



People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
Mohamed Khider University of Biskra
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of Foreign Languages

MASTER THESIS

Letters and Foreign Languages
English Studies

Literature and Civilization

The Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan's Thinking on American Foreign and Military Policy

Submitted and Defended by:

TATAI Malak

Supervisor:

Dr KERBOUA Salim

Board of Examiners:

Mr.	Abdelnacer Ben Abdelrezzak	MAB	University of Biskra	Chairperson
Dr.	Salim Kerboua	MCA	University of Biskra	Supervisor
Mrs.	Asmaa Cheriet	MAB	University of Biskra	Examiner

Academic Year: 2019-2020

Dedication

It was not only a scientific journey, but it was also a journey to rediscover myself again and a chance to feel the ability to do it and break the fear inside me.

I dedicate this humble dissertation to

My lonely lord Allah S.W.T.

Our beloved Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

Mom and Dad.

Lonely sister and brother.

Nana Mama and Oma Sherifa.

The memory of my grandparents Sadek and Belkacem may Allah lighten their graves with his Noor and fill it with his rahma (mercy), sitr (protection) and lotf (kindness) till the Day of Judgment.

For Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians and every single Muslim in this world whether tortured or poor or homeless or in need or deprived.

Acknowledgement

Of course, it would be so obvious that i would thank Allah first because without him I would not be able to move a pencil from the ground towards me to write this research.

I would would like to thank my supervisor's, Mr Kerboua Salim, for his indispensable help which really facilitated the task for me to do the research. I also want to thank my teachers, Mr Benabderrezak Abdenacer, Ms Cheriet Asma, and Ms Bougofa Zineb for taking of their precious time to read and evaluate my work.

My parents' help is also an endless chapter of gifts sent from highest Jannah.

My sister Meriem with her constant motivation is what really pushed me on itself may Allah bless her, save her, and guide her for her soft spirit and transparent heart.

I am also really grateful to Allah for having all these amazing teachers during my life at university.

Last and not least, I would say again thank you Allah for overwhelming me with your blesses inwardly and outwardly.

Abstract

This work aims to investigate naval Mahanian thinking of sea power within a specific setting which is the USA in the twentieth century. At first place, this paper tries to discuss the elements that shaped Mahan's naval thought through his education, his occupations, and military and political American history in the nineteenth century. Then, it attempts to analyze and to explain not only his theory from its elements but also its influence on both the American military and foreign policies during the twentieth century.

Key words

Alfred T. Mahan - nineteenth and twentieth centuries - sea power- strategic thinking - American military and foreign policy

المخلص

يهدف هذا العمل الى تحليل فكرة ألفريد ثاير ماهان حول ' القوة البحرية' ضمن سياق محدد وهو الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية خلال القرن العشرين. تحاول هذه الدراسة في البداية مناقشة ما يمكن ان يؤتي بفكرة ماهان من خلال حياته الدراسية و العملية وحتى تاريخ الولايات المتحدة الامريكية عسكريا و سياسيا فقط خلال القرن التاسع عشر. اضافة الى ذلك شرح هاته الفكرة من حيث عناصرها و بعدها سيتم محاولة استنباط أثرها حول السياسة العسكرية و الخارجية الأمريكية خلال القرن العشرين.

كلمات مفتاحية

القرن التاسع عشر- القوة البحرية -السياسة الأمريكية العسكرية و الخارجية - القرن العشرين.

Resumo

Eso trabajo tiene un objetivo para hacer una encuesta de l'idea de Alfred Thayer Mahan de la fuerza marítima en Estados Unidos a el vigésimo siglo. En primer lugar, este búsqueda científica proba a discutir cómo se puede componer su idea para considerar su educación, sus tres, determinado solamente en eso papel, trabajos y la historia americana militar y política mientras que el noveno siglo. Después, él se esfuerza a analizar para explicar no sólo los elementos de su teoría naval sino que su influencia en político militar y negocios exterior americano a el vigésimo siglo.

Palabras clave

El noveno siglo- la fuerza marítima- político militar y negocios exterior americano- el vigésimo siglo.

Résumé

Ce travail vise à analyser la pensée du stratège américain du XIX^{ème} siècle, Alfred Thayer Mahan. La pensée stratégique de Mahan influença la force maritime des États-Unis durant le XX^{ème} siècle. Premièrement, cet étude essaye de discuter comment sa pensée s'est formée, et ceci en considérant son éducation, son travail et l'histoire militaire et politique des États-Unis pendant le XIX^{ème} siècle. Ensuite, le mémoire analyse et explique non seulement les éléments de sa théorie navale mais son influence sur les politique militaire et étrangère des Etats Unis dans le courant du XX^{ème} siècle.

Mots clés

Alfred Thayer Mahan - XIX^{ème} siècle- la maritime force- la politique militaire et les affaires étrangères Américaines- XX^{ème} siècle.

Table of Contents

Dedication	i
Acknowledgements.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
الملخص.....	iv
Resumo.....	v
Résumé	vi
Table of contents.....	vii
General Introduction	1
 Chapter One: Mahan and His World 	
1.1. Introduction.....	5
1.2. Alfred Thayer Mahan's Formative Years.....	5
1.2.1. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Educational Life in the Naval Academy.....	5
1.2.2. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Educational Life in the College.....	6
1.3. Alfred Thayer Mahan's Career.....	6
1.3.1. A naval Officer.....	6
1.3.2. A Historian.....	7
1.3.3. A Lecturer.....	7
1.4. Mahan's Views on the Role and Duty of the USA.....	8
1.4.1. Political Context.....	8
1.4.2. Military Context.....	10
1.5. Conclusion	13
 Chapter Two: Mahan’s Thinking on the Elements of Sea Power 	
2.1. Introduction.....	14

2.2. Geographical Position.....	14
2.3. Physical Conformation.....	15
2.4. Extent of Territory.....	16
2.5. Number of Population.....	16
2.6. Character of the People.....	17
2.7. Character of the Government.....	18
2.8. Conclusion.....	19

Chapter Three:

The Impact of Mahanian Thinking of Sea Power during the Twentieth Century

3.1. Introduction.....	20
3.2. The Impact of Mahanian Thinking over the American Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century.....	20
3.3. The Impact of the Mahanian Thinking of Sea Power over a Contemporary American Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century.....	22
3.4. Conclusion.....	24
General Conclusion.....	25
Works cited	27

General Introduction

1. Background

Alfred Thayer Mahan may be an important historical figure as a navy expert not only in the United States but also in world naval history. He worked different occupations that comprised naval matters such as being a naval officer, a lecturer, and a historian. Moreover, he could introduce his masterpiece book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660_1783*. Then, Alfred Thayer Mahan might be the first to coin the idea of sea power (Grove). In addition, Mahan's thinking through his work had an impact on US military strategy. Hill argues that "the book [The Influence of Sea Power Upon History] was an instant classic that proved highly influential in both American and foreign circles" (Hill).

Alfred Thayer Mahan can be considered as an influential American historian and geopolitician who could provide a unique thinking on the naval level since he was the "first [who] coined the term "sea power" (Grove). His thinking about sea power could lead him to have an impact on the United States of America's both foreign and military policy.

2. Research Problem

The proposed research aims at analyzing Alfred Thayer Mahan's thinking. What makes his doctrine a significant one in the American navy as the military policy, and in other countries rather than USA as the foreign policy. A theory on sea power that might have influenced USA's both foreign and military strategy in the late nineteenth and all the twentieth centuries. Moreover, it focuses on the role played by his career as a lecturer, a historian, and as a naval officer on his thinking. This work intends to investigate some specific research questions on that subject:

- Who is Alfred Thayer Mahan and why was he an important thinker? - What was his message as a theory and how did it impact American foreign and military policy?

All in All, this research problem tries to detect the influence of Mahan's strategic thinking. In other words, as a reaction to his thinking; it endeavors to extract some remarkable achievements and prove them with the help of the determined contexts which are the American foreign and military policies during the twentieth century.

3. Limitation of the Study

In this paper, we considers only the military and political historical backgrounds in the nineteenth century that may be diagnosed by Mahan and that may be spurred him to react with his naval thinking of sea power in the twentieth century.. This study relies on the main points which are the elements constituting to the idea of sea power discussed in Mahan's book *The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660_1783*. His book offers, as which characterized it, a thorough explanation to sea power's elements justified by historical examples; and which together, sea power's elements and their justifying historical examples, try to elucidate how to use the navy effectively for a particular country. His mahanian naval tenets might be taken as a role model for other countries including the USA to develop their navy and to use it, effectively for their interests. Therefore, it might be worthy to mention how they could impact the USA's foreign and military policy.

4. Aim of the Study

This research aims at providing a full understanding of Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of Sea Power throughout an introduction and description of the main points of

his book, and at finally explaining how his work/theory could contribute to the United States of America; that is to say its importance under the frames of military and foreign policies of USA in the twentieth century.

5. Significance of the Research

A focus on the historical personality of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his main thinking, one that marked an important development in the history of the United States' navy and politics, can help students of US history to understand the United States' foreign and defense policies from a close study to this mahanian thinking. Furthermore, it may be interesting to examine Alfred Thayer Mahan's work of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* to gain an overview about it, his just mentioned non-fiction, and how it could become a masterpiece and a main guideline for naval strategy in the US.

6. Research Methodology

This research paper would use the historical method as a main base for the overall research methodology. In that way, it would rely on critical and argumentative analysis of evidential primary and secondary sources if possible. Moreover, it would examine relevant papers and articles on this research topic. In addition, it would try to look at the studies made by historians and scholars relating to Alfred Thayer Mahan's thinking on Sea Power and its specific shaping of the American foreign and military policy behind the conventional political setting.

7. Structure of the Research

The current dissertation attempts to draw the attention to the impact of the mahanian thinking towards the American military and foreign policy emphasizing the setting of the USA in the twentieth century. The study holds significantly three

chapters. The first chapter targets the world of Mahan from his education to his three selected occupations. In addition, this chapter casts the light on the role and duty of the USA in the nineteenth century as diagnosed by Mahan through two different historical backgrounds.

The second chapter targets his naval thinking of sea power depending on his book 'The Influence of Sea power upon history 1660_1783' to extract and to explain its main points being a first reference book to sea power, particularly. This chapter handles the six main elements of sea power from the geographical position to the character of the government.

The third chapter seeks to analyze the impact of the mahanian naval thinking of sea power over both the American foreign and military policies in the twentieth century.

Chapter One

Mahan and His World

1. 1. Introduction

Born on 27th September 1840, Alfred Thayer Mahan could embrace the citizenship of the state of New York. His education in the naval academy and in the Naval War College could lead him to go over different naval occupations, especially being a naval officer, a naval historian, and a naval lecturer. Moreover, his education and works together provided him with a sharp eye that could enable him to diagnose the situation and role of the United States in the nineteenth century throughout the historical military and political backgrounds.

The first chapter focuses on the role played by his education and his different occupations on shaping and affecting his thinking. Moreover, it strives to discuss how Mahan was able to diagnose the role and duty of the USA in the nineteenth century. They could be seen by him as a gap that may have spurred him to react with his thinking as a solution which may be sea power.

1.2. Alfred Thayer Mahan's Formative Years

1.2.1. Mahan's Educational Life in the Naval Academy

Mahan's educational life in the Naval Academy in this part of the paper tries to know when he graduated, and what practical knowledge he could gain there.

Mahan graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1858 (Russell 122). As an important asset for his future thinking, this practical knowledge could be called by Mahan "early experiences at sea" in the Naval Academy (Taylor 10).

1.2.2. Mahan's Educational Life in the College

Mahan's college life started earlier, and was divided successively into two levels for his age: the Columbia College and the Naval War College. The first level when he entered the Columbia College at the age of fourteen. Then, the second level of his life in college may be when Mahan joined the Naval War College in 1885 (Russell122). He was invited by Admiral Luce president of the Naval War College to become in it an instructor and to conduct research on the naval history and naval tactics (Taylor 10).

1.3. Alfred Thayer Mahan's Career

1.3.1. A naval Officer

As a naval officer he was a “highly educated, specially trained military leader who manage[s] the Navy's personnel, ships, aircraft, and weapons systems” (military.com). Mahan was considered to be of an early educational naval career in the Naval Academy as a trained naval officer. For instance, “on September 30, 1856, Alfred Thayer Mahan was launched on his naval career as acting midshipman a few days after his sixteenth birthday” (Taylor 5). Moreover, Mahan in 1883 “took command of the Wachusett at Callao, Peru. The Wachusett, one of the five vessels in the grand “Pacific Squadron,” had been assigned to oversee American interests and property in the outcome of “War of the Pacific” (1879_1884) between Chile and Peru” (Russell 123). To sum up, he was highly educated not only in the Naval Academy but also in the Naval War College without forgetting to mention his entrance to Columbia College that he could henceforth conduct extensive research on the naval history and on the navy. Additionally, he was trained as a military leader in the Naval Academy where he could rise from midshipman to lieutenant. Consequently, Mahan's just

mentioned qualities of a naval officer may match with the two ones provided by military.com.

1.3.2. A Historian

Mahan as a historian could be someone who “writes or studies about history; an expert in history” (Hornby). This part of paper discuss two main issues: First, the plan he could provide for his naval historical experience as a preliminary source of his thinking. Second, the insight Mahan got through his research on naval history in the Naval War College.

Mahan could generate a plan for his project as a historian in the Naval War College. This plan could also introduce him to the preliminary source he could stand on as a basis. His plan reveals two points as follows which are to establish sea influence over some nations, and to base his justification on naval history (Taylor 26).

Through doing that project of historical research in the Naval War College, Mahan could benefit from that research. It may be the ability to use the college’s textbooks which could aid him to embark on his naval historical research that would lead him to the writing of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. However, Taylor presumably claims that “it is certain that Captain Mahan's *Sea Power* produced by the necessities of the College, [but it was] gained earlier and [of a] more extensive recognition than the College” (Taylor 31).

1.3.3. A Lecturer

Mahan could take a job in faculty position that was offered by Commodore Luce in 1884. He only directed work in strategy and tactics, but also instructed in naval history (Russell 124). Moreover, Mahan could deliver his course in “four disjointed sessions of the War College from 1886 to 1889, [which] formed the nucleus

of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*” (Taylor 38). Furthermore, he gave lectures in that college on “an investigation of the general conditions affecting the maritime development of nations and of the influence of naval power on Europe and America since 1660” (Russell 125; qtd. in Livezey 42). Although, the lectures could not reach the satisfaction of Mahan, they could enable him to relate questions about naval power to larger political and economic issues through history (Russell 124).

1.4. Mahan's Views on the Role and Duty of the USA

During the journey of Alfred Thayer Mahan as a naval historian and related to his thinking about strategy and the role of sea power, there could be diagnosed a case of the USA in the nineteenth century by Mahan. In this paper, the case may be about a drawn set of historical contexts which encompasses mainly the political context and the military context. Each one of these mentioned contexts would include its own factors which would constitute the context in itself, and each factor of these contexts would be analyzed in the form of a given diagnosed case as a gap, a possible solution, and an expected result that may together refer to Mahan.

1.4.1. Political context

Before heading to the three found factors of the historical political context of the United States in the nineteenth century, a researcher in this field of history (or maybe his/her readers) may want to know about the situation of Alfred Thayer Mahan in politics. Though Mahan did not explicit his inclinations for particular political ideologies, his research on sea power and history made him to reconsider his position towards politics. He was an imperialist in his own words. “ I am an imperialist,” Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan once remarked, ‘simply because I am not isolationist’ ” (Russell 120; qtd. in Bradford 42). Moreover, Russell concludes that Mahan did not

treat politics in systematic way. Rather it could be seen through his provided works on history (130).

The first factor is isolation in American foreign policy. Mahan rejected that isolationist stance by supposing a possible solution to it which he endorsed imperialism and internationalism in domestic and foreign policy (Russell 134). This could be verily illustrated in Mahan's own words:

I am frankly an imperialist , in the sense that I believe that no nation, certainly no great nation, should henceforth maintain the policy of isolation which fitted our early history ; above all, should not on that outlived plea refuse to intervene in events obviously thrust upon its conscience (qtd. in Zimmerman 121).

The second factor was poor international reforms (fixing and adjusting) which intended law systems to dispute with nations (Russell 136; qtd. in Mahan 78). Mahan could predict a result of successful international reforms while disputing with nations (Russell 136). This predicted and expected result could happen only when a system of morals and policy would provide elasticity as an element of success in foreign policy (Russell 136; qtd. in Mahan, *Armaments* 78).

Thirdly, arbitration is "the official process of settling an argument or a disagreement by somebody who is not involved" (Hornby). Mahan attempts to argue that USA should not intervene in other countries' disputes (to arbitrate) to settle them because it would be of a waste of energy and of a later costing expense for neglecting the right thing to do (Russell 133; qtd. In Seager II 413-14). In other words, Mahan tries to proclaim the failure of arbitration in the American foreign policy (Russell 133; qtd. in Seager II 413-14).

I do not presume to read the actions of Providence, but I see not how it can fail to strike you that at the very moment the very sound of “Arbitration” so fills men's ears that they can listen to nothing else , their device is returned in mockery on their hands by two wars [Spanish-American and Anglo-Boer], just if ever war was just , and into which one of the parties in either case could not have refused to enter, except at the cost of dereliction to conscience (Russell 133; qtd. in Seager II 413-14).

Eventually, Mahan accepted arbitration later only in case if it went in hand with armament or preparation for war through the increase of military capabilities (army and guns). That is to say, national power for Mahan contains two different sides which are arbitration and armament (Russell 133). Otherwise, Mahan attempted to mix ‘military’ and ‘policy’ as a possible solution to the diagnosed case; he accepted armament only if it would come to be a compatible part to arbitration.

1.4.2. Military Context

First of all, Mahan could observe the military factor of the opposition to the territorial cession of Latin America; it was by mobilizing land forces there (Russell 123). As a possible solution to that gap as claimed by Mahan, it could be already existed being a “one saving grace in this otherwise hopeless ordeal” (Russell 123). That is to say, James G. Blaine the US Secretary of State of that time could not apply his ready-made order to put in real action (Russell 123). In sum, not letting go of their lands using military force would only hinder America’ s national interests of reaching these poor countries to gain their help in possible indirect or direct ways of economy and trade. And the American landed forces there would only be an easy

victim since the inside politics of these lands are ready for revolution and war against their local system of government (Russell 123).

As a second factor, War for sake of only fighting to win would be a fruitless victory (Russell 127). One can take the example of when “Mahan acknowledged that America's task in the Philippines was “troublesome ... [and] perhaps doubtful” (Russell 129; qtd. in Livezey 201). As an alternative, which may be taken as an expected result battles should be set in reason for fruitful results for the country itself rather than merely embarking on campaigns for just winning. Mahan quite expounded this idea as his own when he said that “War is not fighting but business” (Russell 127). To illustrate that result, Mahan could suggest two positive consequences: commercial expansion and sea power. Commercial expansion through an efficient and concentrated industrial complex (connected buildings or empire for industry outside the country) which produced, or would soon be capable of producing, vast surpluses. (where the money that you receive there is more than the one you take in order for you to start commerce there for the American markets and in finding and using raw materials.) This would later necessitate sea power as a second expected result after commercial expansion. (La Faber 677; qtd. in Mahan, *Sea Power* 53). Furthermore, a number of possible solutions that can be counted as maybe five were found whilst analyzing the data of this thesis. First, Mahan could design a policy inspired from the mercantilistic, what can be defined as “earlier European legacy as a role model for American statecraft” (Russell 128). This policy was bordering nations using the sea. It was about production with the object of exchanging products, shipping with continuous exchange, and establishing colonies (La Faber 677; qtd. in Mahan, *The Influence* 70-83-84). Second, the “line officers in the navy, he believed, needed moral power, which to him meant "fearlessness in responsibility and in danger," “self-

reliance,” and “promptitude in action” (Russell 127). Third, developing an opportunity “in the future [of] any fields calling for colonization” for example ensuring the necessity of “foreign establishments, either colonial or military” (Russell 128; qtd. in Livezey 57-58). In order to “provide resting places” (Russell 128) for American warships, “where they can coal and repair” (Russell 128; qtd. in La Feber 683). Fourth, to have the goal of “exploiting [rather than colonizing] lucrative commercial opportunities as they might fall within the larger orbit of Western, Christian civilization” (Russell 128). For instance, Mahan could accept war for the principle that it only seeks to get advantage of the “unexploited materials in territories [as a] politically backward” (Russell 136). Fifth, He could add that decision for war should be through public passion as the real source of impulse and temptation not autocratic rulers only (Russell 136).

As a third and last factor of the military context in this third part of paper, it was the opening of hostilities in the 1861 or the civil war was about “the preservation of the Union” (Taylor11) as an “impelling motive of those who fought for the North” (Taylor11) and not slavery which was “no doubt the primary cause of the war” (Taylor11). Moreover, “he referred to the war between the North and the South as the War of Secession and not as the Civil War” (Taylor11). As a reaction to this third military factor or as a possible solution, Civil war could lead Mahan to consider a vital demand for entering the Naval War College for the following reasons (Taylor 28). To become a staff officer, “so highly proficient in every phase and detail of the science of war” (Taylor 28), “to be qualified to furnish instantly to the Navy Department the requisite technical information” (Taylor 28), and “to carry out effectively the strategy determined by the civilian head of the department under their advice” (Taylor 28). This one factor could have an achieved result that might be expected by Mahan. It was

several years of comparative leisure offered to Mahan as a positive consequence to the cessation of hostilities in 1865 (Civil War). It was specifically the leisure to read, think, and write consecutively (successively) or gradually for his life (Taylor 21).

1.5. Conclusion

Alfred Thayer Mahan was an educated historical figure who could run a fruitful set of career including being a naval officer, a historian, and a lecturer. In addition, there was an undeniable role played by his career of especially those selected three occupations on his thinking. Therefore, it could be said that being a naval officer gained him a practical experience on sea whereas being a historian gained him a theoretical or intellectual experience on the navy (sea). What is more, being a lecturer in the Naval War College could gain him both abilities of influencing and transmitting his thoughts and ideas. All in all, the role played by his career and even his education on his thinking could be summarized in the following point which may be the ability to transmit both of his gained intellectual and practical experience on sea power.

Chapter Two

Alfred Thayer Mahan's Thinking on Sea Power

2.1. Introduction

The naval thinking of Alfred Thayer Mahan on sea power could be that one of uneasy essence to be sketched maybe due to its relation to so much historical items which were used as illustrative examples in his book. To know about this kind of thinking, this paper tries to look to the primary source in which Mahan have used to well-expound his set of ideas on sea power. Therefore, the researcher here would try to rely on Mahan's "the Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660_1783" as main guide which would aid to understand his theory on sea power.

This chapter would try to discuss in order to define Mahan's thinking of sea power. In other words, it, this chapter, would try to explain his message throughout a breakdown followed by a small amplification to his theory of sea power.

Alfred Thayer Mahan could suggest in his book six elements that determine the presence or the existence of sea power. These elements could be seen as natural conditions (Hattendorf); they may explain the theory of sea power using natural factors that would help to achieve sea power. Thus, this part of paper would discuss these six elements of sea power with amplification to each one of them all as a part of the breakdown of his theory.

2.2 Geographical Position

Mahan argued that instead of supporting sea with military strengths for territorial expansion, sea alone for having that advantage of bordering continents is enough for gaining and guaranteeing territorial and even continental expansion

(Mahan 16). Therefore, a geographical position to Mahan may mean that sea power alone guaranteed territorial expansion by using it in a wise manner.

Likewise the Mediterranean Sea could attract many nations for its military and economic advantages, the Caribbean Sea also could attract USA for that same reason (Mahan 17-18). Depending a similar study of the Mediterranean Sea as a guide to know more about the Caribbean Sea strategic points since it has little history (Mahan 17-18). If The Panama canal was completed, it would change from worst to best. That it would transform from “a broken and imperfect line of travel into one of the great highways of the world” [...] (Mahan 18). Not only that but also it would “stand aloof from national complications”(Mahan 18); that it would have a good geographical position of being the center of the national power (Mahan 18) ,and that also may include an advantage for the USA. In addition, Mahan claims that if the Mississippi is well-endorsed with military strength during its ingress and egress for water transit, it would guarantee the dominance of USA just like a mathematical certainty to the Panama Canal which would add a geographical position as a necessary and an important element of sea power (Mahan 18).

2.3 Physical Conformation

Physical conformation may be defined as the situation or the physical structure of a country including the gulf coast which can contribute to the natural conditions of the development of sea power (Mahan 18). Moreover, contribution to natural conditions of The development of sea power through seaboard or coasts of a country as frontiers through their structure that they help to encourage people of that country to interact with other regions of the world and that can only happen when they are easily accessed by its population and especially if they contain harbors because they

have a significant advantage which is not only ensuring but also helping as a mandatory element of sea trade, shipping and navy (Mahan 18).

2.4 Extent of Territory

To Mahan, the extent of territory means the development of sea power through the length of its coast and not the square miles of the country (Mahan 22); therefore, It is according to population whether dense or sparse to determine the strength of the size of that sea-coast (Mahan 22). As a familiar instance, the American war of secession (civil war) where elements of great strength of sea power under subtitle of extent of territory were numerous people, commensurate navy with its other resources, sufficiently dense sea coast, and numerous inlets (Mahan 22). More specifically, such blockade in it, civil war, could be kept only because its plan was correct under specific circumstances (Mahan 22). That even its population was sparse and unfamiliar to sea, and it confronted a large network of inland water dealings (Mahan 22).

2.5 Number of Population

Characteristics of a country's population of sea faring qualities, including the ability to work on ship and to create naval materials, and the number of the people who live in the country may form the fourth natural condition of the development of sea which is 'number of population' (Mahan 22).

For example, The USA does not have that element which may develop its strength of sea power (Mahan 25). It lacks "a great population following callings related to the sea [which] is, now as formerly, a great element of sea power" (Mahan 25). The USA may need as a resolution a seafaring population of merchant shipping and its related industries (Mahan 25). Therefore, due to its deficiency of that fourth

element, it should laid foundations of it the number of population only in a large commerce (Mahan 25).

2.6 Character of the People

A one noticed feature by Mahan for this element of sea power that should be guaranteed and found in a nation is the natural ability of the pursuit of commerce. Because the character of the people of a nation especially if it was great would shape the one of the government (Mahan 25). For instance, “It can hardly be doubted that had the bent of the people been toward trade, the action of government would have been drawn into the same current”(Mahan 25). That is to say, if the people of a country are naturally engaged in commerce regardless to other qualities that they should have as a condition for this fifth element of sea power, the government would be inclined automatically to the same orient, particularly commerce, as its chief action to be taken (Mahan 25).

An illustrative Example that could show how effective is this fifth element is through the way of seeking wealth; when the Spaniards and Portuguese as related nations sought wealth in a way that spoiled the national character and even hampered the gain of their commerce including industries and wealth together (Mahan 25). Moreover, the not yet exploited new world European countries could raise in them a raged feeling of greed for especially silver and gold (Mahan 25). Although they could gain so not with that greedy way of seeking wealth but with their qualities as what forms national character being an element for sea power to be found in order to be used. These qualities are: “bold, enterprising, temperate, patient of suffering, enthusiastic, and gifted with intense national feeling” (Mahan 25). Furthermore, Spain enjoys two facts which would enable her if she does use them wisely, to “take the

foremost place among the sea powers” (Mahan 25). These facts are: being a leading state in Europe after the discovery of America, and having occupying sizeable and fruitful parts of lands of the new world (Mahan25).

Ab initio, if sea could be filled up with pricey projects, the power of sea could be disappeared during the absences of Legislative hindrances (Mahan 28). As a previously addressed issue, Mahan could prescribe a solution for it which is to ensure these following four natural conditions. They are “instinct for commerce, bold enterprise in the pursuit of gain, keen scent for fine trails that lead to it, and possibility for creating colonized exotic areas”[...] (Mahan 28). Besides, Mahan could add that These just provided characteristics of National character being an element of sea power would offer when found and assimilated by the country for the American citizens a natural gift which is the ability of "self-government and independent growth”(28).

2.7 Character of the Government

This last one element of sea power as claimed by Mahan may mean to restrict focus of the government and its institutions to noticeable causes and their simple results with neglecting the habit of going beyond the possibly final influences during the development of a nation's power of sea (Mahan 28).

In illustration, since the relation of a government and its people could be reciprocal in the domain of sea power, Mahan have assimilated the way a government control its nation with the way a man controls his life in which whether success or failure would later prevail among the nation's history or the man's life (Mahan 29). Mahan suggested a way for the success of achieving or applying this element which is practicing an intelligent, wise, and energetic power of the will (29). This element

‘character of the Government’ is crucial one for deciding the success or failure of a nation regarding its sea power, and it must be adopted by the nation including the government and its people (Mahan 29).

2.8 Conclusion

In this paper, the thinking of Alfred Thayer Mahan on sea power was discussed in terms of its six definite elements.

Mahan’s thinking in this paper could be summarized in the following sentence. Sea power is based on six natural elements that could be noticed then to relate to each other compatibly, and which they together at once may help to build what Mahan called ‘sea power’.

Chapter Three
The Impact of the Mahanian Thinking of Sea Power
during the Twentieth Century

3.1. Introduction

Previous chapters one and two have dealt with Mahan's world and his thinking while this third chapter would focus on the influence of his thinking during the twentieth century.

This chapter holds two parts; the impact of the mahanian thinking over the American naval policy in the twentieth century, and the impact of the mahanian thinking over the American foreign policy in the twentieth century as a modern and a contemporary one.

3.2. The Impact over a Contemporary American Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century

One specific reason which could assert the impact of the mahanian thinking of sea power over the American Foreign Policy during the twentieth century maybe Mahan's close relation to the President Theodore Roosevelt who could run the office as the president from 1901 to 1909 as a first earlier part of the twentieth century, and which this relation was described as "good" (Kemble 344). Therefore, this paper may take it his relation with and influence over Roosevelt as a sufficient proof which may help to confirm his influence over AFP during the twentieth century. To sum up, their relation was fluctuating from good to bad that they could not stand longer as friends. For instance, "During the decade 1888-98, Mahan and Roosevelt were as close as they would ever be. During the next decade they as often disagreed as agreed, and from

1907 to Mahan's death in 1914 there was no real warmth in their friendship” (Coletta 1413- 1414) .

For this part of paper, it could be denoted a theoretical side and a practical one as an actual example of the influence of Mahan’s ideas of sea power over the American Foreign Policy in the twentieth century. Theoretically, two main items were found. First, it was that “naval supremacy was the prerequisite to ascendancy in the world political order” (Sumida 39). It means that sea power became an indispensable element for influence in foreign policy matters including the United States of America’s. Second, the sea power was involved and seen in foreign policy during the twentieth century “as a trans-national consortium rather than the single nation state”(Sumida 40). That is to say, sea power as a concept may not hold a single state but only many states at once. Practically, there could be a realistic view of Mahan’s influence over the American Foreign Policy during the twentieth century, and which may be proved through the following extracted brief passage.

The doctrines of sea power also seeped into America's relations with her continental neighbors. Once again, Roosevelt obeyed Mahan's advice, which asserted a “need of adequate fortifications . . . at some point on the Gulf coast”¹⁵ (qtd. in Roosevelt 564). In his administration, Roosevelt constructed this fortification in South America_ the Panama Canal ... Roosevelt also used America's renewed naval power to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. When European powers demanded the settlement of Latin American debts, challenging American supremacy in the Caribbean, Roosevelt readied the fleet to defend those nations ¹⁷ (qtd. in Trani 322). This practice of American intervention to deter foreign intervention

became known as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, a policy enforced by “gunboat diplomacy” (Liu 5-6).

All in all, what could prove Mahan’s effective influence upon American foreign and even domestic policy is not only Theodore Roosevelt maximum agreement to Mahan’s naval ideas on sea power but also their close league both of them (Pratt 423).

3.3. The Impact over the American Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century

The US navy is featured by its size and sophistication which once was the reason to exert American power throughout imperialism which gained it a considerable sum of lands when in peace and war periods (Sea Power: The U.S. Navy and Foreign Policy).

There could be determined five different points of the impact of Mahan’s thinking of sea power over the American naval policy in the twentieth century.

First, Mahan’s doctrines could affect American expansionist policy especially depending a naval force. It was through an influential mahanian article ‘Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power’ (1893) on some military naval decisions, and which urged first to build Pearl Harbor and second to annex Hawaii as a strategic and valuable archipelago for USA (Liu 5; qtd. in Luce 112). Therefore, it this influential mahanian article over some military naval decisions could be of a long lasting effect that Hawaii is joined to USA finally in 1959 as a last fiftieth state annexed to the United States of America.

Second, Mahan with the help of Theodore Roosevelt who run US office as the twenty-sixth president from 1901 to 1909 as a part of the period of the twentieth century could switch the American naval strategy from its old essential orient of commerce destruction to the substituted one as battleship navy (Connery 185).

Third, Hector Bywater have used the mahanian concept of sea power in his novel 'The Great Pacific War' as a presumed basis for the Japanese to draw attacks at Pearl Harbor to prove a possibility of Mahan's strategic military naval impact over Japan as if Mahan have paved the way for Japan to do so being the primary responsible. Later on, Mahan's doctrine especially of commanding the sea based on the just mentioned Japanese historical event of the attack could prove that navy has much effective strength than the army's. USA's turn to apply sea power in the Second World War met the destroyed navy at pearl harbor due to the previous attack which hindered its way to exert that just mentioned mahanian doctrine (Liu 7-8). (USA started to be convinced to take steps forward into applying the sea power using the Japanese attack as an actual example of its success.)

Fourth, Mahan was responsible for US Navy during the twentieth century through two postures as attitudes for USA namely the "posture of constant military preparedness and the posture of imminent global war, which has characterized so much of our century [the twentieth century including the First World War and the Second World War]" (Connery 183).

Fifth, Theodore Roosevelt contributed in enacting mahanian naval doctrine as a change for US naval policy during the first decade of the twentieth century. It was through building a 'Great White Fleet'. Another of Mahan's doctrines was demonstrated as a concluded rule which went first under test by the voyage of this fleet, and which is that "sea power was more than mere battle-fleet strength; it could be augmented by the perception of naval strength"(Liu 4-5).

In conclusion, to Mahan "Naval strategy is as necessary in peace as in war" (Gompert 181; qtd. in Mahan 89; qtd. in Hattendorf 1991). That is to say, sea power as a Mahanian concept can be valuable in foreign policy just as in military policy.

Besides, this could mean that Mahanian thinking being merely of a naval matter may not have influenced only the American military policy but also the American foreign policy. One reason which may prove that is the American Navy's similarity to the British (*Sea Power: The U.S. Navy and Foreign Policy*). In other words, it was the former's navy possession of "command of the sea that affords the United States unrivaled international influence" (*Sea Power: The U.S. Navy and Foreign Policy*).

3.4. Conclusion

The twentieth century witnessed a remarkable influence of Mahanian ideas. This chapter could infer two reasons for Mahan's successful influence over both the American military policy and the American foreign policy during this mentioned period. First, his imperialistic ideas including sea power are what might be called the source of influence. Second, Theodore Roosevelt being one of the twentieth century American presidents has helped due to his full acceptance to Mahanian naval imperialistic ideas of sea power to put them, these ideas, in real influence matter as not only being exercised but also being deemed as a one part of the American foreign policy during particularly the twentieth century.

General Conclusion

Alfred Thayer Mahan was not born a navy expert, but maybe a man of thought who became a strategist and an expert in the military and political use of naval power. It turns out in this paper that he was influenced as shaped by his education, his career, and history especially of the nineteenth century. For instance, the role played by his career and even his education on his thinking could be summarized in his skilful ability to transmit both of his gained intellectual knowledge and his and practical experience on sea power. In addition, it could be said that Mahan was influenced by history at first before he could influence history. That is to say Mahan could diagnose some gaps which belong to the American military and political history of the nineteenth century.

In this thesis, Mahan's naval thinking of sea power was about those six natural elements which are noticed to be related compatibly to each other. Moreover, they, the six natural elements, may show whether a nation is on the right way to build a sea power or not.

Mahan's thinking being could impact both the American foreign and military policies during the twentieth century. For mahanian impact over the American military policy, there could be determined in this thesis some points which could be summarized as follow. First, Hawaii is annexed to USA. Second, the US naval strategy in the twentieth century was changed from commerce destruction to battleship navy. Third, building the Great White Fleet. Fourth, generating two attitudes for USA in the twentieth century namely the "posture of constant military preparedness and the posture of imminent global war" (Connery 183).

On the other hand, Mahan was not a geopolitician at the first place. However, his thinking made him to reconsider his part in politics and why not to influence it.

Therefore, there could be determined an actual Mahanian influence over the American policy in the twentieth century. For instance, it was through the acceptance of President Roosevelt for Mahan's suggestion to build Panama Canal. Eventually this construction was used later as a way for American foreign intervention in Latin America's affairs (Liu 5-6).

Works Cited

- Bradford, J. C. (ed.), *Admirals of the New Steel Navy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1990.
- Coletta, Paolo E., Review of *The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan* by Richard W. Turk, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 93, no. 5, December 1988, pp. 1413-1414. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/93.5.1413>.
- Connery, Christopher L., *Ideologies of Land and Sea: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Carl Schmitt, and the Shaping of Global Myth Elements*. Duke University Press, 2001. pp. 183, 185. PDF file.
- Gompert, David C. *Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific*. RAND Corporation, 2013. p. 181. PDF file.
- Grove, Eric. "Sea Power." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*, Mar 2010. *International Studies Association and Oxford University Press*, doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.294. Accessed on 14 Oct. 2019.
- Hattendorf, John B., ed., *Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan*, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991.
- Hill, Mathew. "The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Summary & Quotes." *The Impact of Mahan's Work*. Study.com. Web. < <https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-influence-of-sea-power-upon-history-summary-quotes.html>> . Accessed on 14 Oct. 2019.
- Hornby, A.S. "arbitration". *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Eighth Edition. University of Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Hornby, A.S. “historian”. *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Eighth Edition. University of Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Kemble, John Haskell, Review of *Admirals of American Empire: The Combined Story of George Dewey, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Winfield Scott Schley, and William Thomas Sampson*, by Richard S. West. *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol.17, no.3, August 1948. p. 344. *JSTOR*. doi: www.jstor.org/stable/3634268.

LaFeber, W. ‘A Note on the Mercantilistic Imperialism of Alfred Thayer Mahan,’ *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 48 (March 1962) p.683.

Lafeber, Walter. “A Note on the ‘Mercantilistic Imperialism’ of Alfred Thayer Mahan.” *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 48, no. 4 (Mar., 1962), pp. 674-683. *Organization of American Historians*. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/1893148. Web. 07 Oct. 2014, 8: 44. PDF file.

Liu, Elson. “Alfred Thayer Mahan_Father of Sea Power.” pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. PDF file.

Livezey, G. *Mahan on Sea Power*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press 1981.

Luce, Stephen. “Naval Strategy,” United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* XXXV (1909). p. 112.

Mahan, A. T. *Armaments and Arbitration*. New York: Harper & Brothers 1912.

Mahan, A. T. *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1905.

Mahan, A. T., *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. New York: Sagamore Press, 1890.

Mahan, Alfred T., *Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan*, edited by John B. Hattendorf. Annapolis, Maryland: the United States Naval Institute Press, 2015. EPUB file.

“Navy Officer Explained.” *Military.com*. Web. <<https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/meaning-officer-in-the-navy.html>>. Accessed on 20 Feb. 2020.

Pratt, Julius W., Review of *Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S.N.*, by Captain W.D. Puleston, U.S.N, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 45, no. 2, January 1940, p. 423. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/45.2.422>.

Roosevelt, Theodore. “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” *Atlantic Monthly* Oct. 1890. p. 564.

Russell, Greg. “Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist.” *Geopolitics*, 11:1, pp. 120-122-123- 124- 125- 127- 128- 129-130- 133- 134-136. doi: 10.1080/14650040500524137. PDF file.

Seager R., *Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Man and His Letters*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1977.

“Sea Power: The U.S. Navy and Foreign Policy.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. Web. <<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sea-power-us-navy-and-foreign-policy>>.

Sumida, Jon. “Alfred Thayer Mahan, geopolitician.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 22:2-3. pp. 39, 40. doi: 10.1080/01402399908437753. PDF file.

Taylor, Charles Carlisle. *The Life of Admiral Mahan, Naval Philosopher*. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920, pp. 5, 10, 11, 21, 26, 28, 31, 38. PDF file.

Trani, Eugene “Theodore Roosevelt and the Diplomacy of Activism,” *Makers of American Diplomacy*, ed. Frank Merli and Theodore Wilson. New York: Scribner's, 1974.

Zimmerman W., *First Great Triumph, How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002. p. 121.