As Adorno asserts, not all commercial exchanges in this system are reificatory character, and it cannot be considered that the capitalist system is the only cause of reification. (Schmitz, 2019, p.44).

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In addition, Adorno believes that Lukàcs was more ideal than realistic, where he tried to dropping the idealism on his theory of reification. Within the same context, Habermas presented a critique of Lukàcs idealism in which he clarifies the opinion of Adorno, where Habermas sees that Lukàcs, in his criticism of the phenomenon of reification he relied on the metaphysical philosophy of history by employing Hegelian dialectics as a way to reunify the moments of the mind. As this dialectic appears in the relation between the types of consciousness and reification.(Schmitz, 2019, p. 45).

Also, Adorno and Habermas rejected the classical analysis relating to the proletarian class, which Lukàcs considers the object of history, and the only solution to eliminate the phenomenon of reification, and the only solution is to eliminate the phenomenon of reification because it is the only class that can reach the highest levels of consciousness. (Schmitz, 2019, p.45)

Based on these criticisms made by both Adorno and Habermas, Honneth presented his critical study of Lukàcs's theory on the phenomenon of reification. However, Honneth in his study of Lukàcs, focused on the economic aspect and neglected the historical aspect, unlike Adorno and Habermas, they focused on the historical aspect. Honneth tried to identify the deficiencies in the analysis presented by Lukàcs. This is what he confirmed by saying:

“With this short reconstruction of Lukàcs analysis, we have at least indirectly defined what kind of mistake or failure cannot be denoted by reification”. (Honneth, 2008, p.25).

Honneth believes that Lukàcs was unable to explain to us the method on which he relied when he generalized the phenomenon of reification in various fields of life, as he did in the economic sphere. Thus, reification has only one nature that is related to the field of commercial exchange through the reifying of subjects, persons, competencies and special abilities, which considers them as just profitable business deals. Here honneth asserts that Lukàcs has applied the concept of reification only to economic phenomena only. Therefore, that in order for there to be a second nature to the concept of reification, he must provide an explanation about the process of influence and transformation that occurs due to reification within the social spheres, away from the economic explanation. (Ibid, pp. 22-23).

Honneth believes that Lukàcs does not view reification as merely a negative moral behavior rooted in our own behaviors and habits, which we can only overcome through some modifications. Considering that, reification represents a pattern of evolving behavior in capitalist societies. So that to members of capitalist society belong to this type of system and are subject to it by virtue of their social upbringing, therefore this rationalization interaction that happens

between the subjects is not considered merely a negative moral behavior or a violation of moral principles. Rather, it is considered a social event because it forms a set of customs and practices that violate all the rules on which human practices are based, and thus it can only be embodied in the form of a limited practice. This is what distinguishes Lukàcs' concept of reification because the normative principles on which he relied in his analysis of this concept are not related to ethical principles, but are related to the human practice that we derive from philosophical anthropology and not from moral philosophy. This what Honneth commented on because he believed that Lukàcs had been unable to clarify his position on the normative issue. (Honneth, 2008, pp. 25-27).

Honneth sees that Lukàcs in his critique of the concept of reification kept the classic view of the concept of effectiveness, which he took from Fichte especially when he linked it to the spontaneous act of the spirit. Whereas, Lukàcs in his book "History and Class Consciousness" tried to present some notes on the practical relation that connects the self to the world when it is not under the control of reification, as here the self becomes an organic unit with the world. In order for the self to coincide with the world, the object must be a consequence of the self. (ibid, pp. 26-27).

On this basis, Honneth drew another criticism that Lukàcs in his critique of the concept of reification was far from realism, because although he adopted some realistic formulas, the idealist character prevailed over his critical analysis, as a result of his being influenced by Hegel and Fichte. (Ibid, p. 27).

Honneth believes that there are some obstacles and problems that Lukàcs did not discuss and did not research about it – knowing that Honneth confirms that these obstacles have not been studied until now- and that is because of the strategy that Lukàcs used in his critical analysis of the concept of reification. Where he was seeking to present this criticism through two strategies- Marx's strategy and Weber's strategy- .(Ibid, pp.27-28).

Honneth also emphasizes that it cannot be generalized that all trade exchange relations lead to the phenomenon of reification. It is true that there are some practices in capitalist commercial and economic exchanges have this characteristic, there are some production processes that human cannot do it as a mere machine because it needs humanitarian possibilities. (Boumenir, 2021, p.72).

Honneth believes that Lukàcs has made the phenomenon of reification limited, as there are many errors associated with these boundaries, but the biggest mistake according to Honneth

is to emphasize the historical role of the proletariat, as the only class capable of transcending reification through revolution, on the one hand. And on another hand, he relied on a set of metaphysical concepts –which he drew from philosophy of Hegel and Ficht- as proof of his idea of the proletariat class. Honneth also emphasized that the awareness reached by this class does not occur automatically, as Lukàcs envisioned it, and this what made him fall in many of the contradictions. (Ibid, pp. 69-70).

2.2. Reification after Lukàcs:

Honneth, by discussing Lukàcs’s concept of reification in all its epistemological, ethical and social aspects, tried to override the unilateral (single) interpretation of Lukàcs, in order to reformulate this concept. Where it was based honneth in critical analysis of the concept of reification to the position of both Heidegger and Dewey on the problem of the impact of technology on human life in general, and on the relation between individuals in particular, in order to extract a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, which today took new concepts and forms. And this in various fields of human life, especially after the instrumental character that has dominated more of the various fields of contemporary life.

2.2.1. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976):

Technology has occupied a large space in the philosophical discussions of contemporary Western thought as a necessary dimension in the life of the contemporary individual, and as a trend with different dimensions. Where the technology was extracted as a result of the western modernist project. Based on this, technology in its broadest sense was the most prominent if what contemporary philosophers dealt with in their criticism of the modernist project. Among these philosophers, we find Heidegger, who tried to uncover essence of technology and display its different dimensions, because it posed a threat and danger to the life of the human, which robbed his freedom, on the one hand. On the other hand, Heidegger pursue to reformulate the problem of reification for deconstruct “the ancient ontology”, and a review of the critical analysis presented by both Marx and Lukàcs to the phenomenon of reification. (Nythmar, 2019, p.36).

Heidegger considers that technology has not remained a mere tool used by human, but rather it evolved beyond that. As this technology has become that dominate the life of contemporary human, thus human turned into a mere puppet under the control of the sureness of technology of machines and devices that enslaved him and robbed him of his identity, as it turned him into a servant of it. And the greatest threat to humanity is the arithmetic method

utilitarianism, which considers the self as a mere ability or energy that produces various tools and means for control various phenomena. By this, a person becomes like thing, distinguished from it by his abilities only, as he turns into a rational animal whose job is just to produce tools. This requires a review of technical aspect or character that turned the world into a technical world and made contemporary human a captive of it. (Boumenir, 2010, p.56)

Heidegger not only criticized the technology and its negative consequences, but also worked on researching in essence, based on his phenomenological method, because the negative use of technology made it the greatest threat to human existence as nuclear bombs. (Ibid, p.53). Heidegger asserts that technology and the essence of technology are not the same thing. For example, the external shape of a tree is not what is the essence of the tree, we may find many trees have the same shape, but they differ in terms of their essence, the same thing applies to technology. (Heidegger, p.43).

Technology, according to Heidegger, does not represent the practical, applied aspect of scientific cognitive, but even this cognitive in terms of what it has become of a instrumental character. and the essence of technology, in his view is in metaphysics through the relation between human and existence, and all f means, devices and tools provided by technology are its manifestations (appearances). (Boumenir, 2010, p.45). Thus, the individual cannot rely on these appearances to realize his relation with the essence of technology, as he tries to adapt with it and considers it a neutral thing, this what makes him lose his freedom and remain under the control of technology. (Ibid, p.44).

Heidegger believes that technology causes human to lose his humanity, as he describes the human relation with technology under what he calls “the forgetting of existence”, as we must distinguish between the ontology of existence and the ontology of existing. This is because the ontology of existence cannot be confined as a subject and therefore cannot be subjected to study, but the ontology of the existing can be subjected to study, thus it can be a subject that this subject may be human or nature. This ontological distinction that made metaphysics a relative thought of existence. (Boumenir, 2010, p.55).

Based on this, Heidegger pursues two main goals:

Laying the foundations for the smashing of ancient metaphysics that were completed because of the dominance of technology.

An existential analysis of the being associated with Dasani as the solution to transcending reification.

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On this basis, Heidegger tried to transcend the ancient ontology, where he rejected Lukàcs's explanation of the phenomenon of reification because he maintained this ontology, and he pursue to reformulate the concept of reification based on a new ontology. (Nythmar, 2019, pp. 35, 38).

Heidegger believes that the concept of reification can be explored basis on of Dasein as the only way to reveal the meaning of being. This Dasein can only be understood by separating it from social life, in the sense of interpreting it from an existential rather than a social perspective. Through this, Heidegger asserts that human is the only who has a pattern of existence, as what distinguishes his being is transcendence. (Ibid, 2019, pp. 36, 38). Dasein is understood as the existence in the world; Heidegger considers that the search for understanding is carried out through the relation of being with the world than its relation with others. So the other completely like me and is unknown to me, on this basis existentialism proceeds from the idea of being in the world and not being with others. (Ricoeur, 2001, p.69).

Existence in the world is related to nurturing, as Heidegger asserts that the fundamental relation between self and the world is one of care. In order for Heidegger to clarify this relation, he presented an existential and phenomenological analysis, through which he sought to prove that the world is open to the daily practical activity of Dasein, and by considering the world as an subject, the self seeks to know it. This why Heidegger rejects the traditional conception that modern philosophy establishes that combines self and subject as dualism, where it put the self against the subject. In this way, the self becomes a mere thing. (Honneth, 2008, p. 30).

As a result of the overlap between the self and the subject, Heidegger established a new system in order to balance them systematically, which is the system of tribal understanding. Since the later cannot described in terms related to epistemology because it is related to previous cognitive and experiences. For example, getting used to using certain tools constitutes previous experience; this experience helps me discover new uses for these tools thus their essence is revealed. (Ricoeur, 2001, p.71).

According to Heidegger, the problem of reification can be understood by relating the being of Dasein to itself and to others. Where the self does not consider the other, merely a means to achieve its project, but rather it considers it as another self that has a project of her own, as the basic relation that unites them is one of mutual care. And Dasein, in order to realize his project, relies on tools that Heidegger calls "at hand". (Nythmar, 2019, p.42).

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Honneth sees Heidegger's concept of care as referring to what we today call "perspective of the participant" whereby the self shares the other in his social life by trying to understand his thoughts, attitudes and desires. (Honneth, 2008, p.34).

Honneth attempted to present a comparison between Lukàcs's analysis of the phenomenon of reification and Heidegger's analysis of issue of technology for reformulate the concept of reification. Where he sees that there is a great agreement between them because there are many common points between them. This is what appears through Lukàcs's book "History and Class Consciousness" and Heidegger's book "Being and Time". Where Honneth concluded:

The thought of each of them coincided in his start, which was linked to the criticism of modern philosophy, as both of them rejected the ancient concept that puts the self against the world. Where Honneth confirms that Lukàcs's goal is not only to present a critique of the theory of reification on which capitalist economy is based, but also to clarify and show that the cause of the crises and problems that modern philosophy suffers from is the encounter it establishes between the self and the subject. Because this encounter destroys the essence of the self and makes it a mere material thing. And if philosophy does not move away from this contrast, it will not be able to overcome the obstacles it faces. The same for Heidegger also rejects this conception of the dualism of self and subject. (Honneth, 2008, p. 30). Because self and subject occupy an important place in philosophy of Heidegger and constitute its essence and object, as Heidegger was more convinced than Lukàcs, with regard to the primacy of the idea based on the possibility of understanding reality in neutral manner away from the reificatory character which was covering on the human structures of this existence. That is why Honneth considers Lukàcs and Heidegger to agree on project to demolish the traditional perception. (Mounis, 2017-2018, p. 117).

We also find that each of them contributed to suggesting an alternative relation between the self and the subject that is based on the confrontation between the self and the subject, considering the world as a mere subject that the self-pursues to know it. As Lukàcs asserts that the relation between self and subject is a relation of sharing practice. (Honneth, 2008, p.30) which means the joint use of a resource, space or commodity. (Mounis, 2017-2018, p.117).as soon as the self enters into this practical relation, this contrastive relation between here (self) and the world is eliminated. On the other hand, Heidegger has also replaced the concept of encounter with the concept of care, because the basic relation between self and subject is a caring relation. (Honneth, 2008, p.30).

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Both of them emphasized that there are elementary structures of human existence, that precede all the stages that human lives and precede all cognitive. Lukàcs's concept of participation is in harmony with Heidegger's concept of care, both indicating a kind of practical orientation that distinguishes a person from other existing, due to his special formulation. Whereas the human who lives in this prevailing situation, he seeks to understand his reality through what he calls "engagement of caring" that allows him to discover the world as the world has a meaning and not just a material world. And Lukàcs confirms that had it not been for this engagement, which is considered an elementary form of the self's relation to the subject, consciousness would not have been able to present a comprehensive understanding of the prevailing situation. On this basis, Lukàcs and Heidegger agree that the elementary structures of human existence, which represented of empathetic engagement, remain present with human in the reified world and do not disappear. (Ibid, pp. 34-35).

They both believe that reification is not just negative moral behavior, because it is about habits and practices, which violate all the rules on which human practices are based. On this bases, reification is an error in the interpretation of human practices that become subject to this reification, but despite this it remains preserving its elementary form which is engagement of caring. (Ibid, p.32).

Both of them were interested in trying to understand the history of individual through philosophy, as Lukàcs preserved the classic proposition (subtraction), and followed the strategy of Marx and Hegel and considered that the proletariat is the subject of history. While Heidegger used being as a subject of society and history. (White, 2020, p.22). This is what represented the difference between Lukàcs and Heidegger.

In addition, one of the differences between them is that Lukàcs linked the problem of self and subject to capitalist society, and thus his criticism is linked to the social theory. While Heidegger did not link his critique to the social conditions that the basis of social theories, rather, he presented a general critical study of existence and tried to provide a neutral understanding of reality. (Honneth, 2008, p.30).

The principles of thinking of each of them differ from the other, where Heidegger, through his work *Being and Time*, was seeking to prove that mental language which the previous ontology depended has distorted the concept of care. Because it considered it merely a character related to the daily events of human existence. Whereas Lukàcs's method was completely different from Heidegger's principles, as he believe that capitalist system eliminated the possibility of recovery of participating practice, due to the phenomenon of reification that

dominated the relations between individuals, and it became the character of this system. (Ibid, p31).

They also differ in the idea of a human future, as Lukàcs considers that a human puts a plan for his future to follow it, while Heidegger considers Dasein as a project, it reaches its future through reveal. (Nythmar, 2019, p.49).

Honneth's purpose in presenting this comparative study is to try to determine the extent to which Heidegger's concept of care contributes to clarifying Lukàcs's concept of participation, on this basis, Honneth sees Heidegger's concept of care imposed itself. Because Lukàcs's analysis of second nature was based on the subject's attainment of a degree of consciousness, due to its sense of alienation that made it contemplate the prevailing situation. In this situation the subject becomes an observer, and based on this the subject concludes that it is impossible to separate it from the world, because the basic relation between them is not a relation of reification, but rather another relation that is defined through the concept of practice that Lukàcs left is mysterious and complex. (Honneth, 2008, p.33).

That is why Honneth relied on Heidegger's concept of care this ambiguity, considering that the care represents what Honneth calls the "perspective of the participant". Nevertheless, that does not mean that the individual understands himself through the other based on the communicative relation that occurs between them through their address to each other. Heidegger rejected this perception and asserted that the intersubjective activity between individuals is through positive affirmation of the individual, which is preceded by the existence of the individual first, but if this affirmation is absent, this relation will become the reificatory relation, as this affirmation is embodied through the concept of care. On this basis, Honneth considered Heidegger's concept of care in this sense corresponds to Hegel's concept of recognition, this why Honneth replaced the concept of care with concept of recognition. (Ibid, pp.33-36).

2.2.2. John Dewey (1859-1952):

After the analytical study presented by Honneth between Lukàcs and Heidegger on the phenomenon of reification, and after he tried to explain the concept of the participatory practice of Lukàcs through Heidegger's concept of care, he turned to the study of reification from Dewey's perspective for present a more explicit concept than that of Lukàcs and Heidegger.

Shortly after Lukàcs published his book "History and class consciousness, Dewey published two articles in which he employed his own terminology and his conception of the first

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relation between the individual and the world. And Dewey has confirmed that the total experience is the bases of any mental understanding and any cognitive, as there is no mental understanding that is not related with experience, where this experience is revealed through participation that achieves the benefit of individuals. (Honneth, 2008, p. 36).

Dewey distinguishes between two experiences; a primary experience is the direct interaction with things and is characterized by being temporary and full of changes, as all experiences being with this type of experience. Secondary experience it is a reflection of the primary experience, where it is dominated by intellectual activity for achieve order and homogeneity.

On this basis, experience occurs because of the interaction of asserts that nature is not separate from the individual because there is a continuity between nature and experience that occurs as a result of the individuals' involvement with the environment, so their relation with the environment becomes a continuous participation relation. Based on this, Dewey asserts that experience does not derive from introspection only, but also through interaction with nature, as this experience is linked to space and time as necessary conditions that precede every human activity. (Acampado, 2019, pp. 2-4).

Dewey refuses to combine the duality of the individual and the world because this perception harms the various social practices in the life of the individual and leads to the separation of cognition and feelings, theory and practice, science and art. Where he asserts that all our practical dealings and the various experiences that we live in this world are the basis of all our mental cognitive, and thus the relation between the individual and the world is a practical relation. Also, all existential issues –including the interaction of the individual with others or dealing with things- are based on experience. Therefore, every situation experienced by the individual is based on experience, where the individual does not distinguish between emotional, cognitive and volitional elements “moods”, for this reason Honneth considered that the method that Dewey used in his criticism of the concept of “observing individual“ is what Dewey calls “the spectator model”, it's a clear and direct method. (Honneth, 2008, pp. 36-37).

Dewey sees that through a feature that distinguish the experience, the self is aware of its practical participation with the world, and the self realizes its existential connection with it. In order to describe this phenomenon, Dewey used the term “interaction”, confirming that the daily activity of the individual is not based on self only, but is represented in participation and dealing with others. (Ibid, p. 37). Where the principle of interaction refers to the influence relation between the individual and the environment, the individual is not an isolated being, but lives in a

physical and social environment, which is what constitutes the world of things and individuals around him where he is affected by and affects them. (Jedidi, 2004, p.239).

Dewey sees that it is possible to understand and analyze the situation in which the individual lives by separating the self and keeping away from this experience. Where the analytical elements –which the self needs in addressing the practical problem from an intellectual aspect- appear as a result of a contemplative attempt to separate the elements that were previously selected through “mood”. Where at this moment the emotional elements are separated from the cognitive elements, and here the effectively neutral individual becomes able to oppose the object of knowledge and try to understand the direct primacy experience from intellectual aspect. (Honneth, 2008, p. 38).

Dewey believe that if we take a phrase consisting of a subject and a predicate, in term linguistic structure, we can explain the relation between the self and predicate as an adjective for it. But, ontologically we can only define this relation if this adjective is derived from the primacy qualitative experience that was established (confirmed) through the process of abstraction. That is why Dewey considered that the self and the predicate are complementary to each other. because they refer to the primacy qualitative interaction that takes place with the world. He also considered that all phrases aim to define the human through the predicate, where it is understood by following this method on which the qualitative experience is based. (Ibid, p. 39).

Dewey linked experience, in its new concept, to the inference that results from interaction. The individual is in a position of real experience where he performs the process of inference and conclusion to benefit from the incident that aroused his thinking. And when we talk about reasoning, we are talking about logic, this explain that logic results from the interaction of the individual with his environment and the world around him. Based on this, Dewey asserted that experience and logic cannot be separated because experience is the source of logic. (Jedidi, 2004, p. 106).

Dewey sees that the qualitative experience appears as a given that is presented to thought to be preserved and consolidated through abstract processes. The term given in this sense becomes like a characteristic on which all the subjects of thought are based, and this is what represents the existential practical commitment. On this basis, Honneth took the idea of priority and applied it to recognition, where he tried to prove the priority of recognition through some psychological studies. (Honneth, 2008, p. 40).

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Although Dewey did not use the term reification, he rejects the traditional conception that puts the self in a neutral confrontational relation with the subject it seeks to understand. Where he confirms the importance of clarifying the relation between self and subject so that society can understand itself. With this conception, Dewey agrees with Lukàcs and Heidegger in their criticism of modern philosophy. (Ibid, p. 36).

We also find that Lukàcs's concept of participation and Heidegger's concept of care agree with the concept of practical participation of Dewey. This is through the daily activity of individual, which is the interaction, participation and dealing with others, where the relation of influence between the individual and other, the individual and his environment.

Dewey also agrees with Heidegger on the idea of the "mood" that governs the self's understanding of its relation with itself and its relation with the world. Where Dewey considers that all existential issues -including the interaction of the individual with others or dealing with things- stem from experience. Therefore, every situation that the individual lives is based on this primacy experience in which the individual does not distinguish between emotional elements and cognitive elements, this is what represented the "mood".(Honneth, 2008, p. 37). The same is true of Heidegger, who considered that "mood" is a part of reality that arises from being in the world, and through the individual can face thing in the world.

Dewey and Heidegger also agree on what Heidegger calls "at hand". Heidegger used this concept to describe different attitudes toward things in the world. Dewey also crossed through it on the primacy interaction and the different attitudes that take places between the self and the world. That is when he confirmed that the ontological relation between the self and predicate it determined through experience. (Honneth, 2008, p. 39).

Proceeding from this analytical study, Honneth seeks to emphasize that the reality of the individual's actions in their primacy form of his relation with the world does not take a neutral observing position. Rather, it appears in the form of a positive affirmative relation, which is recognition. Therefore, the recognition of this meaning is consistent with the concept of participation in Lukàcs, the concept of care for Heidegger and the concept of practical participation according to Dewey. On this base Honneth considered recognition:

"A recognitional stance therefore embodies our active and constant assessment of the value that persons or things have in themselves".(Ibid, p. 38).

In addition, Honneth sees that Lukàcs, Heidegger and Dewey have emphasized the priority of the interactive relation –between individual and others, individual and world- of all

acquaintances. Where each of them expressed this relation in his own term. And since this interactive relation is represented by recognition, this indicates the priority of recognition over all human practices. (Ibid, p. 47).

Through this analytical study presented by Honneth about the concept of reification between Lukàcs, Heidegger and Dewey, we conclude that he was pursuing three goals:

- Proof the priority of recognition, in the sense that recognition precedes cognitive.
- Reification leads to forgetting recognition, where the relation between individuals transformed from a relation of recognition to a relation of reification.
- Reformulation of the concept of reification because it took new forms and did not remain confined to the concept presented by Lukàcs, in order to reconstruct the theory of recognition.

Honneth tried to demonstrate the priority of recognition based on three concepts:

Lukàcs's concept of "empathetic engagement", Heidegger's concept of "care" and Dewey's the concept of "qualitative experience".

Where Lukàcs used the concept of empathetic engagement to express the initial relation that brings the individual with others and with the world, as this engagement takes two natures; the first nature is related to the economic aspect, and the second nature is related to the various fields of life.

But since Lukàcs's analysis of the second nature was mysterious, Honneth relied on Heidegger's concept of care as a way to clarify this mysterious and to reformulate Lukàcs interpretation, through the concept of positive affirmative that is embodied through the concept of care, considering that the relation between the subjects is a caring relation. On this basis, Honneth concluded that the concept of care in this sense corresponds to Hegel's concept of recognition, for this, he replaced the concept of care with the concept of recognition.

However, Honneth still believe that this concept was still mysterious and needed clarification. this why he relied on Dewey's method as a clear method on the method adopted by Lukàcs and Heidegger; in order to prove the priority of recognition, through experience as a given, it is prior to all cognitive and topics of thought. Where it represents a kind of practical commitment, the same with regard of recognition, for it precedes everything, including the phenomenon of reification.

However, this mutual recognition has diminished because of the domination of the reificatory character, where recognition of individuals has been denied. Therefore, this reification became like forgetting to recognition, and this is what appears through Heidegger's

idea of forgetting existence. This is what promoted Honneth to reconstruct the theory of recognition based on the reformulation of the concept of reification in its various forms, as it hinders the self from achieving its identity.

2.3. Honneth's Theory of Reification:

Reification has arguably been the most important concept in Western Marxism since Lukács. This intellectual school attempted to respond to realism critiques of progressive politics, particularly conservatives who saw democratic revolution as unrealistic in light of socioeconomic reality, as well as to dissociate itself from bourgeois moral-political philosophy. It is seen as ideological. The critique of reification offers a third way for critical theorists who are dubious of realism on the one hand and frictionless idealism on the other, a method that is both critical and conscious of social realities whose essence is simply historical existence. (Scharfer, 2017).

Due to a renewed interest in Marx's philosophy and the work of Axel Honneth, who recently presented a reinterpretation of the concept of reification and alienation based on both Honneth's theory of recognition and social theories of authentic life, reification has reappeared in recent debates in European social political philosophy. (Lotz, 2013).

Honneth was keen to go beyond Lukács's monolithic interpretation of the concept of reification in order to diagnose the crises and social ills prevalent in capitalist societies. This prompted him to criticize Lukács' conception of reification by reconsidering the mechanical nature of the relationship that exists between the economic base (infrastructure) and the various forms of consciousness (superstructure). And the search for new dimensions and other forms of reification, which in his opinion are defined as follows: Self-reification (relationship with the self). Objective reification (relationship with the world). Intersubjective reification (relationship with others). (Boumenir, 2013, pp. 87-88).

In a nutshell, the term 'reification' refers to the phenomena of social ties becoming perceived as 'thing-like.' In his Tanner Lectures, Honneth tries to resurrect the concept of reification for modern critical theory while also taking a huge step forward in recognition theory. (Owen, 2010).

The definition and application of the term reification, which is not commonly used, is a critical initial step. This task alone is more difficult than it appears at first, given the term's enormous and varied meaning. Lukács' depiction of commodity structure in *History and Class Consciousness* (Lukács, 1972), as referenced in. (Scharfer, 2017).

Schafer (2017): I largely agree with the popular interpretation of that work, which holds that Honneth psychologizes the concept of reification, reducing its utility as a diagnostic tool for social illnesses.

However, his attempt to establish a model of normal self-development from which to explain reification as a pathological aberration is the central issue here. Honneth's anthropology steers clear of any specific explanation of socialization in the context of modern institutions, leaving it unclear what role these institutions play in reification. As a result, Honneth is increasingly being accused of identifying a psychological rather than a societal disorder in his (official) theory of reification. (Schafer, 2017).

Honneth claims that reification is based on the forgetting of a primary relationship toward oneself, things, and other people that is not found in epistemological relations, but rather in recognitive relations, i.e. that all cognitive acts return to intersubjective relations in which others are encountered in a noncognitive empathetic and reifying way. (Lotz, 2013).

His hypothesis revolves around a phenomenon he refers to as "recognition forgetfulness." He links forgetting to a state of 'reduced attentiveness,' in which the underlying fact of recognition is relegated to the background and no longer has the ability to inform the cognition process. 'I would like to establish this element of forgetting, of amnesia, as the cornerstone for a reinterpretation of the concept of "reification", Honneth writes. The line "All reification is a forgetting," which serves as an epigraph to this book and is derived from the addenda to *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, appears to have inspired Honneth. Honneth is clearly aware, however, that a close reading of the concept of "forgetting" in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* yields a concept intricately entangled in a psycho-social history. (Foster, 2011).

The idea represents the cognitive and attitudinal process by which a being that does not embody any particular property of things, such as a human being, is still recognized and regarded as a thing by others, as well as, possibly, by itself, in its most basic form. Lukács states at the start of his essay, *History and Class Consciousness*, that reification entails nothing more than the fact that "a relation between people takes on the character of a thing" (Honneth 2008a, 21).

Honneth demonstrates that the theory of recognition can overcome these four constraints of Lukács' theses if reification is defined as the "forgetting" of an initial interpersonal and self-relation, both founded on recognition, rather than reification of a nebulous "manifestation of life." (Lazzeri, 2011).

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To this end, Honneth begins by expanding on the concept of recognition that he had previously sought to develop. As a result, he might describe reification as the “forgetting” of recognition in two dimensions: recognition of the other and recognition of oneself. There are two types of reification that relate to these: reification of the other and reification of oneself. At the same time, this definition provides an opportunity to broaden the explanation of how reification processes are formed, an explanation that differs significantly from Lukács', albeit including his point of view. (Lazzeri, 2011).

Honneth utilizes the concept of emotional recognition to explain two types of phenomena in a hazy way. The first alludes to the existence of a new dimension in the study of recognition that arises in Honneth's book on reification (Honneth 2008), namely "self-recognition" and its inverse, "self-reification," while the second refers to reification's determination as negative, or the “forgetting” of original recognition (Lazzeri, 2011).

Self-recognition is reintegrated into its intersubjective dimension in this situation, far from Frankfurt's naturalism, and we must acknowledge that the possibility of self-recognition is merely the result of a successful recognition process. As a result, if Honneth wants to stay true to his intersubjective conception of identity formation, he must choose for the second meaning of the concept of self-recognition. said, the ambiguity persists, this time over the causes of reification, because the introduction of this concept raises an important issue for his analysis if attention is paid to the fact that, just as recognition of others can be substituted for a reification attitude toward them, self-recognition can be substituted for a reification attitude toward oneself (Honneth 2008, 63–75). As cited in (Lazzeri, 2011).

Now, according to Honneth, self-reification is the result of a number of more or less institutionalized practices linked to the "self-presentation of subjects" in the context of a new wage relation characteristic of late capitalism, rather than a socially produced reification on the intersubjective plane, i.e., a suspension of recognition. These methods compel the subject to "present itself," that is, to create goals and experience the requisite instrumental and artificial sentiments, not just in work contexts governed by neo-management concepts, but also in other situations (we will stay with this example in what follows), in others also. These arrangements, “which latently compel individuals merely to pretend to have certain feelings or to give them a self-contained and clearly contoured character, will promote the development of self-reifying attitudes” (Honneth 2008a, 83). As cited in (Lazzeri, 2011).

While self-recognition necessitates recognition, self-reification does not necessitate reification by others, from which it is independent, any more than self-reification necessitates

reification of others or reification of others necessitates self-reification. (Honneth2008). As cited in (Lazzeri, 2011).

Given that reification and recognition are diametrically opposed, the second difficulty arises from the fact that Honneth's book contains numerous conflicting definitions of reification, which correlate to changes in the definition of recognition. In fact, Honneth has proposed a concept of reification that is diametrically opposed to the recognition-empathy definition. Empathy, according to this definition, is the ability to adopt the perspective of another based on the ante-predictive assessment of a nature and attitude resemblance between the partners. (Lazzeri, 2011).

In this scenario, reification can only be interpreted as the deactivation of any sympathetic projection based on the belief that the other is devoid of sensitivity, and thus of any potential to experience what he or she is meant to appreciate. (Lazzeri, 2011).

Honneth, on the other hand, presents another definition of reification that assumes another definition of recognition in the same sentence in which he describes the absence of the other's sensitivity: "We may be capable of perceiving the full expression of human expressions in a cognitive sense, but we lack, so to say, the sensation of connection, For us to be touched by the expressions we see, it would be required." (Lazzeri, 2011).

Honneth makes a distinction between "genuine" kinds of reification (such as genocide, war, or economic enslavement) and "fictitious" forms of reification to stress the radical character of this mentality (such as the instrumental presentation of self, prostitution, or interpersonal cruelty). "Under the surface of these sorts of reification, the ontological difference that exists between the person and the thing is still present in consciousness," according to fictitious forms of reification. By contrast, "this difference is obliterated from awareness in the case of real examples of 'reification,'" and individuals are considered entirely and simply as things. (Honneth 2008b, 106). As cited in (Lazzeri, 2011).

In this way, we're dealing with the reification of others, even if it's an unintended consequence of self-reification. In these circumstances, attention should be made not only to the "forgetting of primary recognition" through reifying attitudes, but also to the "forgetting of secondary recognition" through reifying attitudes. (Honneth 2008b).

However, as there is no self-reification without the process of reification by others, even if there is an inadvertent chance of reification of others as a result of self-reification, we must

also consider their impacts. As a result, it is difficult to justify Honneth's argument that these processes might occur independently. (Lazzeri, 2011).

When a human being is considered as an object, reification of others occurs, according to Honneth's theory. Since a result, the original recognition is suspended as any identification with others, and hence any ability for affective interaction, is deactivated. (Lazzeri, 2011).

Reification, in this view, is nothing more than a type of utter disdain with the intent to humiliate. It does not consider individuals to be things, but rather treats them as though they have no value, resulting in a degradation that allows for more severe treatment. Certain types of killing are made easier by the lack of emotional recognition, from the bureaucratic decision based on physical and psychological distance from the victim, through a chain of hierarchical mediations that renders the victim invisible, to execution, which is made possible only by the existence of an often impermeable boundary between the executioner and the victim. Affective deactivation also allows for various forms of economic servitude. Some sorts of reification, such as demands for self-presentation, interpersonal cruelties in general, or sexual violence in particular, are totally fake, according to Honneth, because they are a question of "as if." (Honneth 2008) (Lazzeri, 2011).

Reification practices, according to Honneth, are "social diseases," or situations that are incompatible with the prerequisites for a decent life. The first is reifying classification (or "typification"), which, like racism or anti-semitism, refuses to assign persons "particularly human attributes," resulting in the "forgetting" of emotional awareness. Yet in this situation, it is not clear how "human beings could be led by purely intellectual paths to insistently deny the personal characteristics of members of other social groups" (Honneth 2008a, 81;2008b 105). (Lazzeri, 2011).

As a result, the "autonomization of the aim," or the primary and exclusive consideration of a defined goal that diverts attention away from seeing the harm done to those who are involved in achieving this goal, must be called. This is a very extreme example of instrumentalization. (Honneth 2008a). Economic exploitation in a non-legal situation, for example, is a clear expression of goal autonomy. This approach is bolstered by a reifying categorization that serves as a source of incentive.(Honneth 2008a). (Lazzeri, 2011).

Last but not least, repetition is crucial. The "routine" of its implementation, in which predetermined procedures are followed as essentially technical activities, strongly reinforces insensitivity un the treatment of victims (Honneth 2008a). Through familiarity and repetition,

reification becomes over-determined. While it is obvious that these various aspects support each other. (Lazzeri, 2011).

Honneth proceeds to create a new account of engaged practice, one understood as a sort of reciprocal recognition, using this study of Lukács as a starting point. Though the concept of recognition had already become a signature concept for Honneth by the time he wrote *Reification*, he makes clear that he now has in mind a different type of mutual recognition than the three main forms that he had addressed in *The Struggle for Recognition* (Honneth, 1996). Specifically, trust, respect, and regard. We are now told that the latter are all "normatively substantial kinds of acknowledgment," meaning that they all require a developed subjectivity to be loved, respected, or appreciated (Honneth, 2008, p. 152).

If one were to avoid the idealistic view reflected in the official Lukácsian account, Honneth now claims that subjectivity itself must be regarded as a product of mutual recognition. As opposed to the substantive kinds of recognition that had dominated his earlier work, we are now confronted with a formal sense of recognition, which he refers to as variably fundamental, elementary, and fundamental, or antecedent recognition, which can be thought of as a "transcendental condition" for any self-awareness. To put it another way, one of the argument's basic premises is that "recognition must precede cognition"—that any reflective sense of self must eventually require earlier recognition connections with sympathetic partners. From this vantage point, Honneth is able to reframe the concept of reification as a type of forgetfulness of this most basic form of recognition. According to the source, (Schafer, 2017).

For his part, Honneth wishes to see his concept of reification as primarily a social philosophy category. Certainly, all of his examples are aimed to demonstrate how reification can still be regarded as having a social foundation. (Honneth, 2008, pp. 59, 156) But, while Honneth's amnesia may have a social genesis, it's no longer obvious that it must be—that is, what exactly is it about the lessened attentiveness to antecedent awareness that could not simply have its origin in my own psychological circumstances. (Honneth, 2008, pp. 75–85; Jütten, 2010) Obviously, if the link between reification and its social sources is non-essential, the task of identifying the social obstacles that stand in the way of overcoming reification becomes greatly obscured. While Honneth's recent work can provide a more tightly integrated recognition-based theory of reification with social criticism. (Schafer, 2017).

Conclusion:

Honneth has shown that the works of Lukács, Heidegger and Dewey were primarily intended to demonstrate the importance of recognition in the structure of human relations. He

Chapter Two: Situating Reification in the social theory of Axel Honneth

refused to be closed to the self and centered around it, so we find that transcending the phenomenon of reification from Lukàcs' point of view is based on a form of human interaction that seeks to change the world.

As for Heidegger, in the context of his criticism of the concept of reification, in its various ontological forms, he was interested in highlighting that the concept of "care" might reveal to us the form of the practical relationship with the world and with others, which characterizes the pattern of human existence according to its special ontological structure. On the other hand, Dewey did not stop emphasizing the importance of positive interaction with the environment that surrounds us, and with others in order to get out of the tendency towards self-centeredness.

Based on this, Honneth emphasized, through his philosophical approach to the ideas of these three philosophers, the primacy of recognition, and that reification led to the forgetting of recognition on the one hand. On the other hand, he emphasized the role of recognition in overcoming the various forms of reification prevailing today in our contemporary world.

Chapter Three

3. Honneth's Social Theory of Recognition.

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3. Honneth's social theory of recognition:

Introduction:

Honneth, through his philosophical project based on recognition, seeks to establish a normative theory of society. With the aim of rebuilding the critical theory anew so that it is in line with the social, political, economic and cultural transformations that contemporary societies have known. The tasks of this social theory, according to Honneth, are twofold:

Descriptive task: It is based on diagnosing social diseases at the level of individual and collective experiences - including the phenomenon of reification and various forms of disrespect - that hinder the achievement of a good life for individuals in terms of social and moral terms.

Normative task: It is based on identifying and knowing the criteria and forms of successful social life.

According to Honneth, these two tasks constitute an integrated unit between the descriptive and normative character from the theoretical side, so that the latter appears as a critical theory of society.

On this basis, Honneth in his book "The Struggle for Recognition" reconstructed the social experience based on the forms of intersubjective recognition that he considers an institution of the individual's identity, in order for the self to realize its existence and obtain recognition from others. Therefore, Honneth attempted a structural reintegration of the forms of social conflict and the patterns of lived moral experiences - that is, between forms of disrespect and forms of recognition - because, in his view, this struggle is a form of struggle for recognition. (Boumenir, 2017).

Based on this, Honneth sees that the mutual recognition that is between self and others is enough to put an end to social conflicts based on control, domination and social injustice. Thus, individuals can achieve themselves through intersubjective and positive interaction with others, and their recognition of them as human beings capable of fulfilling their needs and convictions. Individuals' self-realization can only take place within the framework of intersubjective social relations, which depend on the realization of three distinct normative models of recognition: love, rights and solidarity, as a transgression of three forms of social disrespect: the violations of the body the denial of rights and denigrating ways of life. (Boumenir, 2015, p. 52).

3.1. Forms of disrespect:

In order to clarify the theory of recognition, Honneth tried to identify the various social pathologies that contemporary societies suffer from due to the physical and psychological damage they inflict on individuals, which prevent individuals from achieving their selves.

On these bases, Honneth sees that a person's loss of self-respect and dignity generates feelings of anger and frustration, which are the basis of his awareness that he is a victim of disrespect. Where a person can be exposed to various forms of disrespect through his interaction with others. (Boumonir, 2018, p.131). And we can define these types on the basis of recognition, since every form of recognition corresponds to a form of disrespect. (Honneth, 1996, p.132). And considering that these forms hinder the achievement of recognition, Honneth took an inset in it and tried to understand it under what he call «lived moral experiences », based on the basic idea that :

When a person realize that he has been the victim of unethical Transactions-no doubt- he describes his situation-based one some statements, as humiliation and exclusion associated with forms of disrespect or lack of recognition experienced byContemporarysocieties, especially in light of the new dominanceof new or advanced capitalism .

Where the statements of humiliation, exclusion and insult are considered a kind of attack (assault) on the person on both the physical and psychological sides. it also negatively affects the positive self-understanding that he has acquired through the process of intersubjective, that he went through in the process of socialization , this why the experience of disrespect is an assault that completely threatens a person's identity, and this experience is tantamount to denying individuals of their rights to obtain recognition. That is why –according to honneth- in order to establish a theory of social morality, we need to analyze the various forms of disrespect. (Boumenir, 2018, p.p.131, 143,145).

As there are three forms of disrespect:

- The first form relates to an individual's physical integrity.
- The second form is related to the exclusion of the individual from some of his rights.
- The third form is relates to denigrating individual and group ways of life. (Alalwi, 2021, p.p.12, 13).

3.3.1. The violation of the body:

Self-confidence is one of the basics in a person's life that cannot be dispensed with, and this confidence is gained through a form of recognition, which is love - But if love is absent, the individual will be weak personal. Due to the upbringing on which it is based. In addition, Honneth's analysis of love or the absence of love in disrespect is not what psychoanalysts usually offer because Honneth Link It to the physical aspect under what is called violating physical integrity. And this is the first form of disrespect where it corresponds to the first form of recognition which is love.(Zurn, 2015, p.32).

In addition, this kind of disrespect what affects a person's physical integrity as a result of the ill-treatment, he was subjected to where his body is deprived of freely disposing of it. In addition, this form of disrespect is more destructive than other types, because it depends on controlling an individual's body without his desire. This is what leads to the deterioration of his personality as a result of his feeling of not being able to defend himself and he is at the mercy of another self, this is on the one hand, also it affects his relationship with himself on the other hand. (Honneth, 1996, P.132).

To show us this, Honneth presents torture and rape as examples of physical violence, as through them, control of the individual's body by force. This may lead to the elimination of one of the most important foundations on which recognition is based, which is self-confidence. The individual acquires self-confidence instinctively in early childhood –through the form of love- where he is in control of his body. (Zurn, 2015, p.32).

However, with this kind of disrespect, one loses his dignity and self-confidence because of controlling his body being exposed and a result of the damage he inflicts from this control. And the pain felt by the individual in this situation is not only physical pain, but also psychological pain, (Boumenir, 2010, P.156)

This is what has been proven by specialized psychological studies that subjecting a person to torture or rape affects the psychological aspect a lot, which leads to the so-called psychological death; this is what affects his relationship with others because of absence of love. (Boumenir,p.134).

This physical assault deprives the individual of the feeling of independence in controlling himself and his body, in addition, it makes the individual lose self-confidence, and it deprives the individual from living a stable reality.

Loss of self-confidence affects two aspect: a social aspect and an ethical aspect.

From a social point of view: loss of self-confidence affects all practical dealings with others and extends to the physical level, and this affects the formation of an individual's personal identity.

From a moral point of view: the loss of self-confidence leads to a weakness in the personality, because others base the strength of the personality on self-confidence and recognition. (Zurn, 2015, p.32).

Finally, this form of disrespect does not differ with the historical period or the cultural framework of the society. As it is not linked to the historical process of change, unlike the other two forms of disrespect, which are considered an integral part of the historical process of change. (Honneth, 1996, p.133).

3.1.2. The denial of rights:

If the first form of disrespect is related to physical abuse that causes the individual to lose their self-confidence, the second form of disrespect is associated with degeneration that affects a person's self-respect; as a result of his exclusion from some of the rights, this is called the denial of rights. (Ibid, p.133).

There are two paradigmatic forms of legal disrespect –the denial of rights- : the first is to deprive an individual of some or all of the legal rights, while the second is to deny the individual the ability to the participation in making laws that is a legal ostracism. These two forms of legal disrespect degrade an individual's ability to be self-reliance and his ability to take responsibility for the consequences of his action. In addition, these forms hinder the ability of the individual to understand himself from the practical side as an equal subject in law with others; he deserves to receive his dignity like the rest of the free and equal members of society. (Zurn.2015.p.38).

So depriving a person of his rights means that they are not recognized moral responsibility as others, this marginalization makes him feel insulted and humiliated because his position (status) and his interaction with others in the community were excluded. (Boumenir, 2010, p.175).

As an example, in the legal doctrine of coverture, upon marriage a woman becomes legally subject to her husband whereby she lost her legal independence. Among this legal doctrine of coverture- with regard to property and contract rights- woman when her engagement directly from the man, she is prohibited from owning personal property in her own name, also she is prohibited from being independent in concluding contracts with others. Thus, the woman becomes at the mercy of her husband.

Therefore, this form of disrespect prevents her from understanding herself as a free and equal moral subject like other members of society, it also affects her self-respect, and thus woman suffer from a form of social death. (Zurn, 2015, pp.38-39).

On this basis, this form of disrespect leads to lose the ability to relate to oneself as an interacting member and legally equal with others, it leads to a loss of self-respect. In addition, this form is an integral part of the process of historical change this is because the semantic content of moral responsibility changes with the development of legal relations. (Honneth, 1996, p.134).

3.1.3. Denigrating ways of life:

The third form of disrespect is related to the second form, because the second type stems from this third type that negatively affects the social value of individuals and groups. (Ibid, p.134).

Whereby the individual loses his social esteem, and does not obtain the recognition, he deserves due to his competencies and qualifications, and thus does not obtain the social status that deserve it. (Alouch, 2016, p.15)

The term status here refers to the degree of social esteem given to the individual by society, based on his self-realization in accordance with the cultural horizon of the society. Where this aspect is exploited in a negative way in order to reduce the value of individual life, and to deprive persons from obtaining the social value they deserve due to their special abilities. (Honneth, 1996, p.134)

This cultural distortion is a humiliation and insult to different ways of life, which are the means to achieve individual's selves, that is because there are cultural norms that reduce some lifestyles and work to change patterns of self-perception and the social conditions for self-esteem within society. In light of this distortion of the reputation of society, some persons refuse to associate with these patterns, and thus this leads to a lack of positive recognition of their abilities and special characteristics. In addition, on the other hand, we find some persons do not have full and equal opportunities to develop self-esteem, because they belong to certain ethnic groups. For example, a group of individuals belonging to a certain ethnic group, are insulted because of their practices and beliefs, this negatively affects their ability to establish a practical relationship with oneself, and destroy their ability to understand the traits and achievements they deserve. (Zurn, 2015, p.42-43)

Consequently, here the individual's associated with a certain group becomes a negative thing for them after it was positive, since these persons were deprived of social approval, which leads to a loss of self-esteem. On this basis, a person should not associate himself with this cultural decline until after the socio-historical appreciation of determined. Thus, this form of disrespect, as well the form of denial of rights, is related to the process of historical change. (Honneth, 1996, p.134)

From all of the above we can conclude that:

- The first form of disrespect, which is linked to physical violation leads to a loss of self-confidence.
- The second form of disrespect, which is linked to the denial of rights leads to a loss of self-respect.
- The third form of disrespect, which linked to the denigration of ways of life leads to a loss self-esteem.

From here, it becomes clear that the experience of disrespect is an assault on the individual's personal identity completely, as it leads to depriving the individual of his right to obtain recognition. This is what is called the concept of "humiliation" that threatens the person. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, it leads to the creation of social and political conflicts within society in order to change the living conditions.

An example of this is the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Where the colonizer is forced to defend and serve the colonized, but soon the colonizer realizes this unjust relationship, and works to get rid of it because it realized that it lives in a kind of disrespect. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 140). This creates a kind of conflict between the colonizer and the colonized, and if colonized continue in this struggle, it will achieve its independence, which constitutes a kind of recognition.

Honneth also asserts that the three models of disrespect represent a kind of social invisibility that is not limited to physical abuse and control over the autonomy of the self only, but also affects the psychological aspect of the self. Where Honneth means - by the visible and the invisible - that if the individual is recognized, he is visible, but if he is not recognized, he is invisible. Based on this, the visual represents a set of legal situations and social practices that make the individual occupy his appropriate position within social relations. Moreover, since disrespect does not represent any of this, it represents the invisibility that causes the individual to live in a negative emotional state as a result of not

being recognized as a subject capable of forming a moral judgment. This is what makes individuals look for recognition of its various forms as the only solution through which the invisible is transcended and the visible is achieved, because mutual recognition represents the space in which the interaction between individuals is achieved. So that it fulfills their psychological and emotional demands (love), their legal demands (the right), and their social demands (solidarity). (Boumenir, 2018, p.p. 144-147). Therefore, a tolerant society is one in which the individual can achieve himself and his dignity away from social contempt and inequality.

3.2. Forms of recognition:

Honneth sees that in order for individuals to overcome various forms of disrespect, and to regain their dignity and their social status, there must be some kind of mutual recognition between them as a necessary condition for the realization of people's identity and reconfigure themselves.

Honneth considers that the process of self-formation is linked to what he calls social interaction, and through this intersubjective interaction that takes place between the individual and others, and what these relations include in the forms of social interaction; the individual acquires awareness of himself and the way to achieve it through the opinions of others about him. Therefore, the process of self-realization can only occur through recognition and through the individual's relations with others. (Boumenir, 2010, pp. 107-108).

This what Honneth confirmed by saying:

“The reproduction of social life is governed the imperative of mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation -to- self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the- normative perspective of one's partners in interaction, as their social addressee”.

(Honneth, 1996, p. 92).

The process of self-formation is realized through three forms of recognition:

Love: it achieves a level of personal identity, which is self-confidence, and this form is a conformation with the first form of disrespect –the violations of the body-

Legal rights: through which the individual achieves self-respect, and through which the second form of disrespect can be overcome –the denial of rights-

Solidarity: through which individuals obtain esteem-self, and this form confronts the latter form of disrespect – denigrating ways of life-

3.2.1. Self-confidence and Love:

Honneth employed love in its broad sense form of recognition and the basis for developing one's self-confidence, where Honneth considered that:

“Love relationships are to be understood here as referring to primary relationships insofar as they –on the model of friendships, parent-child relationships, as well as erotic relationships between lovers- are constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of people”. (Honneth, 1996, p.95).

Through this definition, Honneth confirms that love is not just a sexual relationship between man and women, as love provides the individual with emotional security through which he learns the value of his feelings and emotions, and helps him to show them in his interaction with others. (Boumenir, 2018, p.99).

Love, according to Honneth, represents a primary relationship linked to a limited number of people. It is embodied in the process of interaction that takes place between individuals, whether within the framework of family relations, or outside the framework of the family, such as friendship relations. Thus, the social space allows individuals to form relationships with each other based on the emotion of love, as it is a primary relationships that depends on the unstable balance between independence and attachment. This is evidence by Hegel's idea of “being oneself in another”, which served as a starting point for Honneth. (Honneth, 1996, p.96).

In order to clarify this practical self-relationship between individuals, Honneth relied on the psychoanalytic theory of the psychologist Donald Winnicott, who presented an accurate study on the relation between the mother and the child as a model of the love relationship. (Zurn, 2015, p. 29). Where the relationship of the child with his mother is the first level of mutual recognition, because the first form of recognition takes place through the initial interaction that exists between them, as the role of the mother is to care, because she meets all the needs all physical and emotional needs of her son. (Boumenir, 2010, p.109).

The first stage of the relationship of the child with his mother represents the original coexistence in which they form one self because the mother considers her son an integral part of her, and the child does not realize that he is a separate self that has its own existence. Each of them sees that he is not distinct from the other, and this is what constitutes a behavioral unit. that Winnicott expressed in the concept of "primary intersubjectivity." (Honneth, 1996, p. 98). In which the child is subordinate to his mother and is dependent on her in everything. However, gradually, after the development of this relationship among them, the child begins to separate

from his mother as a result of the development of his abilities to control his own world. And his realization that he is an independent self with its own emotional and physical existence. In addition, that the self-participating in this interaction - the mother - has its own existence. And here the struggle for mutual recognition is embodied in this form - love - as the child struggles with the disappointment he has been exposed to and struggles to get used to the new situation in which he was separated from his mother. The mother is also experiencing a kind of conflict in which she struggles to prove her independence and to teach her son to be self-reliant, while maintaining mutual emotional trust. On this basis, each becomes a separate and distinct being from the other, and thus they move to the so-called "singularity". Nevertheless, this singularity occurs only in a healthy way, based on their mutual emotional support. As there is continuous care on the part of the mother to help her child understand his motives and emotions, thus being a source of comfort and safety, which makes the child exchange the same feelings with her, and this creates a kind of mutual trust between them. Based on this, this type of love between the child and his mother constitutes a kind of mutual recognition based on emotional support, as each recognizes the other as an independent being with its own physical and emotional existence. (Zurn, 2015, pp. 29-30).

Roné Spitz has confirmed through his empirical studies on the relationship between the child and his mother that depriving the child of his mother's care leads to changes in the child's behavior, despite the care of all his physical needs. Daniel Stern was able to demonstrate that the interaction between mother and child is a very complex process, in which both partners acquire the ability to share their feelings mutually. (Honneth, 1996, pp. 96-97).

Honneth emphasizes that this interpretation is not limited to the love relationship that brings together the child and his mother, but applies to all other relationships on the one hand. On the other hand, he asserts that all love relationships are linked to the unconscious process of remembering the first love experience experienced by each individual, as all these relationships contain a kind of mutual recognition of the independence of the other. Because each recognizes that, the other is separate from him and has his own desires and needs. However, this independence is linked to mutual love and emotional trust that guarantees the continuation of attention and care among them, and this ensures the continuation of this relationship, because if there is independence that is not linked to mutual love, this relationship will fail. So love in all relationships is based on mutual participation between two people, each of whom realizes that he exists for the other. (ibid, pp. 105-106).

On this basis, recognition in the first form - love - does not represent a state of strife as much as it represents a link between two experiences: the experience of the individual's ability to be alone, and the experience of the individual's existence. As this experience makes each of them trust the other and trust themselves. (Ibid, p. 105). That is why Honneth believes that the positive relationship that an individual can have towards himself when he experiences recognition on an emotional level is represented in self-confidence, which is a kind of emotional guarantee for each individual. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 100).

Based on this, love is a necessary condition for achieving self-confidence, which in turn is a prerequisite for achieving personal identity. This is that self-confidence gives the individual openness to himself, thus establishing a healthy practical relationship with himself, as he is reconciled with himself. And it enables him to overcome all the psychological crises he is going through. In addition, Honneth considers that self-confidence is a necessary condition for achieving other types of personal identity - self-respect and self-esteem - if self-confidence is not achieved, it is impossible to achieve other types. And since each type of personal identity corresponds to a form of recognition, this means that if love is absent, other forms cannot be fulfilled. (Zurn, 2015, pp. 31-32).

Through this, we can consider love - according to Honneth - as the structural nucleus of moral life, because this bond is through which the individual achieves self-confidence, without which he cannot participate independently in social life. (Boumenir, 2015, p. 55).

3.2.2. Rights and self-respect:

The second form of mutual recognition between subjects is related to legal relations. This form of recognition helps to gain self-rights granted to them, it guarantees them legal protection that allows them to understand themselves as active and equal individuals. (Zurn, 2015, p. 34).

Rights:

"As referring to those individual claims that a person can legitimately expect to have socially met because he or she participates with equal rights, in the institutional order as a full-fledged member of a community". (Honneth, 1996, p. 133).

This legal recognition means that individuals are guaranteed their freedom and autonomy as equal moral individuals. Where these individuals gain some kind of respect. On this basis, Honneth asserts that this universal respect should not be seen as an emotional attitude based on emotional trust, rather, it is a cognitive achievement that the individual reaches, and starting from

mental understanding. If this form seeks to achieve a kind of respect away from feelings of love and affection. (Ibid, p. 110).

That is, self-respect is achieved through distant relationships between members of the legal community that depend on a rational understanding, in contrast to self-confidence that is achieved through the emotional support on which the love relationships that form close relationships are based. (Zurn, 2015, p. 34).

Rights are based on two basic assumptions:

- Individuals are responsible for their behavior and actions towards others.
- Obligations those legal institutions impose on individuals towards others.

These two assumptions can be summed up in the idea: *"The law treats individuals as morally autonomous agents: capable of freely willing and acting in the light of their own rational considerations, and legitimately accountable held to account as such when their actions affect others"*. (Zurn, 2015, P. 35).

Meaning that an individual cannot enjoy his rights unless he realizes that there are obligations towards others that he must abide by it, where the individual shows the idea of Mead "the generalized other" and as the individual learns through it to recognize others. (Honneth, 1996, P. 108). If this mutual recognition is achieved between individuals as having the same rights, when the self is socially recognized as a member of a group that can be considered a human being with its rights, this is not achieved by stubbornness as the individual plays an acceptable social role within an organized group according to the principle of division of work. (Boumunir, 2015, P. 52).

This confirms that respect is not based on the individual's characteristics or special abilities, but respect here as a human being has the right to equality with all other individuals. For example, the criminal, no matter what crime he committed, he deserves respect as a human being, a human being. But this respect does not mean accepting what he did, but rather he must be punished for his actions. Respect here is represented in good treatment and granting him his legal rights. (Zurn, 2015, P. 35).

Legal recognition grants members of society their rights regardless of their social or cultural affiliation ranks and jobs, where legal recognition does not take into account any exception or preference and discrimination of one person over another. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 112).

Based on this, Honneth divided individual rights into three sections:

Civil rights: through which individuals guarantee their freedom, as this category represents the negative rights that protect a person's life, freedom and property from unauthorized interference by the state.

Political rights: Individuals are guaranteed to participate in the processes of forming the public administration, and thus represent positive rights.

Social rights: Individuals guarantee basic welfare by ensuring the equitable distribution of goods among individuals, as this category also represents a kind of positive rights. (Honneth, 1996, p. 115).

Honneth sees that through these legal rights granted to the individual, he gains self-respect because they represent recognition of him as a morally independent individual with his rights and freedom. In order for the individual to understand that he is morally independent, he must realize that he has obligations towards others, as these obligations are mutual among them. On this basis, he realizes that he deserves legal protection like other individuals as a morally responsible legal subject. Through this, it appears that this form achieves a kind of self-respect that is related to the social aspect within the framework of legal rights. (Zurn, 2015, pp.36-37).

This is what Honneth emphasized:

“What gives rights the power to enable the development of self-respect is the public character that rights possess by interaction partners. For, with the optional activity of taking legal recourse to a right, the individual now has available a symbolic means of experience whose social effectiveness can demonstrate to him, each time anew, that he or she is universally recognized as a morally responsible person.” (Honneth, 1996, p. 120).

As a more clarification, Honneth presents the conception of society as legal rights. Which is the experience of Joel Feinberg (Nowheresville): Through it, it is assumed that our society does not live without legal rights, as it depends on the mutual goodwill between individuals. Also, in this society, no one can claim his rights, as they enjoy general autonomy even if it harms the dignity of others. Here the individual cannot defend himself or demand that he be treated well. This indicates a lack of social respect, as it is not possible in this society to develop the self-respect of the individual as a respected member who deserves to be treated like other members of the community. (Zurn, 2015, p. 37).

Based on this, we conclude that through legal recognition, the individual can realize that he is a member of society like other individuals, as he shares with them all the rights and qualities that make participation in the formation of discursive management possible, and thus this form of recognition achieves a level of personal identity, which it is self-respect. (Honneth, 1996, p. 120).

On this basis, the difference between the first form and the second form of recognition appears:

- Love involves emotional attitudes toward others as it is expressed through trust and emotional support, while legal rights seeks to understand the mental claims of both self and others as it is expressed cognitively.
- Both are considered a form of respect, but love achieves respect through influence, while truth achieves respect through rational understanding.
- Love is limited because it is linked to a small number of people, but rights are not limited because they represent universal rights and are linked to all individuals.
- Love is for special and individual feelings of its kind, while rights are directed to general characteristics related to all individuals. (Zurn, 2015, p. 36).
- Represents unconditional support, legal rights represent conditional support.
- Love seeks to achieve self-confidence, while rights aim to achieve self-respect.
- Love represents a continuous and permanent relationship, but legal rights are related to certain moments only that are not permanent.
- In the case of love, the child gains self-confidence from the care of the mother, while in the case of legal rights, individuals gain their respect as a universally respected experience. (Honneth, 1996, p.118).

3.2.3. Solidarity and self-esteem:

In addition to the two previous forms, we find a third form of recognition, which is solidarity and estimate, which is a form of social evaluation that is based on the characteristics and capabilities of each person that make them different from others.

Honneth believes that this form of recognition can only be realized through the existence of common values and social goals among all individuals that they seek to achieve. Because if there is no kind of sharing in these values and goals, this mutual estimate between individuals cannot happen. As each of them contributes in the life of the other, this constitutes a kind of social solidarity. (Honneth, 1996, p. 121).

Solidarity in modern societies has become conditional on the relations of mutual appreciation between the autonomous selves. So the estimate is here based on the values that give the qualifications and capabilities of others an important role in public practice. As this type of relationship based on solidarity creates a feeling of sympathy for the individual privacy of the other person and this assesses what the individual is keen on developing the capabilities and potentials of this person. (Boumenir, 2015, P. 62).

Based on this, estimate is a relative assessment of individuals, where they are evaluated by their own characteristics, abilities and achievements. As each person appreciates and respects the other based on his morals, behaviors and traits. For example, a person is valued based on his tolerant behavior or his completion of a difficult project at work, here is presented positive assessments of the individual's personality and what he has provided, as this estimate represents an unconditional support through which solidarity and interdependence are achieved among members of the same society. However, it is worth noting here that not all competencies and achievements deserve estimate, except for individual achievements of their kind that achieve a goal or value of the goals and values of the community. This type of achievement is the one that deserves positive evaluation. Therefore, each person must appreciate each other in a reasonable way that is not exaggerated, if the goals and values of this society that determine what should be valued are shared among them. (Zurn, 2015, pp.41-42). And based on the fact that social estimate is limited to the abilities and competencies specific to each individual, which differ from one person to another. This makes the individual feel that he is "valuable", especially when he is known for his achievements. This, in turn, achieves a kind of personal self-awareness, through which the individual learns about his abilities and traits and what earns him a kind of self-confidence (Honneth, 1996, p. 125).

Honneth emphasizes that each individual must have a self-understanding of the culture of the community through which the values and goals of the community are determined. Because the assessment of the individual's capabilities is linked to these goals. As the culture of the community is the guiding framework that works to assess the individual's capabilities and special traits that are determined through the extent of their contribution to achieving community goals. On this basis, self-understanding of the culture of society provides the criteria by which the capabilities and achievements of individuals are evaluated by judging them mutually according to the extent to which they contribute to the achievement of culturally defined values. (ibid, p. 122).

On this basis, Honneth focuses on understanding the culture of society, its goals, and its relationship to social, solidarity and cooperative activity. In order to be able to determine the criteria on which the social assessment is based, as the individual's assessment is based on the extent of the individual's contribution to achieving the goals of society, which are common goals among all individuals, as the evaluation criteria differ from one society to another according to its culture. (Zurn, 2015, p. 42). Given that these abilities are determined in accordance with the goals of society, Honneth sees that the individual lives a kind of cultural conflict because social goals were determined before he entered work in this social life. (Honneth, 1996, p. 126).

Honneth sees the type of recognition linked to the presupposition of social life as it ought to be. And that is why the members of each society seek to contribute to achieving the goals of their society through their abilities and competencies, because if the criteria for social estimate are determined based on what is prevalent this form of recognition becomes no different from the second form -legal recognition-. The more goals are open to different values on what is prevalent, the more clear the social estimate, because this assessment is based mainly on the capabilities and unique characteristics of an individual, as his position in society is determined based on these capabilities. (Ibid, p. 122).

This Honneth calls the "community of value", which is based on solidarity relations between its various members who participate in this society and support goals and contribute to their achievement, as this solidarity achieves self-esteem and community appreciation. (Zurn, 2015, p. 42). Based on this, Honneth asserts that these achievements are as much as is related to individual it is related to the community, because he contributed to achieving one of the goals of this community. Through this the individual achieves what Honneth calls "social pride" or "social honor". Because the rest of the community members are proud and appreciate this achievement, and this makes the individual realize that a member of a social group that, through collective cooperation between individuals, can achieve values and goals whose value and benefit to society is recognized through the rest of the community members. And based on this mutual interaction between individuals constitutes a kind of solidarity, because each person recognizes and appreciates the achievements of the other on this basis, solidarity can be understood as:

"An interactive relationship in which subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, among themselves, they respect each other symmetrically". (Honneth, 1996, p. 128).

Thus this form of estimate achieve a kind of social recognition, because the individual can only fully realize himself in a social context, especially if all forms of recognition are available. (Zurn, 2015, p. 41).

This basis shows us that this type of recognition differs from both of the previous two forms; although in the three cases, there is a kind of respect. As respect in love is through emotional support, and in legal rights respect is achieved as a result of its connection with a general characteristic considering individuals are interacting In the third figure, respect is related to the special traits that distinguish one from the other.(Honneth, 1996, p. 113).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Honneth has distinguished between three forms of recognition, each of which contributes to achieving the level of personal identity levels.

The first form: It related to the emotional desires and needs that the individual seeks to achieve through love that takes place through unconditional emotional support between individuals. Where this form is within the framework of a limited relationships between close people- that is, between the individual, and his family and his friends. And based on this support provided by this form, the individual gains self-confidence.

The second form: It related to the legal rights that are achieved from rational understanding, as this form takes place within the framework of distant relations, as it is universal and includes the entire human race, and through the legal support provided by this form, individuals can obtain respect.

The third form: It related to the characteristics and capabilities of each individual that he revolves around contribute to achieving the goals of the society. This estimate is made between individuals who share the same moral and cultural values of a particular society; this is what achieves social solidarity. Through this form, the third level of personal identity is achieved, which it is self-esteem.

Through these three forms on which recognition is based, the forms of disrespect that are considered the biggest obstacle to changing society are eliminated, as recognition is the only way to achieve a social life based on moral standards.

On this basis, Honneth considers that recognition is a means of achieving social integration through which human societies and groups that bring together a group of individuals separated from each other are distinguished. The happiness of society is measured by the extent to which it is able to guarantee the conditions of mutual recognition that allow the realization of the identity of the individual and provide him with the appropriate conditions for a decent life.

Honneth also asserts that the morality of a society is measured by the extent to which it is possible to guarantee the conditions for mutual recognition between selves. But it is worth noting that this recognition cannot be achieved with the surest conflicts in social life, for this reason the concept of conflict plays a key role in the movement of social development. And for this reason Honneth sees that mutual recognition can only be achieved by the linguistic communicative act that leads to understanding on the social level as Habermas thought. Based on this, the three forms of recognition (love, right, and solidarity) are the ones that determine the formal conditions of social interaction relations in which individuals guarantee their dignity and achieve mutual recognition among themselves. (Pompez.2018 .P. P.124.128.)

The following table can illustrate these relationships:

Mode of recognition	Emotional support	Cognitive respect	Social esteem
Dimension of personality	Needs and emotions.	Moral responsibility.	Traits and abilities.
Forms of disrespect	Abuse and rape.	Denial of rights, exclusion.	Denigration, insult.
Threatened component of personality	Physical integrity.	Social integrity.	Honour, dignity.
Practical relation-to-self	Basic self-confidence.	Self-respect.	Self-esteem.
Forms of recognition.	Primacy relationships (love, friendship).	Legal relations (rights).	Community of value (solidarity).
Developmental potential		Generalization, de-formalization.	Individualization, equalization.

3.3. Freedom as a struggle for recognition:

Honneth linked his theory of recognition to the concept of freedom, as true freedom is only achieved through interaction with others within the three subjective domains that are represented in the forms of recognition (love, right and solidarity). Where these three forms

represent a necessary and basic condition for achieving human freedom within social and political institutions.

Honneth has worked on rebuilding Hegel's book "Principles of the Philosophy of Right" by excluding metaphysical concepts and focusing on the concept of freedom. Where we find that Hegel, in his talk about freedom, focused on social freedom in its three forms, which are: legal right, internal morality and ethical life.

Based on these three concepts, Honneth presented his concept of freedom according to three levels:

First: Freedom at the legal level, which is linked to the so-called negative freedom.

Second: Freedom on the moral level is linked to what is called reflexive freedom.

Third: Freedom at the ethical level and linked to the so-called social freedom. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 183).

3.3.1. Negative freedom:

Individuals with this level of freedom enjoy rights that others do not, such as the right to physical integrity, property, and contracting freedom. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 184).

From "Thomas Hobbes" authoritarianism in the seventeenth century to "Robert Nozick's" contemporary libertarianism, the negative model of freedom can be seen in a range of modern ideas of justice. According to this viewpoint, an individual is free to follow all idiosyncratic desires because there are no external barriers to activity. She is not free when she is externally prevented from satisfying her contingent desires. Individuals are instead depicted as isolated monistic actors attempting to egoistically satisfy their own desires in this approach, which ignores shared ties of affection or devotion to others. Of course, there is a concept of moral duty to others that relates to negative freedom: people should interfere with others' negative freedom as little as possible. (Zurn, 2015, p. 157).

The model of justice, which is commonly associated with the negative model, is an instrumentalist variation of the social contract. As unconnected, egoistic monads, individuals calculate that it is in their best interests to have as little interference from others as feasible. The best way to guarantee this non-interference is to enter into a one-time prudential contract with others to establish equal individual rights to the greatest amount of non-interference possible, rights that are then enforced by a state with a monopoly on coercive power to make it unprofitable for individuals to violate those rights. In other words, justice is merely the

enforcement of subjective rights to non-interference that are justified as being in the egoistic interests of each actor. Because actors are assumed primarily concerned with their own personal goals, there is no sense in which justice is tied to social collaboration. (ibid, 157). Because this would require us to ascribe an additional, higher-order element to the quest for liberty, one that would justify the assumption that subjects have an interest in cooperating with all other subjects, the theory prevents citizens from seeing themselves as creators and renewers of their own legal principle. (Honneth, 2014, p. 27).

The central concept of freedom influences the status and scope of these ideologies' concepts of justice. This is because in such a thought experiment, people are only allowed to execute individual computations. By presuming that people are just concerned with preserving and securing their own freedom, any considerations other than strategic wisdom are filtered out. Its subjects can only trust any political and legal order derived in this manner if it fits each of their individual needs. (Ibid, p. 27). Thus, political involvement or democratic citizenship are unnecessary because justice may be attained simply by enforcing individual subjective rights, which can be done by any government that supports the fundamental rule of law, whether authoritarian, oligarchic, or democratic. (Zurn, 2015, p. 158).

Negative freedom reveals itself in the extent and even shape of the justice principles expressed by both theories, making the situation more nuanced than these two choices. Because this theory assumes that an individual's desire for freedom is rationally restricted to a desire to face as few limitations as possible, the laws of a fair political system can only communicate the value of freedom by giving as much flexibility as possible for personal decision-making. (Honneth, 2014, p. 27).

The limitations of this freedom paradigm become apparent when we examine several exemplary cases, such as the addict, the manipulated person, the coerced person, and the wanton. In each example, we can clearly observe that their behaviors are free in the negative sense, but they are also unfree in a crucial sense. Thus, while the alcoholic may have no external impediments to another drink, his inner need to drink more is essentially a source of unfreedom.

Individuals, according to Honneth, do not make autonomous decisions about their preferences. Instead, their actual objectives are left to the whims of natural or social forces – causes and forces outside their control. Acts of the person are unfettered, but his desires and goals are. (Zurn, 2015, p. 158).

3.3.2. Reflexive freedom:

Since at least the mid-eighteenth century, when writers like “Rousseau” and “Kant” began to emphasize the centrality of conceptions of authenticity and autonomy as vital to any individual freedom worth having or aspiring to, this underlying restriction of the negative model has been a recurring issue. As a result, a new model of freedom emerged, which Honneth refers to as “reflexive freedom.” Regardless of the discrepancies in specific ideas, the core premise of reflexive freedom is that an individual's acts are free when they are driven by his or her own goals.

Freedom necessitates the exercise of free will: a free person must live her life in accordance with her own self-evidently endorsed motives and reasoning. As a result, freedom necessitates not just the absence of interference in one's activities, but also the ability to reflect on and freely or honestly decide on the contents of one's own goals. True freedom necessitates that one's acts stem from a sufficiently refined and pure will, rather than from random desires that arise at any given time. (Zurn, 2015, pp. 158-159).

Honneth draws out two basic lines of thinking in recreating the diverse reflexive conceptions of freedom. The first is a type of reflexive freedom based on moral autonomy. According to “Kant”, a person is free when he establishes a rule of action that can withstand rational scrutiny and then follows that rule as the true motivation for the activity. The ideals of authenticity, personal integrity, and individual self-realization prominent in the literature of early nineteenth-century Romantics provide a second fundamental model of reflexive freedom. This model of freedom was first articulated clearly in “Rousseau's” writings in which an individual can only truly become who she is after a long period of reflection on her own experiences and feelings in order to articulate the deep, authentic core of her personal identity. According to this broad definition, a person is free when she acts only on desires and goals that are true reflections of her deepest, most authentic self.

Honneth describes the three basic forms of justice theories based on reflexive freedom. On the one hand, there are a variety of proceduralist views of justice that match to the autonomy strand. Procedurelism, popularized by theorists such as “John Rawls” and “Jürgen Habermas”, holds that the legitimacy of collective political decisions is ultimately a function of whether those decisions were made under ideal procedures for structuring collective cooperation, procedures that ensure that each individual is treated as a free and equal citizen. (ibid, p. 159).

As a result, justice is a feature of political structures that may secure equal freedom of each individual in a collective willing reflexive process. Honneth, on the other hand, examines two major families of hypotheses in relation to the authenticity strand. First, there are views like

“John Stuart Mill's “that claim that justice refers to the social and political arrangements that provide the greatest number of people with the greatest amount of freedom for real self-development over the course of their lives. Various versions of republicanism, for example, represent a second family of authenticity-influenced ideas, such as Hannah Arendt's theory, which claims that justice requires individuals to realize themselves in and through collective forms of self-realization. Despite the differences between liberal proceduralism, liberal perfectionism, and republicanism, all of these theories of justice have one thing in common: they all consider the realization of individuals' reflexive freedom to be the aim of – and the main purpose of – just social arrangements. (Ibid, p.160).

Honneth sees that this type of freedom is difficult to link to a certain justice as in negative freedom, as the degree to which individuals cooperate to achieve their social demands in this reflexive freedom is higher than it was in negative freedom because it represents a kind of independence and self-awareness. (Honneth, 2014, p. 40). Here the self is aware of its intentions, purposes and actions, and it also has the ability to assume responsibility for the self. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 134).

3.3.3. Social freedom:

Honneth suggests social freedom as an alternative to negative and reflexive freedom because it represents a broader meaning of individual freedom.

This kind of freedom requires an appropriate social environment, from which the actions of the individual derive their goals. Since real freedom, according to Honneth, requires subjective conditions that are related to, the control of the individual, and it also requires objective social conditions that are not subject to the control of the individual. (Zurn, 2015, p. 161). In addition, this kind of freedom can only be achieved through recognition that takes place within the framework of social institutions. Where Honneth believes that the importance of the principles of the philosophy of right lies in social freedom.(Boumenir, 2018, p. 185).within this context, Honneth says:

"it is obvious that our individual freedom depends upon the responsiveness of the spheres of action in which we are involved to our own aims and intentions. The more that we feel that our purposes are supported and even upheld by these spheres, the more we will be able to perceive our surroundings as a space for the development of our own personality". (Honneth, 2014, p. 60).

Honneth argues that in order to properly understand freedom, we must understand the value of withdrawing from social roles and obligations within a broader concept of freedom, since for him, negative and reflexive freedom are essential elements of modern freedom. (Zurn, 2015, pp. 161-162). This has, Hegel showed that this type of freedom was established in comparison to the other two models of freedom (negative freedom and intellectual freedom). Based on the idea that individuals are not isolated, but rather there is an interactive relationship that binds them to each other.

Within this context, Honneth, in his talk about this freedom, refers to the love relationship between a man and a woman that does not cancel the freedom of either of them. He emphasized that the concept of love refers to that awareness of the unity that is formed with another person, so that the individual is not isolated from himself. But at the same time he cannot achieve awareness of himself except by canceling his self-existence and knowing that himself is formed as a unity with the other, meaning that the individual He realizes himself through the other, and this is what embodies the mutual recognition associated with the mutual self-determination of individual freedoms. (Boumenir, 2018, pp. 185-186).

In this way, Honneth emphasizes the relationship between recognition and freedom, because what individuals benefit from in their ethical life with regard to this existing interdependence is a basic self-conditioning for achieving individual independence. For this reason, the other two types of freedom contain many shortcomings because they do not fulfill the autistic conditions that are a prerequisite for achieving individual autonomy. (Ibid, pp. 186-187).

On this basis, Honneth considers that there are two aspects to social freedom: The first aspect is subjective freedom, which is the freedom that is linked to mutual recognition within the set of aspirations formulated between the partners in the interaction between.

Objective freedom is linked to a set of moral aspirations, based on the institutional criteria through which the rights and duties of individuals are determined. (Ibid, p. 187).

In order to achieve these two aspects of social freedom, three basic conditions must be met:

First, the individual achieves his personal goals by promoting others to his goals, where this interaction is reciprocal between all individuals, and this is what Honneth calls the relational institution where the goals of individuals overlap with each other through that the freedom of others is a condition for achieving personal freedom.

The second condition is that relational institutions gain their validity through mutual recognition between individuals, given that freedom is based on consent and mutual reinforcement of goals, this represents a kind of mutual recognition.

Honneth emphasized that all forms of individual freedom depend primarily on mutual recognition.

The third condition of freedom is that all participants must agree to relational institutions from a reflexive point of view, so that institutions of freedom conform to the requirements of morality, associated with discursive and critical processes. (Zurn, 2015, pp. 162-163).

In addition to these conditions, we also find that in order for individuals to achieve actual freedom, it must be achieved through the three intersubjective domains that are represented in the forms of recognition - love, right, and solidarity. These three forms are also basic and necessary conditions for realizing the actual human freedom that the self can achieve. Through their interaction with others within socio-political institutions. (Boumenir, 2018, p. 191).

Therefore, Honneth considers that social freedom is achieved through what he calls institutions of recognition. That provide them with a set of rules, symbols and standards that allow them to define their aspirations and ensure the stability of their daily interactions, and thus achieve their subjective freedoms resulting from their participation in social life within a form of common social life. (Ibid, p. 188).

Finally, Honneth connects freedom with justice, since justice is based on equal opportunities for individuals to participate in institutions of recognition. (Honneth, 2014, p. 61). Whereas, true justice is based on the three normative principles of recognition. In order for the individual to achieve his independence, his need and right to benefit from his society and contribute to its development must be recognized. What is called justice is measured by the quality of recognition relations between individuals. (Boumenir, 2017, p. 84). A just society is one that allows individuals to exercise their personal freedom.

Based on the forgoing, we conclude that Honneth distinguished between three levels of freedom:

Negative freedom, in this type of freedom the self possesses some rights that others cannot dispose of.

Reflexive freedom, which is related to the self-conscious of its purposes and aims.

Social freedom where it relates to the self-participating in the process of interaction and intersubjective, within the various institutional fields.

Conclusion:

Honneth worked on the reconstruction of social experience, based on his philosophical project based on recognition. First, he diagnosed various forms of disrespect as an obstacle to achieving recognition. On this basis, he distinguished between three forms of disrespect:

- Firstly, it is related to the physical and psychological aspect, which is the physical abuse.
- Secondly, what is related to the legal aspect is the denial of rights.
- Thirdly, what is related to the social aspect is the distortion of lifestyles.

The theory of recognition is the only solution to transcend forms of disrespect, through which the individual can achieve himself because it is based on the mutual interaction between individuals and groups. Where this interaction takes place through three forms: love, right and solidarity, proportional to the three levels of personal identity: self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.

Honneth worked on a normative reconstruction of the concept of individual freedom from three levels of freedom: negative freedom, reflexive freedom and social freedom. This is in order to ensure that individuals can achieve this freedom, as it is their basic demand on the one hand. On the other hand, all subjective practices must be reconstructed within the institutions that must be expanded to include the institutions of the social state, democracy, family relations and the economic system - the capitalist market system -. From this freedom, justice is achieved.

General Conclusion

General conclusion:

Due to its openness to multiple key philosophical references: "Kantian, Hegelian, Marxist, and psychoanalytic" on the one hand, the Frankfurt School is regarded the most famous modern critical social philosophical school. On the other hand, it maintains up with the complex issues that face today's society, as well as the intellectual, social, and political upheavals that are occurring. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of this school is that it has adopted criticism as a technique of inquiry, attempting to conduct a critical examination of Western civilization in order to reevaluate its foundations and principles in light of the tremendous changes it is undergoing. Modernity has resulted in the creation of several social maladies such as alienation, reification, and loss of individual dignity, particularly since the age of lights, which is a crucial turning point for modernity. The Frankfurt School pioneers gave a critical examination of these societies based on this foundation.

The Frankfurt School has progressed in three stages. The first stage of this school, which is represented by "Max Horkheimer" and "Theodor Adorno", was established at the turn of the twentieth century. "Jürgen Habermas" represents the second stage. "Axel Honneth", who attempted to recreate critical theory in accordance with current events, currently represents the third stage.

On this basis, I reached a set of conclusions, which are as follows:

Honneth wanted to develop a new social philosophy in order to crystallize a new critical theory, so he did a detailed critical study of the first critical theory, "Max Horkheimer" and "Theodor Adorno," and then filled in the gaps with the second critical theory, "Jürgen Habermas." It was opened to a variety of "philosophical, social, and psychological" references. In order to gain a better knowledge of the web of social relationships and to build a new strategy within the philosophical, social, and political current that deals with the different issues of recognition in the Western world.

Honneth appears to have sought to reformulate this concept of Lukacs, depending on both Heidegger and Dewey, in order to extract various types of reification according to ethical and social dimensions, through the phenomena of reification. Based on this, Honneth emphasized, through his philosophical approach to the ideas of these three philosophers, the primacy of recognition, and that reification led to the forgetting of recognition on the one hand. On the other hand, he emphasized the role of recognition in overcoming the various forms of reification prevailing today in our contemporary world.

Honneth was able to build a new social theory that answers to present human goals and conforms to all new historical changes. He expanded critical theory in general and the Habermasian communication paradigm in particular by introducing the notion of recognition. Honneth's fascination with the concept of recognition can be seen in the way it was developed as a self-contained philosophical paradigm.

Honneth's theory of recognition is founded on the core premise that self-realization is contingent on individual and group recognition and reciprocal contact, because an individual's vision of himself is developed via his interactions with others.

Honneth distinguished three types of recognition (love, truth, and solidarity) that correspond to three levels of self-actualization on this premise (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem). As a result, this theory is sufficient to stop social disputes based on control and social unfairness, as well as to eradicate forms of disrespect. Since conflict cannot be reduced to a set of economic conditions, we must consider the ethical dimension of this conflict, which is linked to individuals and groups' aspirations to embody moral values and standards in order to achieve their identity within appropriate social, economic, and political contexts. As a result, we see that Honneth's conflict is a social experience in which the selves battle for mutual acknowledgment in order to achieve their identity.

Honneth worked on a normative reconstruction of individual freedom based on three degrees of liberty: negative liberty, reflexive liberty, and social liberty. On the one hand, this is to ensure that individuals can obtain their freedom, as it is their fundamental demand. All subjective activities, on the other hand, must be remade inside institutions that must be broadened to include the social state, democracy, family connections, and the economic system - the capitalist market system -. Justice is achieved as a result of this freedom.

Finally, I may make a series of recommendations that could be the focus of further research. We can examine Axel Honneth's philosophy of the self through my humble reading of his publications, given that he focused mostly on how to attain recognition of the subject. He was also interested in establishing moral standards for social problems, thus he studied ethics.

Finally, I hope that this research will be of interest to students and that they will take advantage of it

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Abstract:

Honneth attempted to build a normative theory of society through his philosophical endeavor based on the paradigm of recognition. To bring critical theory up to date with the social, political, economic, and cultural developments that contemporary cultures have experienced. Two tasks underpin this theory: Descriptive task: It is based on diagnosing social disorders at the level of individual and communal experiences - such as reification and other forms of disrespect - that obstruct individuals' attainment of a good existence in social and moral dimensions. Normative task: It is based on recognizing and understanding the criteria and forms of successful social life, which are recognized forms.

On this basis, Honneth worked on the structural reintegration of diverse forms of social conflict and patterns of lived moral experiences inside the so-called normative model of mutual recognition using this as a starting point. He believes that self-formation is dependent on what he refers to as interactive exchanges.

It is through the individual's intersubjective relationship with others. Through the opinions of others in him, the individual gains awareness of himself and how to attain it through various forms of social contact. He distinguished three levels of recognition: love, which leads to self-confidence, right, which leads to self-respect, and solidarity, which leads to social appreciation. On other hand, Honneth connected recognition to the concept of freedom since actual freedom can only be achieved via interaction with others within the three subjective domains represented by recognition forms.

المخلص:

سعى هونيث من خلال مشروعه الفلسفي القائم على براديجم الاعتراف إلى تأسيس نظرية معيارية للمجتمع، من أجل إعادة تحيين النظرية النقدية من جديد حتى تكون مواكبة للتحويلات الاجتماعية، السياسية، الاقتصادية والثقافية التي عرفتها المجتمعات المعاصرة. حيث تقوم هذه النظرية على مهمتين: مهمة وصفية: تقوم على تشخيص الأمراض الاجتماعية على مستوى التجارب الفردية والجماعية بما فيها ظاهرة التشيؤ ومختلف أشكال الاحتقار- التي تعيق تحقيق الحياة الجيدة للأفراد من الناحية الاجتماعية والأخلاقية. مهمة معيارية: تقوم على تحديد ومعرفة معايير وأشكال الحياة الاجتماعية الناجحة التي تتمثل في أشكال الاعتراف.

على هذا الأساس عمل هونيث على إعادة إدماج بنيوي لمختلف أشكال الصراعات الاجتماعية وأنماط التجارب الأخلاقية المعاشة ضمن ما يسمى بالنموذج المعياري للاعتراف المتبادل. إذ يرى بأن عملية تكوين الذات أمر يتوقف على ما يسميه بالتبادلات التفاعلية. فمن خلال التفاعلية التبادلية التي تتم بين الفرد والآخرين. وما تتضمنه من أشكال التعامل الاجتماعي يكتسب الفرد وعيه بذاته وبكيفية تحقيقها من خلال آراء الآخرين فيه. ولقد ميز بين ثلاثة مستويات من الاعتراف: الحب الذي يحقق الثقة بالنفس، الحق الذي يحقق احترام الذات والتضامن الذي يحقق التقدير الاجتماعي. هذا وقد ربط هونيث الاعتراف بمفهوم الحرية، ذلك أن الحرية الحقيقية لا تتحقق إلا من خلال التفاعل مع الآخرين ضمن المجالات التبادلية الثلاث التي تتمثل في أشكال الاعتراف.